European Economy. Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the European Community. No 40, May 1989 by unknown

European Economy appears four times a year, in March, May, July and 
November. It contains important reports and communications from the 
Commission to the Council and to the Parliament on the economic 
situation and developments, as well as on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community. In addition, European Economy presents 
reports and studies on problems concerning economic policy. 
Two supplements accompany the main periodical: 
Series A-'Economic trends' appears monthly except in August and 
describes with the aid of tables and graphs the most recent trends of 
industrial production, consumer prices, unemployment, the balance 
of trade, exchange rates, and other indicators. This supplement 
also presents the Commission staff's macroeconomic forecasts and 
Commission communications to the Council on economic policy. 
Series B-'Business and consumer survey results' gives the main 
results of opinion surveys of industrial chief executives (orders, 
stocks, production outlook, etc.) and of consumers (economic and 
financial situation and outlook, etc.) in the Community, and other 
business cycle indicators. It also appears monthly, with the exception 
of August. 
Subscription terms are shown on the back and the addresses of the sales 
offices are shown on page 3 of the cover. 
Unless otherwise indicated the texts are published under the responsibility 
of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the 
Commission of the European Communities, rue de la Loi 200, 1049 
Brussels, to which enquiries other than those related to sales and subscrip-
tions should be addressed. 
May 1989 
Commission of the European Communities 
EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY 
Directorate-General for External Relations 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Number 40 
Reproduction is subject to acknowledgement of the source. 
Printed i11 Belgium, /989 
Catalogue number: CB-AR-89-040-EN-C 
Horizontal mergers and competition policy 
in the European Community 
Alexis Jacquemin, Pierre Buigues and Fabienne Ilzkovitzl 
I Respectively Professor at Louvain Catholic University and Economic Adviser in the Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG II); Principal Administrator in DG II and lecturer at the University of Aix-Marseille; Administrator in DG II and lecturer at Brussels Free 
University. -
The authors wish to thank M. Emerson, P. Goybet, D. Bal, F. Preud'homme, C. Mathieu and C. Mulligan of DG II, D. Schwarz, R. Daotit, P. Wathelet 
and J.P. De Laet of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV) and Mr F. Rawlinson of DG IX for their help in preparing this study. 
4 
Abbreviations and symbols used 
Countries 
B 
DK ,,. 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
pJ 
UK 
EUR9 
EUR 10 
EUR 12 
Currencies 
ECU 
BFR 
DKR 
DM 
DR 
ESC 
FF 
HFL 
IRL 
LFR 
LIT 
PTA 
UKL 
USD 
SFR 
YEN 
CAD 
Os 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
European Community excluding Greece, Spain and Portugal 
European Community excluding Spain and Portugal 
European Community, 12 Member States 
European currency unit 
Belgian franc 
Danish krone 
Deutschmark 
Greek drachma 
Portuguese escudo 
French franc 
Dutch guilder 
Irish pound (punt) 
Luxembourg franc 
Italian lira 
Spanish peseta 
Pound sterling 
US dollar 
Swiss franc 
Japanese yen 
Canadian dollar 
Austrian schilling 
Other abbreviations 
ACP 
ECSC 
EDF 
EID 
EMCF 
EMS 
ERDF 
Euratom 
Eurostat 
GDP(PNP) 
GFCF 
LDCs 
Mio 
Mrd 
NCI 
OCTs 
OECD 
OPEC 
PPS 
SMEs 
SOEC 
toe 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries having signed the Lome Convention 
European Coal and Steel Community 
European Development Fund 
European Investment Bank 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
European Monetary System 
European Regional Development Fund 
European Atomic Energy Community 
Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Gross domestic (national) product 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Less-developed countries 
Million 
1 OOO million 
New Community Instrument 
Overseas countries and territories 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Purchasing power standard 
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Tonne of oil equivalent 
Not available 
Contents 
Foreword 
Introduction 
Part A - Forms and effects of horizontal mergers 
Chapter 1 - Forms of merger and other more or less permanent link-ups 
Chapter 2 - Costs and benefits of mergers 
2.1. Economies of scale versus monopoly power 
2.2. Reduction in transaction costs versus internal inefficiency 
2.3. An efficient 'market for corporate control' versus the perverse effects 
of takeovers 
2.4. Empirical research into the effects of mergers 
Part B - Features of industries and of EC merger activity 
from the point of view of competition policy 
Chapter 3 - Typology of industries for merger control purposes 
3.1. Method 
(a) Indicators 
(b) Classification matrices 
3.2. Classification of industries 
(a) Industries in which mergers offer little or no prospect of efficiency 
gains 
(b) Industries in which merger activity is prima facie beneficial 
(c) Industries in which mergers are likely simultaneously to produce 
efficiency gains and to present the danger of a reduction of 
competition 
Chapter 4 - Main features of mergers in the EC 
4.1. Increase in total numbers 
4.2. Geographical type 
4.3. Main motives for mergers and acquisitions 
4.4. Prominence of large groups 
4.5. Marked differences between Member States 
4.6. Mergers in services 
Chapter 5 - Assessment of merger trends with reference to sectoral criteria 
5.1. Concentration in manufacturing: international comparisons 
5.2. Merger activity and economic conditions in industry 
9 
11 
13 
14 
17 
17 
20 
20 
21 
23 
24 
24 
24 
26 
26 
28 
29 
30 
33 
33 
34 
34 
35 
35 
36 
40 
40 
41 
5 
6 
Part C - Analysis for the purposes of European merger 
control 
Chapter 6 - Criteria for a reduction in European competition 
6.1. Criteria suggested by economic analysis 
6.2. Analysis of the European merger control proposal 
(a) Article 2: mergers which 'create or strengthen a dominant pos-
ition' 
(b) Article I (2): the turnover criterion 
Chapter 7 - The efficiency defence 
Chapter 8 - Procedure for scrutinizing mergers 
Conclusions 
Annexes 
I. (a) Definitions of indicators 
2. 
3. 
(b) Identification of industries in which there is a danger of monopoliza-
tion 
(c) Identification of industries in which mergers could lead to efficiency 
gains 
(d) Merger activity and economic conditions in industry 
Document (COM(88) 734 final)- revised version - of 19.12.1988: 
Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings 
Document (COM(88) 823 - SYN 186) - of 16.2.1989: Proposal 
for a 13th Council Directive on company law concerning takeover 
and other general bids 
Bibliography 
45 
46 
46 
49 
49 
50 
52 
54 
57 
59 
61 
62 
64 
65 
67 
77 
93 
List of tables 
Table 2.1 Market share of the 10 largest firms 21 
Table 3.1 Illustration of classification of industries for merger control 
purposes 32 
Table 4.1 Mergers and acquisitions of majority holdings 1982-87, by 
nationality of parties (from same EC country, different EC 
countries, or an EC and a non-EC country) 34 
Table 4.2 Main motives for mergers and acquisitions in 1985-86 and 
1986-87 35 
Table 4.3 Breakdown of mergers by size (combined sales) of firms in-
volved 35 
Table 4.4 National, EC cross-frontier and international (EC + non-EC) 
mergers (including acquisitions of majority holdings) in the 
Community 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 in services 37 
Table 4.5 Recent bank mergers and acquisitions 38 
Table 5.1 Shares of manufacturing industry accounted for by large firms 
in the EC, USA and Japan - I 986 40 
Table 5.2 Share of largest firms in output of selected EC industries 41 
Table 5.3 World and European leaders 43 
Table 5.4 Mergers by geographical type and economic conditions in 
industry. Total period I 982-87 43 
Table 6.1 Sectors in which 1985 EUR I 2 output was under ECU 3 billion 51 
Table 6.2 Sectors in which 1985 EUR 12 output was over or around 
ECU I O billion 51 
7 
8 
List of figures 
Figure 2.1 Mergers and the welfare trade-off 
Figure 2.2 Success and failure of 45 British and 52 US acquisitions 
Figure 3.1 Matrix I - Identification of industries in which there is a 
danger of reduction of competition 
Figure 3.2 Matrix 2 - Identification of industries in which mergers may 
lead to efficiency gains 
Figure 3.3 Classification of industries into four groups 
Figure 4.1 Numbers of mergers and acquisitions of majority stakes 
involving the I OOO largest European firms 
Figure 4.2 Mergers by nationality of acquirer 
Figure 5.1 Index of merger and acquisition activity ( 1982-83 = 100) 
Figure 8.1 Stages in the merger vetting process 
Figure 8.2 Order of proceeding in the scrutiny of horizontal mergers 
List of tables in annex 
Annex l(b) Identification of industries in which there is a danger of 
monopolization 
Annex l(c) Identification of industries in which mergers could lead to 
efficiency gains 
Annex I (d) Merger activity and economic conditions in industry 
18 
22 
26 
27 
27 
33 
37 
42 
55 
56 
62 
64 
65 
Foreword 
The realization of the principal potential gains resulting 
from the achievement of the internal market depends on the 
growing role played by competitive forces. It is in effect as 
a result of the pressure of competition that firms are forced 
to exploit new opportunities, that gains in productivity and 
cost reductions are translated in lower prices, that quality is 
improved and the range of goods broadened and, finally, 
European competitiveness is enhanced. 
However, it is not evident that within the new post-1992 
context economic agents will accept the free play of competi-
tive forces. As experience subsequent to the lowering of tariff 
barriers has shown, the European authorities risk being 
confronted, after a brief interval, by a multiple of private 
and public strategies to distort competitive conditions or to 
transfer to the Community level certain trade barriers. 
Among the main risks are: that of an increase in the instances 
of mergers and of takeovers which are not inspired by a 
desire to improve efficiency; the setting-up of multinational 
oligopolies including those controlled by third countries and 
likely to abuse a dominant position; the risk of renewed 
collusive behaviour related to the sharing out of geographic 
or sectoral markets; a growth in the number of State inter-
ventions whose objective is to protect 'national champions' 
be they privately or publicly-owned firms. 
This leads to the basic question already raised in the study 
conducted by T. Padoa-Schioppa: 1 should European compe-
tition policy be strengthened or loosened in the context of 
achieving the internal market? 
If the reply is nowadays in the direction of a reinforcement 
it is nevertheless clear that this basic theme constitutes a 
large field for thought which warrants a considerable amount 
of research. It was in this context that in November 1988 an 
1 T. Padoa-Schioppa et al .. Efficiency, stability and equity, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1987. 
international seminar was organized within the Commission 
under the joint sponsorship of the Directorate-General for 
Competition and the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs on the theme 'Corporate mergers'. On this 
occasion a preliminary version of this study was presented 
and discussed. 
The success of this event showed the usefulness of collabor-
ation between the Commission services and international 
experts. The day's discussions also opened up many new 
perspectives on the economic analysis of competition. 
This subject concentrated on one of these aspects, i.e. on 
horizontal concentrations. On the one hand the restructuring 
required for achievement of the internal market should lead 
in certain areas to beneficial concentrations. On the other 
hand, these operations may also provoke restrictions on 
competition and the creation of dominant positions. 
It is therefore important to situate these mergers among the 
many possible modes of concentration and to highlight the 
principal costs and benefits which may be anticipated. It 
would also prove of use to identify, on the basis of the 
characteristics of European industry, those 5ectors where the 
beneficial effects are a priori capable of outweighing the 
negative effects. Finally, it is necessary to investigate the 
conditions under which a European merger policy might be 
efficacious. 
This is the objective of this first study which provides both 
an excellent synthesis of recent economic analyses in this 
area as well as an original contribution to their application 
in the Community context. 
Antonio Maria Costa 
Director-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs 
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Introduction 
With 1992 just over the horizon, Europe is experiencing a 
proliferation of mergers and takeovers, especially among its 
largest firms. These strategies, as distinct from purely finan-
cial operations, are altering the structure of markets for 
goods and services and engendering new types of corporate 
behaviour. Such transformations may lead to greater ef-
ficiency, but they may also create or strengthen dominant 
positions leading to a reduction of competition. 
The object of this study is to analyse these phenomena and, 
in the light of the analysis, to evaluate the proposed EC 
policy for controlling cross-frontier mergers. 
Part A distinguishes mergers from alternative types of al-
liance between firms and discusses the main theoretical argu-
ments concerning the costs and benefits of mergers from an 
international perspective. 
In Part B these arguments are applied to mergers in the 
context of the future single European market. The study 
attempts to analyse the effects of mergers according to the 
features of the industry concerned. It also looks at recent 
trends of merger activity in Europe. 
With specific reference to the proposals for Community 
regulation of mergers, Part C discusses the criteria the EC 
competition authorities should apply in evaluating the im-
pact of mergers and suggests an order of proceeding in 
applying the criteria. 
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Part A - Forms and effects of horizontal mergers 
Three basic types of merger can be distinguished according 
to the relationship between the businesses being merged. 
Horizontal mergers bring together businesses at the same 
level in the production chain making substitute products; 
vertical mergers - or vertical integration - incorporate 
within an organization businesses which are vertically related 
in the production chain, i.e. one of which produces inputs 
for the other; finally, conglomerate mergers bring together 
businesses making products which, from the point of view of 
demand, are neither substitutes nor inputs for one another. 
This study will confine itself to mergers of the horizontal 
type. These can take a variety of forms ranging from incor-
poration into a loose group structure to full legal mergers 
in which one or both of the merging companies ceases to 
exist as a separate legal entity. The impact of mergers can 
also vary, some leading to increased economic efficien,cy, 
others causing distortions in resource allocation. 
Part A prepares the ground with a brief discussion of these 
two subjects: the forms and the costs and benefits of mergers. 
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Chapter 1 - Forms of merger and other more or 
less permanent link-ups 
Firms wishing to expand face a fundamental choice between 
external growth by merger or acquisition and internal (or 
organic) growth. External growth has advantages from the 
firm's point of view: 
(i) The firm obtains assets that are already working and 
so yield a quick return, as opposed to the long time-lag 
before the payoff from fixed investment. 
(ii) Acquisition of a competitor automatically increases the 
acquirer's market share and enlarges its markets, 
without creating additional capacity for which there 
might be no demand. 
With the 1992 programme speeding up progress towards 
integrated markets in Europe, the merger and acquisition 
route also allows firms to enter new geographical and pro-
duct markets more quickly in order to exploit first mover 
advantage. 
But growth by acquisition also suffers from various pro-
blems: 
(i) Human problems and particularly the deterioration in 
the working atmosphere that may be caused by a merger 
are often acute: clashes of management styles, redun-
dancies, compensation for loss of management position 
and reorganization may create uncertainty within the 
firm that is harmful to efficiency. 
(ii) The integration of the new business units into the firm's 
central accounting system and the determination of 
joint objectives and strategies may be a laborious pro-
cess. 
(iii) The administrative, legal and tax difficulties in Europe 
are still formidable and sometimes lead to considerable 
internal inefficiencies. 
A matter of wider public interest is the fact that external 
expansion can absorb resources, in terms of capital invest-
ment, R&D and management time, which internally could 
have been used to create new assets. 
External growth can take many forms. At the most general 
level one can distinguish between full legal mergers and 
mergers involving only changes in the ownership of the 
companies concerned. 
A legal merger (in French 'fusion') transfers the assets and 
liabilities of two or more companies to a single new or 
existing company. The companies whose assets are merged 
14 
may all disappear into a new company or one of the compa-
nies involved may absorb the other(s). 1 
Legal mergers obviously involve major reorganization, from 
changes in the membership of the board right down to the 
product range. The reorganization serves the same aims as 
any merger: expansion or consolidation of market share, 
rationalization on a secularly declining or cyclically depres-
sed market, realization of economies of scale or increase of 
monopoly power. 
An important point to note is that compared with alternative 
forms of external growth, legal mergers generally lead to 
thorough integration of the constituent parts and to a new 
situation which is irreversible or reversible only at high cost. 
In Europe, there are institutional obstacles to cross-frontier 
mergers of this type. 
The main problem is the absence of a framework of Euro-
pean legal rules and practices. At present, all intra-European 
acquisitions or mergers must be carried out under national 
company law. 
Two consequences flow from this. 
First, the organization and administrative costs of multina-
tional firms in Europe are often very high because of the 
duplication made necessary by the requirements of multiple 
establishments and adaptation to specific local rules. Com-
parisons with similar activities in the USA bear out the high 
costs due to this situation. Furthermore, the legal arrange-
ments that have to be constructed are often complex and 
opaque. 
The second consequence is that mergers appear not as Euro-
pean operations but as acquisitions of one national company 
by another of a different nationality, which tends to offend 
national susceptibilities and to provoke nationalist reactions. 
This is all the more true as, in the absence of Community 
provisions, the takeover bid ( often hostile) is one of the main 
means of reorganization involving companies of different 
nationalities. 
1 In both cases at least one of the companies ceases to exist and the assets 
and liabilities of the defunct company are transferred to another company 
which becomes its sole successor. But in the first situation the shares of 
the old companies are generally exchanged for those of the new. whereas 
in the second the transfer of assets and liabilities to the absorbing 
company takes place through the issue of its shares to the absorbed 
company. 
Chapter I - Forms of merger and other more or less permanent link-ups 
As full legal mergers on a European scale are not possible, 
the form taken by transnational mergers in the Community 
is that of the merger involving only changes in ownership. 
The most common type is the takeover of one company by 
another by acquiring a sufficient number of its shares, but 
with both companies continuing to exist as separate legal 
entities. Takeovers may be carried out by purchases of stakes 
from other companies, buying up shares on the stock market, 
or public takeover bid. The result is a group of companies 
subject to central control through various kinds of links, 
ranging from financial interests to the presence of the same 
individuals as directors or managers. It is more an economic 
than a legal entity, in which a high degree of decentralization 
between the group companies exi.:;ts side by side with com-
mon ultimate control. Usually the internal structure of the 
group is complex and there are chains of command along 
which instructions are passed to particular groups of busines-
ses. Sometimes, the intermediate links in this chain are 
subsidiaries which have become large enough to have set up 
subsidiaries in their own right or they are financial holding 
companies occupying strategic positions in a web of financial 
relations. 
It is possible to identify various reasons why groups do not 
appear to be merely transitional forms on the way to more 
tightly run organizations, but stable structures which, 
though subject to frequent reorganization, show little ten-
dency towards complete integration. 
They boil down to two factors: flexibility and decentralized 
management. 
With regard to flexibility, organization as a group makes 
market entry and exit easier. Geographical diversification 
requires adjustment to the economic, social, political and 
institutional conditions of the various countries in which the 
firm operates. This adjustment is facilitated by a network of 
legally independent subsidiaries. 
Similarly, entry into a new product market is less risky by 
acquisition of a company in that business (or merely a stake 
in one) than by organic growth or legal merger. 
The group· structure also makes such moves more easily 
reversible: if a subsidiary is doing badly, getting out of that 
business is a more feasible option than if it was legally 
integrated. In the event of a change in the strategy of the 
group, it is also easier and quicker to sell a financial stake 
than to dispose of fixed assets. 
From the management point of view the form of a group, 
in which each company is a legally independent entity and 
the assets and liabilities of the parent and the subsidiaries 
are separate, both reduces risk and allows extensive control 
to be exercised at low cost. Also, subsidiaries may be more 
easily manageable units in which managers have a keener 
sense of their responsibilities than in the case of companies 
with a divisionalized or branch structure. Finally, in a group 
company staff relations tend to be on a more personal level 
and the management of human resources is easier. 
What we find, then, is a combination of the advantages of 
concentration of physical and intangible assets and of a 
decentralization of management and responsibility which 
permits flexibility. 
Nevertheless, for these advantages to be realized the group 
must have a strategic overall view of its operations, reflected 
in group policies for employees, products, geographical cove-
rage, finance, research, etc., which exploit synergies and 
serve a general objective defined at headquarters level. 
As in the case of legal mergers, the approach of 1992 makes 
EC regulation of takeovers and the provision of European 
legal forms for companies an urgent priority. Otherwise, we 
could well see a proliferation of reorganizations and link-
ups, of varying degrees of reversibility, which are neither 
based on a common strategy, nor offer the necessary security 
and transparency for employees, minority shareholders and 
creditors. 1 
Finally, among the forms of link-up between companies that 
do not involve a legal merger are contractual arrangements 
under which a number of separate firms work together on 
a project, normally as legal equals and in a manner requiring 
complete unanimity between them. Compared with the pre-
vious forms, such arrangements are highly flexible and rever-
sible. They are also relatively unstable. 2 The limiting case is 
the joint venture controlled by two or more companies. This 
form of cooperation involves the setting up of a more or 
less permanent organization which may become a new legal 
entity. It tends to go beyond the largely informal relationship 
existing under a cooperation agreement and to lead to rela-
tionships that are stable and organized. The first European 
legal framework catering for such transnational cooperation 
arrangements, which will be available from I July 1989, is 
the European economic interest grouping. 
1 The new European directive which from 1990 will require those acquiring 
large blocks of shares on the stock exchange to inform the company 
concerned is a step in the right direction. The draft statute for a European 
company also contains a section on groups, which recognizes the right 
of the group to require the member companies to pursue its interests 
but, at the same time, gives protection to minority interests which could 
thereby be threatened. The European company project is also a useful 
contribution to the development of a legal framework for mergers in the 
EC. 
2 For a general analysis, sec Jacquemin and Remiche (ed.) ( 1988). 
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For the purpose of competition policy, joint ventures may 
be viewed as restrictive practices or mergers. According to 
the 1977 De Laval-Stork decision 1 a joint venture is a partial 
merger rather than a restrictive practice where the partners 
put their existing production facilities or marketing organi-
zations into the joint venture and having done so effectively 
and irreversibly cease to be actual or potential competitors 
and lose the capability to return separately to the market. 2 
Joint ventures of this type should be subject to the merger 
control rules. 
It should be pointed out, however, that most mergers and 
restrictive practices involve complementarity rather than 
substitution. 
The conclusion of this rapid survey of forms of merger and 
other more or less permanent link-ups between firms is that 
increases both in efficiency from large-scale operation and 
in market power can be pursued in many ways through 
internal or external growth, and among the forms of external 
growth are full legal mergers, mergers by takeover, joint 
ventures and others. Hence, there is no clear correlation 
I OJ L 215, 23.8.1977, p. 11. 
2 A thorough study of this question was made by Caspari (1986). See also 
Overbury (1986). 
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between the desire to exploit economies of scale or to increase 
market share and the choice of a specific type of link-up, 
such as a full merger. 
The selection of a particular form of link can be inspired by 
a desire to reduce transaction costs (efficiency) and to gain 
better control over a market (monopoly power).3 Among 
the criteria for this choice, we have seen that the speed 
of the operation and the desired degree of flexibility and 
reversibility are important. 
Evaluating the role of these factors in a given case requires 
a difficult balancing act. For example, a full legal merger 
may represent a long-term commitment and quest for 
control: such an operation, involving largely irrecoverable 
(sunk) costs, gives notice to actual or potential competitors 
that the company intends to enter a (geographical or pro-
duct) market on a permanent basis, and perhaps to dominate 
it. The decision also ties down the merged company, in that 
the cost of exit from the market will be high: the disinvest-
ment and dismemberment involved would result in much 
larger losses than in the case of a joint venture or a simple 
cooperation agreement. In applying the future European 
merger control regulation, it will be important to bear in 
mind that alternative forms of link-up exist to achieve the 
objectives of such operations. 
3 See Boyer and Jacquemin ( 1985). 
Chapter 2 - Costs and benefits of mergers 
Three main types of benefits are attributed to mergers: 
economies of scale, the internalization of activities that in-
volve high transaction costs when firms rely on the market 
for them, and the threat of takeover as a sanction on ineffi-
cient management (the 'market for corporate control'). But 
against each of these potential benefits can be set possible 
inefficiencies resulting from mergers, inefficiencies both wi-
thin and outside the firm. Benefits and costs will be discussed 
together. 
2.1. Economies of scale versus monopoly power 
Compared with the other two types of effects, the cost 
savings obtainable from increases in the scale of production 
(economies of scale) and the possible reverse implications in 
terms of creating or increasing monopoly power have been 
studied in considerable depth. The role of economies of scale 
in production is well-known. These cost savings can accrue 
from a better division of labour within the production unit, 
the spreading of fixed costs, and longer production runs. 
Mergers which lead to reorganization may help firms to 
realize these economies and to attain the optimum efficient 
scale. The size of the economies achieved will depend on the 
slope of the average cost curve for outputs below the opti-
mum scale. There can also be scale economies in functions 
such as transport, distribution and research. 
Besides these static scale economies there is the phenomenon 
of learning effects associated with the increasing experience 
of production of a product or service. These mean that the 
cost of producing each extra unit decreases as the cumulative 
previous output increases. 
Finally, -we must mention the role of 'scope economies', 
whereby the sum of the costs of producing two products 
separately may be higher than the cost of producing them 
together. Here factors such as complementarity are at work, 
whereby for example the same indivisible input can be used 
at once in the production (or distribution) of several goods. 
By extending its range of products, a firm can thereby not 
only better control demand but also reduce its costs. 
These phenomena have led many authors (see for example 
Demsetz (1973); Peltzman (1977)) to conclude that high 
concentration - chiefly brought about by mergers - and 
large market shares are a sign of efficiency, because they 
show that firms with low costs have increased their market 
Chapter 2 -- Costs and benefits of mergers 
shares at the expense of the less efficient firms. The low costs 
lead in the short run to higher profitability. I 
Other economists however, stress the role of horizontal 
mergers as a means of reducing the number of competitors 
in a market or of gaining better control over substitute 
products, which under certain conditions may directly in-
crease prices and profit margins (see Encaoua, Jacquemin 
and Moreaux (1986)). High concentration could also encou-
rage collusion: the fewer the firms in a market, the greater 
is the likelihood of collusive behaviour (see especially Scherer 
(1980); Martin (1988)).2 
These two points of view can be combined in the well-known 
model representing the case of an industry composed of n 
firms producing a homogeneous product and using output 
as a decision variable. The corresponding equilibrium rela-
tion can be written: 
n 
L = (p - :E ci)/p = H(l + R)/E 
i=l 
where Lis the aggregate Lerner index, i.e. the proportionate 
difference between the market price, p, and the sum of 
the marginal costs, c, of the n firms, H is the Herfindahl 
concentration index, i.e. the sum of the squares of the market 
shares, R is the sum of each firm's expectations as to the 
change in the output of the whole industry should it increase 
or reduce its own output by one unit, and E is the price 
elasticity of market demand in absolute terms. 
It is apparent from this simple model that market share 
alone or the degree of concentration alone do not account 
for the difference between price and marginal cost. The price 
elasticity of demand, which itself depends on the degree of 
product differentiation and the existence of more or less 
close substitutes, is also an important factor. Once product 
differentiation (or local market differentiation, which is 
equivalent) is explicitly introduced into the equation, it be-
comes clear that supranormal (monopoly) profits can exist 
at equilibrium, even in an apparently competitive market. 
The combination of product (or regional) differentiation 
1 In the medium and long term, the entry of new competitors into the 
market will tend to erode supra-normal profits. 
2 A third argument is that much of the investment undertaken by firms 
established in a market represents irrecoverable, sunk costs which create 
an exit barrier. This investment is seen as a credible commitment to the 
market, reducing the profit expectations of potential entrants. By having 
a restrictive effect on the entry of new firms, sunk costs tend to encourage 
concentration. For empirical results pointing in this direction, see Kes-
sides ( 1988). 
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economies of scale increases the possible size of such profits 
(see for example Eaton and Lipsey (1986)). Finally, if the 
openness of markets to trade is taken into account, as it 
must in the context of post-1992 Europe, the expression 
must be adapted to incorporate the effect of the competitive 
pressure exerted by imports1 and exports. 
Of course, an equilibrium relation says nothing about the 
direction of causality. Those who give precedence to the 
efficiency effects believe that the increased concentration 
resulting from mergers leads to cost reductions which, other 
things being equal, allow increases in margins. 
Those, on the other hand, who focus more on the dangers 
of monopolization see the causality as working mainly in 
the opposite direction : mergers tend to induce price rises, as 
a result both of increased concentration and the expectation 
of more collusive behaviour (increase in R) .2 
In fact, it is probable that in many cases mergers simultane-
ously produce some efficiency gains, notably in the form of 
cost reductions , and some increase in monopoly power which 
may manifest itself in higher prices. There is thus the question 
of a trade-off between the two types of effect. This is sug-
gested by Figure 2.1. 
The price p0 is that prevailing before the merger and is 
slightly above the marginal cost c0 (the perfectly competitive 
price) . After the merger there is both a reduction in costs to 
c1 (efficiency gains) and an increase in price to p1 (monopoly 
power). The consequences in terms of net social welfare were 
analysed by Williamson. The sum of areas A and B is the 
loss of consumer surplus due to the rise in price, while the 
areas A + E - C represent the extra profits accruing to 
the firms. 
1 For thi s extension , see especially Jacq uemin (1982). If imports a re ta ken 
into account , the expression becomes: 
H 
L = E ( I + R) ( I - tm), where tm is the degree of import penetra tion . 
It should be noted that a major part of import nows consists of intra-
firm transactions between the parent company and subsidia ries of multi-
nationals. The competitive pressure exerted by thi s type of trade is slight 
or nil. Such nows may even increase monopoly power (for a general view 
see de G hellinck ( 1986)). 
2 In both approaches it is predicted that the increase in concentration as a 
result of mergers will increase the total rate of profit in the industry and 
the ra te of profit per firm . But some theoretical work suggests that on 
· i rta in assumptions the profitability of a merged firm may well be less 
than tha t of its constituent parts befo re merger (Salant, Swritzer and 
Reynolds ( 1983)) . However if more reasonable assumptions are made 
(Perry and Porter ( 1985)) the opposite result is obtained . 
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FIGURE 2.1 : Mergers and the welfare tradHiff 
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The net gain (or loss) in social welfare due to the merger is 
the sum of the two effects : BN = (A + E - C) - (A + 
B) = E - (B + C). 
Williamson showed that quite small efficiency gains are 
usually sufficient to offset the adverse effects due to the 
increase in monopoly power. 
In the context of the single European market, the model 
needs to be adapted to take account of international trade . 
A starting point is the question of the impact of the lowering 
of non-tariff barriers. On the one hand, this will increase 
competition from imports. On the other, it may in the longer 
term lead to restructuring which reduces the number of firms 
in the market and increases concentration. Recent work (see 
Venables and Smith (1988)) has attempted to answer this 
question, using a partial equilibrium model which takes into 
account phenomena of economies of scale and situations of 
imperfect competition. It suggests that the lowering of non-
tariff barriers will produce a net gain in social welfare even if 
the number of firms decreases, because the smaller consumer 
surplus associated with increased concentration would be 
more than offset by the improvement in returns to producers 
due to exploitation of economies of scale. The work also 
indicates that a complete integration of the Community 
market, involving a considerable reduction in the monopoly 
power of firms on their national markets, 1 should result in 
much larger gains in social welfare than in the previous case 
because the benefits of large scale would be combined with 
increased competition.2 
A second aspect of the international dimension has been 
investigated by work which has tried to isolate the effect of 
mergers solely on domestic welfare and to identify the types 
of foreign competition conducive to it. 
The starting point is the fact that national compet1t1on 
policies only take account of behaviour that has an impact 
on their own countries' economy and ignore the interests of 
consumers of the product in other countries and the profits 
of foreign firms. Applied to the European context, this 
approach says that in evaluating the effects of a merger, the 
only losses that need be considered are the reduction in the 
European consumer surplus and the only gains the increase 
in the profits of European producers. 
Let us suppose, for example, that in Williamson's model 
a represents the consumer surplus, obtained by European 
consumers and p the proportion of profits accruing to Euro-
pean producers. 
The net gain or loss in European social welfare is then: 
-a(A + 8) + p (A + E - C) = 
~ [ [ ~; a] (A + B) + E - B - C l 
All other things being equal, the net European gain in welfare 
resulting from a merger would be th~reater, the larger the 
degree of European involvement in the 1T1erger and the lower 
the proportion of the output consumed in Europe. Hence 
the size of the gains and losses for EC consumers and 
producers will be affected both by the intensity of competi-
tion from foreign firms and by the trade policies that are 
adopted. 
1 In an econometric study of European industry Sleuwaegen and Yama-
waki (1988) have shown that even by the end of the 1970s the Herfindahl 
index, calculated at Community level, was more strongly correlated with 
. , nati_onal marginal rates of return than the national index of concen-
tration. 
2 Smith and Venables show, using their Cournot (competition on output) 
model, that welfare gains are greater when the number of firms changes 
than when it remains the same")This result is not confirmed by a Bertrand 
{price competition) model wit!rproduct difTerentiation. 
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This international aspect has been considered in a series of 
recent studies of the effects of mergers. Ross (1988), for 
instance, shows that the lowering of tariff barriers is more 
effective in limiting the price-increasing effects of a merger, 
the larger the number of foreign firms. Ordover and Willig 
(1985) have put forward a model which suggests that the 
effectiveness of competition policy in this context depends 
on the protectionism or otherwise of trade policy, via tariffs 
and quotas. Macroeconomic policy also plays a role : the 
effect of a reduction in the number of domestic producers 
is very sensitive not only to the number of foreign firms, but 
also to the level and variability of the exchange rate. If 
the main protection against domestic monopoly power is 
imports, exchange rate volatility will lessen this protection . 
From this point of view, the European Monetary System 
indirectly has a beneficial impact on competition in the 
common market. 
The cost-benefit approach to horizontal mergers indicates 
that the problem is complex and that an efficiency defence 
of mergers is not straightforward. But even this approach is 
a simplification of reality and therefore questionable: it is a 
static approach , reduced to two variables (price and output) 
in partial equilibrium and neglecting the problems of imper-
fect information. Efforts to extend it to dynamic situations 
involving uncertainty and allowing for the role of non-
price strategies (quality and durability of products, technical 
progress, etc.) are unconvincing. 3 
At the present time, judgments as to whether a merger 
presents a danger of monopolization, potential efficiency 
gains or a combination of the two must be based on general 
indicators. 
As far as monopoly power is concerned, the indicators 
favouring its emergence are well-known : hi&h market share 
with a scattered competitive fringe, low import penetration 
and high entry barriers, demand that is inelastic and also 
static or only slowly increasing, and a differentiated product, 
etc. 
Among the factors that point to the likelihood of effici ency 
gains are large-scale economies and learning effect s, substan-
tial excess capacity,4 and high capital intensity and technol -
ogy content. It is criteria such as these that will be used to 
examine the present situation in the EC in Part B of this 
paper. 
3 Innova tion is a very controversial issue. It is oft en argued tha t market 
power increases capacity to innova te, suggesting a trade-off be twee n 
static efficiency ga ins fa voured by competiti on a nd d ynam ic ga ins a rising 
from monopoli za tion. Recent wo rk indica tes however, tha t th is trade-
off is not the rule a nd that market monopoliza ti on is generall y bad for 
innova tion . See especially European Economy No 35 ( 1988). 
4 Usua lly in declining industries which are in need o f ra ti ona li za tio n. 
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2.2. Reduction in transaction costs versus inter-
nal inefficiency 
The internalization of functions within large firms instead 
of relying on the market for them is partly explained by 
the desire to realize economies of scale. In situations of 
asymmetric access to information or to specific assets or 
human resources for which markets are imperfect or non-
existent, a merger may be undertaken to absorb a competitor 
who possesses information, key assets, brands, distribution 
networks or management that can improve the performance 
of the acquiring firm . Obtaining these resources through the 
market could take too long, be too expensive, or even not 
be possible. Hence, a merger would be less expensive in terms 
of transaction costs than the alternatives of cooperation or 
internal growth. 
These phenomena of the internalization of transactions 
within an organization are thus prompted by the search for 
efficiency. 
But for an organization to be able to replace the market 
advantageously and for such mergers to yield real synergies, 
it is necessary to set up machinery within the new entity 
which makes its internal operation efficient. Yet the pitfalls 
awaiting the large merged organization are legion: poor 
communications, failure to cut out costly duplication, insuf-
ficient coordination, and, finally, lack of flexibility. 
In recent years the question of firms' flexibility in an in-
creasingly uncertain world has become more and more im-
portant. Some of the difficulties large firms have in adapting 
to their changing environment may be due to the over-rigid 
organization imposed in the course of increasing concentra-
tion so as to exploit economies of scale. 
In conditions of great uncertainty about the level of demand, 
the lesser exploitation of economies of scale by small to 
medium-sized firms using a flexible technology may be more 
than offset by their ability to respond to changes in demand. 
To make a success of a merger, it is necessary to organize 
the merged unit in such a way as to achieve flexible decentra-
lization. Otherwise, production economies could be more 
than offset by organizational diseconomies. 
2.3. An efficient 'market for corporate control' 
versus the perverse effects of takeovers 
A third possible benefit of mergers arises from the takeover 
process. The various forms of takeover can be just as effec-
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tive a means of transferring control of one company's assets 
to another as a full legal merger, and the replacement of the 
acquired company's management can likewise lead to better 
exploitation of its resources. This 'market for corporate 
control ' also reduces the danger of conflicts of goals between 
the owners and managers of companies. To the extent that 
managers have different preferences from shareholders, in 
terms of profits, sales or degree of risk aversion, the takeover 
mechanism helps reduce the associated distortions. The mere 
threat of takeover is an incentive for management or the 
controlling shareholder to run the business in the best in-
terests of the company (see Wtterwulghe ( 1988) and 'Sympo-
sium on takeovers', Journal of economic perspectives, No I, 
winter 1988). 
Conversely, many of the defence tactics used against hostile 
takeovers may be damaging to the interests of the sharehol-
ders of the target company and serve only those of its 
management. A very strict regulation of takeovers might 
therefore have undesirable consequences (see Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter (1988)). 
On the other hand, a basic assumption behind the favourable 
view of hostile takeovers is that the stock market correctly 
reflects the value of the acquired and acquiring firms . This 
is not necessarily the case. The expected benefits may not be 
realized, with the takeover failing to improve performance 
but only redistributing profits from the managers to the 
owners. Moreover, the management of the predator com-
pany may be guided by motives other than profit maximiza-
tion, motives which reflect their own interests and cause 
them to pay too high a price for the acquisition. Added 
to these aspects are various considerations concerning the 
perverse effects that takeover activity can have on the actual 
management of companies. 
Takeovers may absorb a large proportion of management 
time and induce some managers to give more attention to 
financial transactions than to productivity and competitive-
ness. The threat of takeover encourages the maintenance of 
excessive liquidity and the pursuit of short-term profit, at 
the expense of strategic investment that would yield a high 
return only in the long term. There are also dangers in firms 
taking on increasing debt either to finance or ward off 
takeovers . In some cases, key assets needed for an industrial 
growth or diversification strategy are sold off to finance or 
prevent a takeover. Finally, frequent changes in the control-
ling shareholders, decision centres and headquarters of com-
panies are apt to affect the ability of management to enter 
into lasting commitments in relation to specific human capi-
tal and their loyalty to the company. 
2.4. Empirical research into the effects of mer-
gers 
The theoretical argument about the costs and benefits of 
mergers does not allow a general presumption for or against. 
It is therefore illuminating to look at the results of empirical 
research into the effects of mergers. Only two aspects will 
be considered here: the impact of mergers on concentration 
and the effects on performance. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, most mergers in Europe were 
horizontal rather than vertical or conglomerate. The little 
research that has been done in this area found that merger 
activity considerably increased national industrial con-
centration ratios. In the UK, for example, it has been shown 
that between 1954 and 1965 most of the increase in the 
market share of the largest firms was due to mergers (see 
Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 
Market share of the 10 largest firms 
1954 1965 % of change 
due to 
mergers 
Food 62,1 80,5 70,1 
Drink 40,8 87,2 76,3 
Chemicals 80,6 86,4 31 ,2 
Metal goods 58,7 74,3 107,1 
Electrical engineering 60,4 81,2 105,8 
Vehicles 57,2 85 ,8 70,6 
Textiles 55,9 74,2 127,8 
Paper and publishing 63,6 78,1 111 ,1 
Miscellaneous 58,3 65 ,6 95,9 
Source: Cowling et al. ( 1980). 
Similar results have been obtained for Germany (Mi.iller 
(1976)), The Netherlands (de Jong (1976)) and Sweden 
(Ryden ( 1972)) etc. 
The statistics published in the Commission's annual competi-
tion reports show that in recent years the vast majority of 
the takeovers occurring in the common market have been 
by firms belonging to the I OOO biggest with sales of over 
ECU 1 billion. Such mergers clearly increase concentration. 
As for the effects in terms of profitability and growth, many 
studies point to the absence of substantial efficiency gains. 
A comparative study, directed by Mueller ( 1980), of results 
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from various EEC countries concerning full legal mergers 
concluded that : 
(a) tests to identify economies of scale as a possible objective 
proved insignificant: for one thing, the size of acq ui ring 
firms was usually greater than the minimum optimum 
scale for the industry; 
(b) the tests of post-merger profitability suggested that the 
mergers had little or no effect on the profitability of the 
merging firm in the three to five years following the 
merger; nor was there any significant difference in the 
return per share three years after the merger. This con-
firms the results obtained in many American studies (see 
Scherer ( 1980) pp. 138-139); I 
(c) the mergers did not lead to lower prices or higher sales. 
Thus, the largely negative results of the research suggest 
that it is not possible to find a single explanation of 
mergers: neither greater efficiency nor monopoly power 
seem ex post to be the dominant objective.2 They also 
suggest that the chances of success are slim and that 
the costs of the changes in organization (difficulty of 
'digesting' the acquisition, diseconomies of large organi-
zations) are often greater than the benefits claimed by 
the promoters. 
Detailed studies of the success of mergers in the UK (Meeks 
( 1977); Coxling et al. ( 1980)) confirm that efficiency is rarely 
increased by merger, and sometimes reduced . Studies by 
management consultants come to simi lar disappointing 
conclusions. Coley and Rein ton ( 1980) looked at US and 
British companies in the Fortune 250 li st and the Financial 
Times 500 which in the past had made acq uisitions to enter 
new markets. Figure 2.2 shows that on ly 23% of the 11 6 
firms analysed were able to recover the cost of their capital 
or better still the funds invested in the acquisition pro-
gramme. It also appears that the higher the degree of diversi-
fication , the smaller is the likelihood of success. For horizon-
tal mergers in which the acquired firm is not large, however, 
the success rate is high (45%). 
I A number of American studies have looked a t cha nges in the ma rket 
price of the shares of firms in vo lved in merge rs. A ge neral result is 
tha t the sha reholders of acquired compa nies rea lize substa nt ia l gains 
following the acqu isition. The important questi on fo r judging the benefit s 
of a merger howe ver is how it a ffects the shareho lders of the acquiring 
firm . The gains fo r these shareholders are s li ght o r nil a t the time of the 
acq ui sition. a nd one year aft er the merge r have genera ll y turned nega ti ve . 
For a discussion see Mueller ( 1986) . 
2 Other exp lana ti ons such as ri sk spreading (more associa ted with di ve rsifi -
cation) or speculation on the s1ock ma rk et underva lua ti o n of some 
companies compared wit h their long-term profit po tentia l a rc even less 
generall y a pplicable. tho ugh they may well be presen t. 
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FIGURE 2.2: Success and failure of 45 British and 52 US acquisitions 
116 acquisition 
programmes 
Size of company 
acquired 
Degree of 
diversification 
20 
small 
low 
The main reasons for failure appear to be : too high a price 
paid for the acquisition, over-estimation of the potential of 
the acquired business in terms of synergies and market 
position, and inadequate management of the process of 
integration after the acquisition. 
Hence, a body of convergent evidence suggests that mergers 
are far from being a panacea to improve competitiveness. It 
should be noted, however, that the empirical research does 
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not refer to the dynamic market conditions such as are being 
created by the 1992 programme. 
As we shall see in Part B, in some industries that have 
hitherto been fragmented, horizontal mergers may be neces-
sary in order to exploit the new opportunities created by an 
integrated market. The only conclusion to be drawn from 
the empirical evidence is that a general presumption in 
favour of such mergers is not justified. 
Part B - Features of industries and of EC merger activity from the point 
of view of competition policy 
The theoretical arguments presented in Part A showed that 
mergers could yield benefits in the form of efficiency gains 
as well as imposing costs in terms of increases in monopoly 
power. In Part B we first suggest a series of indicators that 
can be used to make a preliminary classification of industries 
into those in which mergers - and thus concentration -
are likely to have on balance beneficial effects and those in 
which the overall effect is likely to be negative . We then go 
on to describe recent EC merger activity in these terms. 
23 
Part B - Features of industries and of EC merger activity from the point of view of competition policy 
Chapter 3 - Typology of industries for merger 
control purposes 
The purpose of this section is to put forward a method for 
analysing mergers in relation to the industries of the merging 
firms and to illustrate the use of the method to classify the 
industries into distinct groups according to the likely balance 
of the benefits and costs of mergers in the industries. 
At the outset, two words of caution are in order about the 
interpretation placed on the classification, and about the 
limitations of the method. The first is that the classification 
merely attempts to identify the industries in which larger 
size may yield economic benefits without a great risk of 
reduction of competition; it does not imply that a merger is 
necessarily the best way of achieving these benefits, for as 
we have seen in Chapter I of Part A, various other forms 
of alliance between firms are possible. 
Secondly, the classification is intended only as an aid - as 
one means among others - that may help in analysing 
mergers. Clearly, the features of the industry are not the 
only factor to be taken into consideration in assessing the 
justification of a merger. As was shown in Part A, other 
criteria relating to the firms involved (for example, their 
market share) or to the products (such as whether they have 
close substitutes for the same end-use) must also be taken 
into account. Hence, the classification of an industry in one 
of the four groups does not prejudge the final verdict on a 
specific merger in the industry. Nor do negative verdicts on 
certain mergers in an industry mean that any merger at all 
in the industry should be condemned, especially if the in-
dustry has features indicating that large size may be a source 
of efficiency gains. 
3.1. Method 
The object is to identify the industries in which mergers are 
more likely to produce efficiency gains and those in which 
the danger of reduction of competition is uppermost. To do 
this, we need to find indicators for the degree of competition 
in an industry. 
In general, concentration ratios like the Herfindahl index 
which show the combined market share of the n largest 
firms, are an approximation to the degree of competition. 
But Part A showed that they are not a sufficient guide. 
Another problem is that the subdivisions of the industrial 
classification used may not necessarily coincide with the 
definition of the relevant market. For these reasons, other 
criteria than concentration data are used here. Some of 
these criteria emphasize two aspects of competition that are 
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tending to become more important than in the past, namely 
the internationalization of competition and the competition 
from innovation and technical progress (see especially de 
Woot (1988)). These two aspects are often linked. 
In many markets, competition now operates on a world scale 
and the relevant geographic market is no longer national but 
covers all the industrialized countries, and more particularly 
the 'triad' of Europe, North America and Japan. In these 
industries, European firms need to be allowed to strengthen 
their position on the world market by establishing a strong 
base for the internationalization of their operations on the 
European market. 
Secondly, for a growing number of industries the main thrust 
of competition comes from technological advances and the 
ability to use this new technology to conquer new markets. 
Thus, in high-technology sectors in which the cost and 
complexity of technological development are often beyond 
the means of firms operating only on their domestic market, 
it is necessary both to increase competition in Europe by 
ending the preferment of national champions and to encou-
rage cooperation between firms, especially by promoting 
large-scale European projects. 
Let us look at each of the proposed indicators in turn. 
(a) Indicators 
Four indicators are used to characterize industries. The first 
two help to identify the industries in which the danger of a 
reduction in competition is greater, the other two those in 
which further concentration may produce efficiency gains. 
(Definitions of the indicators are given in Annex I (a).) 
Demand growth. The rate of growth in demand over the 
period 1980-85 shows the stage of the life-cycle of the in-
dustry (developing, mature, declining). Other criteria too 
can be used to establish this, for example profitability, the 
pace of technological change or the number of new entrants. 
But comprehensive data on these are not available for all 
industries. Moreover, demand growth is a key component 
of the competitive environment of firms. 
It can be assumed that the danger of a reduction of competi-
tion is greater in mature or declining industries. This is 
because in such industries firms are more eager to increase 
their market share to make up for the slowing in growth 
and to gain better control over their costs, a key factor in 
competition at this stage of an industry's life cycle. Conse-
quently, firms react vigorously to new entry because the slow 
growth of tht: markt:L limits tht:ir ability to absorb a new 
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firm and to try to eliminate their weaker competitors. Entry 
is further limited by the advantages incumbent firms have 
in terms of experience, long-standing relations with custo-
mers and control over certain resources. The number of exits 
from the market also tends to be high as some firms opt for 
a strategy of rapid disinvestment in the face of the decline 
of the industry. 
Conversely, in expanding industries the danger of a reduc-
tion of competition is less. This is because a growing market 
attracts many entries because of the higher profits that can 
be made, and entry is relatively easy as incumbent firms 
have no real advantage in terms of cost, experience and 
reputation. Also, with technology tending to be in a state 
of flux, competition through innovation and technological 
change is keener. 
Import penetration. As was stressed above, the degree of 
concentration of an industry is not always a sure guide to 
the amount of monopoly power held by the leading firms. 
Another factor which affects the intensity of competition on 
a market is its degree of openness to international trade. 
Many empirical studies (see Jacquemin (1982)) have shown 
that competition from imports considerably limits the mar-
ket power of domestic producers. For this reason, import 
penetration is used here as an indicator of the intensity of 
competition. There is a caveat, however, namely that import 
figures may overstate the intensity of competition where 
there are large intra-firm trade flows. In that case, the 
competition from imports is more apparent than real since 
the imported goods are made by foreign subsidiaries or sister 
companies of domestic firms. Subject to this qualification, 
it may be assumed that the danger of a reduction of competi-
tion is greater in industries relatively closed to international 
trade, whether from within or outside the Community. Inci-
dentally, competition from non-EC imports appears to be 
stronger than that from intra-EC imports. 
Economies of scale. The existence of economies of scale in 
an industry may be interpreted in two different ways. On 
the one hand, it may represent a disincentive to new entrants 
and thereby reduce competition; on the other, it may point 
to a possibility of efficiency gains as the size of firms in-
creases. Let us look at both these aspects in turn. 
Economies of scale put large or diversified firms at an 
advantage because they can spread their fixed costs over a 
larger number of units produced. But as a barrier to entry, 
they suffer from limitations (see Porter (1982)): exploiting 
scale economies may conflict with other objectives of the 
firm (brand image, quality, etc.), and plants big enough to 
reap scale economies may be too specialized and not flexible 
enough to adapt to new technologies. 
Also, various writers (see Jacquemin (1985) and Kessides 
(1988)) have shown that it is more the presence of sunk costs 
rather than economies of scale that acts as a barrier to entry. 
The argument is that if fixed costs are recoverable, an entrant 
who fails can withdraw without penalty. But if costs are 
irrecoverable, that is if they cannot be clawed back when the 
entrant completely leaves the business, there is an imbalance 
between the incumbent firms and entrants. 
Hence, the existence of economies of scale will be regarded 
here rather as an argument in favour of concentration. The 
industries in which the potential gains to be expected from 
exploitation of economies of scale are substantial are identi-
fied using the data presented in the study by Pratten ( 1988). 
This study, which surveys recent work on economies of scale, 
estimates for a large number of industries the extra unit 
costs supported by firms operating at less than 50% of 
the optimum scale. The higher this cost penalty the more 
profitable it is for a firm to approach the optimum scale. 
Here too, one must be aware of the possible failings of 
this indicator. Estimates of scale economies are based on 
microeconomic data and their aggregation, even at fairly 
narrowly defined industry level, is problematic. Nevertheless, 
it is acceptable to use them as an indicator in this study 
because its object is not to quantify precisely scale economies 
but only to identify the industries where they are important. 
Technological content. There is an arguable case for saying 
that mergers can also be beneficial in high-technology in-
dustries. These industries are highly R&D-intensive and 
because of indivisibilities in R&D up to certain thresholds 
firms require a sufficient scale of operation in order to 
undertake research programmes. There are many other eco-
nomic reasons why link-ups between European firms in such 
industries are justified. They increase the resources available 
and so encourage the undertaking of more ambitious and 
risky projects which single firms cannot afford. They also 
help cut out duplication and may encourage transfers of 
technology, thus speeding up the dissemination of innova-
tion. 
But as well as strengthening the performance of European 
firms in advanced technology, it is necessary to improve 
their ability to translate their research into positions of. 
international competitive advantage. To do this, greater 
competition needs to be introduced into the European mar-
ket by opening up public procurement and increasing the 
number of large European projects. This conclusion is borne 
out by recent empirical work, which shows that markets 
which are more competitive, have low barriers to entry and 
are open to international trade show a greater propensity to 
innovate (see European Economy No 35 (1988)). 
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Around 20 high-tech industries a re investigated in this study. 
They were identified mainly on the basis of the classification 
proposed by the OECD (see OECD (1986)) but with help 
from supporting sources. The list of the industries and the 
sources are given in Annex !(a). 
(b) Classification matrices 
The four indicators are used to compose two classification 
matrices. The first combines the first two criteria and allows 
industries to be classified into two broad categories : 
(i) those in which there is a danger of a reduction of 
competition : mature or declining industries and in-
dustries relatively closed to trade; 
(ii) those in which prima facie there is less danger of a 
reduction of competition, because they show strong 
growth or are relatively open to trade . 
The second matrix links the last two criteria and identifies 
industries in which an increase in concentration could pro-
duce efficiency gains. These are those which are highly tech-
nology intensive and/or offer substantial economies of scale. 
Combining the results of the two matrices allows the in-
dustries to be classified into the four groups shown in Figure 
3.3. 
Group I: industries in which mergers present a danger of a 
reduction in competition without any likelihood 
of efficiency gains (I n III); 
Group 2 : industries in which mergers should produce neither 
efficiency gains nor a danger of reduction of com-
petition (II n III); 
Group 3: industries in which mergers offer potential effi-
ciency gains without a danger of reduction of 
competition (II n IV); 
Group 4 : industries in which mergers may simultaneously 
produce efficiency gains and accretions of mono-
poly power (I n IV). 
3.2. Classification of industries 
This section describes the results of the classification of 
manufacturing industries into the four groups using the 
FIGURE 3.1: Matrix 1- Identification of industries in which there is a danger of reduction of competition 
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Economies of scale 
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-
·, 
FIGURE 3.3: Classification of industries into four groups 
Group I 
Industries in which mergers offer little or no prospect of efficiency gains 
and in which there is a danger of reduction of compelilion 
Slight 
Group2 
Industries in which mergers offer tiute or no prospect of efficiency gains 
and in which there is little danger of reduction of competition 
Substantial 
Gains 
IV 
• . : .... 
Danger of reduction of competition 
Considerable 
Group4 
Industries in which mergers are likely simultaneously to produce efficiency 
gains and lo present a danger of a reduction in competition 
Considerable 
Potential efflC'lency gains 
Group3 
Industries in which mergers offer prospects of efficiency gains and do not 
present a danger of reduction of competition 
Slight 
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two classification matrices. Some of the criteria used in the 
classification matrices are also valid for service industries. 
For example, the extent of international trade and economies 
of scale could in theory be estimated for services as well as for 
manufacturing industries. But the empirical measurement of 
such factors for service industries runs up against major 
difficulties, because of both problems of definition (for 
example a suitable measure of output for banks) and Jack 
of data . For this reason, this limited study will only attempt 
to classify manufacturing industries. 
The subdivision of industries is the fairly fine 3-digit NACE 
level, in which 120 industries are distinguished. But even at 
this level of disaggregation, some industries are too heteroge-
neous or data too difficult to obtain for it to be possible to 
classify them into one of the groups. Thus, the classification 
given here is intended to be more illustrative than exhaustive. 
(a) Industries in which mergers offer little or no prospect 
of efficiency gains 
Within this category, two groups can be distinguished accor-
ding to whether or not there is a danger of a reduction of 
competition. 
( i) Industries in which there is a danger of reduction of compe-
tition ( GrQup 1) 
This group includes the building materials (except advanced 
materials), metal goods (except boilermaking), furniture, 
paper and rubber goods, paints and varnishes, and tobacco 
industry. 
Some of these industries are declining, like the foundry and 
forging industries, because their markets are being eroded 
by competition from other materials or other technologies 
(plastics replacing steel sheet in household electrical applian-
ces, castings replacing forgings in the motor industry) . Other 
industries are mature, with a production technology that is 
well-known and widely disseminated. This does not mean 
that no research is going on in some of these businesses, but 
such technological change as there is does not justify an 
increase in concentration in them. This is the case for 
example in the tyre industry, where major restructuring 
involving cuts in capacity and a reduction in the number of 
European producers has already taken place, leaving a mar-
ket structure that is already oligopolistic. The same is true 
of the tobacco industry, already highly concentrated, and 
the paints and varnishes industry, in which a wave of mergers 
has seen medium-sized local producers taken over by inter-
national groups. 
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In these industries, the competition faced from imports is 
generally at a quite low level and invariably less than the 
average for EC industry. Some of them are indeed virtually 
closed to international trade because of the low value-to-
weight or volume ratios and the high transport cost of their 
products. Industries in this position are the cement, lime and 
plaster industry, iron castings and some of the metal goods 
industries. In these industries, import penetration is under 
10 %, compared with the all-industry average of 35 %. But 
other structural factors may also explain the low volume of 
trade, such as non-tariff barriers (for example on building 
materials) or EC external trade policy (for example Article 
115 and voluntary export restraints on tyres) . 
In most of the industries, the potential economies of scale 
are modest. In the few sectors where they are significant (10-
20% in the cement, brick and iron castings industries), the 
size of the relevant geographic market is limited by transport 
costs. In such circumstances economies of scale operate as 
entry barriers and reinforce the tendency towards monopoli-
zation in closed markets. In the cement industry, for 
example, the market is already very concentrated in some 
EC countries. In Denmark, the market structure is very close 
to a virtual monopoly, in the UK the leading group has held 
60% of the market since 1970 and in France and Germany 
the market share of the four biggest firms was 80% and 
67% respectively even as far back as 1975 · (EEC, Tenth 
Report on Competition Policy ( 1981 )) . 
To sum up, the industries in Group I are those in which 
demand is not growing and there is little or no competition 
from imports. There is therefore a danger of a reduction of 
competition in the industries. Also, as economies of scale 
are either modest or tend to act as entry barriers and the 
technology is relatively static, mergers do not appear justi-
fied. 
(ii) Industries in which there is little danger of a reduction of 
competition (Group 2) 
Unlike the industries in the previous group, those in Group 
2 are fairly open to international trade. In some of them, 
imports from outside the Community are greater than those 
from other EC countries. This is the case with industries 
importing their raw materials from outside the EC (fur, 
wood) and with those in which there is strong competition 
from the newly industrializing countries, such as the clothing, 
leather and leather goods, cork and basketware and toy 
industries, where European firms are not competitive with 
low-wage countries. Similarly, in the paper industry Euro-
pean firms face competition from new producers in countries 
with ready access to raw materials such as Brazil , the USA 
and the Scandinavian countries. Finally, in the musical in-
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struments industry, which is relatively undeveloped in Eu-
rope, Japan exercises leadership. 
Competition is also on a world scale in mature or declining 
industries like steel, textiles and certain industrial and agri-
cultural machinery, but in these industries intra-EC trade 
predominates. 1 In textiles for example capital intensity is 
higher than in the clothing industry. Consequently, the Ja-
bour cost advantage of developing countries is Jess important 
and import penetration from developing countries is lower. 
In these industries, substantial restructuring has already 
taken place. In steel and key sectors of the European textile 
industry (spinning and weaving) for example there seems to 
be little room for further economies of scale in production. 
Also, in these industries the largest European firms are as 
big or bigger than their American or Japanese counterparts. 
In some of these industries, the way for European firms to 
improve their performance no longer lies through larger-
scale production but through greater flexibility, which large 
size sometimes does not allow. A relatively flexible plant can 
adapt to new technology and changes in demand more 
quickly. With such plants EC firms would be able to speci-
alize in high value-added niche markets. Such a strategy is 
already being pursued in the clothing industry, where mass-
produced garment manufacture has been partly transferred 
to developing countries, whereas European clothing manu-
facturers largely specialize in top-of-the-range fashion gar-
ments (see IFO-Institut and Prometeia (1988)). Similarly, in 
the machine tools industry flexibility and speed of response 
to demand are new requirements for production plant. 
Thus, in this second group of industries, it appears that the 
concentration that might have been beneficial for restructu-
ring Community industry has already taken place. Further 
concentration through merger therefore offers little prospect 
of additional efficiency gains, although in the industries in 
which there is strong competition from imports the danger 
of a reduction of competition would generally be slight. 
However, although the 'cost-benefit' analysis of further con-
centration of these industries leads to the conclusion that 
merger is not a good strategy for EC firms, this result should 
not lead to the rejection of mergers which do not reduce 
competition. Competition policy and industrial policy 
should be kept separate. 
1 In some of these industries, EC fo reign trade policy has a decisive 
influence, as for example with the Multifibre Arrangement for textiles . 
(b) Industries in which merger activity is prima facie benefi-
cial (Group 3) 
Group 3 consists of industries in which there is less danger 
of a reduction of competition and mergers offer real 
prospects of efficiency gains. Industries in this ca tegory 
include advanced materials (glass, ceramics}, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, computers, telecommunications, elec-
tronics, the motor and aerospace industries and precision 
instruments. 
In these industries mergers that make economic sense should 
not be discouraged provided they do not harm competition. 
Therefore, in scrutinizing actual merger proposals, it will be 
necessary to assess the impact the merger will have on the 
degree of competition. To do this, the battery of indicators 
used here will have to be supplemented with criteria showing 
the position the firms involved have on their market (for 
example market shares). 
Let us look first at the case for saying that the danger of a 
reduction of competition is less in this group. First of all , in 
some of the industries demand is growing strongly, leading 
to greater uncertainty of market positions. This is so in 
pharmaceuticals, computers and office automation , telecom-
munications and in the motor and electronics industries . 
Secondly, in these industries competition is on a world scale 
as is shown by the high level of import penetration (the only 
exception is pharmaceuticals but here foreign multinationals 
tend to supply the EC market from local subsidiaries). In 
most of them, imports from outside the EC account fo r a 
major proportion of imports. This is the case with compu-
ters, telecommunications, electronic goods, optical instru-
ments and medical and surgical equipment. Also, in these 
industries, as in the motor industry, imports from outside 
the Community have increased faster than intra-Community 
imports over the period 1979-86 and the Communi ty has 
lost market share on export markets (see European Economy 
No 35 (1988)) . Looking at the origin of the imports from 
outside the EC it is found that the main competi tion is from 
the Japanese (radios, TVs, cars and optical instruments) 
and the USA (computers and telecommunications) (see 
Jacquemin and Sapir (1988)). 
In these industries, the European firms need to become more 
efficient to improve their performance on world markets. 
Would greater concentration help them to do so? The fea-
tures of the industries in this group suggest that it would. 
The industries are passing through a phase of development 
in which competition through innovation is important and 
R&D expenditure is consequently high. Also in most of the 
industries the potential economies of scale are such that 
large firms should have a cost advantage. In the consumer 
electronics industry for example, the low rate of exploitation 
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of economies of scale by European manufacturers partly 
explains why their production costs are often 20-35% higher 
than those of their Japanese competitors (see Fourteenth 
Report on Competition Policy (1985)). 
The performance of European firms in these industries has 
so far been handicapped by the fragmentation of the Com-
munity market. The national division of public purchasing 
of telecommunications and computing equipment, and the 
existence of conflicting standards and administrative bar-
riers, for example in the motor and pharmaceutical in-
dustries, restrict the ability of national firms to tap the wider 
European market and hamper cross-frontier cooperation. 
This may explain why the top four or five European firms 
in these industries tend to be considerably smaller than their 
American counterparts and in two industries (computers 
and electronics) are even smaller than any of the top five 
Japanese companies (see also Chapter 5). 
Two industries require a word of explanation, namely the 
motor and pharmaceutical industries. It may be surprising 
to see the motor industry in this group, considering that it 
is an oligopoly in which in 1986 seven firms together held 
77% of the West European market. The fact is however 
that differences in technical regulations and taxation have 
prevented a rational organization of the industry and the 
resulting segmentation of national markets has led to 
substantial price differences. In this industry, therefore, the 
completion of a single European market is expected to lead 
to the exploitation of considerable economies of scale 
through production agreements between European groups! 
and simultaneously to intensify competition by ending the 
segmentation of the EC market (see Ludvigsen (1988)). 
The case of the pharmaceutical industry differs from that of 
the other industries in the group in that it is relatively 
protected and already highly concentrated. It is an industry 
in which a few large multinationals operate alongside a large 
number of smaller firms and already control 70-80% of 
the market in France, Germany, Italy and the UK (see 
Economists Advisory Group Ltd (1988)). In this industry, 
in which R&D investment is very heavy and very risky, 
increased precompetitive research cooperation between large 
European firms could improve their performance on the 
world market in which the best placed firms are now Ameri-
can or Swiss. Also, mergers involving the smaller firms in 
the industry would not harm competition. 
Finally, a general feature of the high-growth industries in 
this group is that European firms often prefer alliances with 
1 It is thought that production agreements will mainly involve joint use 
of 'platforms' by different manufacturers. This production technique 
combines some features of assembly lines and nexible manufacturing. 
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non-European firms. The proportion of mergers involving 
non-European partners is higher than in other industries 
(see Chapter 5), and of 142 joint ventures formed in the 
industries over the period 1983-87, 71 were with firms from 
non-EC countries (see Seventeenth Report on Competition 
Policy (1988)).2 As de Woot (1988) points out, there is a 
danger that European firms will be handicapped in the 
globalization of these industries because they are internatio-
nalizing without possessing a strong European base. The 
example of Airbus in the aerospace industry illustrates the 
advantages of increased cooperation between European 
firms. 
All these arguments point to the need to encourage link-ups 
between European firms in the industries of this group. But 
as we have seen (Part A, Chapter 1), link-ups can take 
different forms and the most appropriate may not necessarily 
be merger. This issue will be addressed in Part C. 
(c) Industries in which mergers are likely simultaneously to 
produce efficiency gains and to present the danger of a 
reduction of competition (Group 4) 
In this last group are a number of industries that will be 
greatly affected by the completion of the single European 
market (see Buigues and Ilzkovitz ( 1988)) because their 
markets are now divided by high non-tariff barriers which 
are to be dismantled by the end of 1992. They are industries 
in which competition is presently stifled by protectionist 
national regulations. 
In these industries the advent of the single market should 
lead to restructuring and considerable merger activity. Mer-
gers have advantages in terms of efficiency but might reduce 
competition at Community level. Two types of industries 
belong to Group 4, those heavily dependent on the public 
sector and parts of the food and drinks industry. 
The industries mainly serving public-sector markets are 
boilermaking, heavy electrical plant, railway equipment and 
shipbuilding. In these sheltered industries each Member 
State has hitherto been able to support its 'national cham-
pion'. Consequently, intra-Community trade has remained 
at a very low level and the number of European producers 
is much higher than in the USA. The result is that EC firms 
have excess capacity and are less efficient (see Atkins (1988)). 
Hence, the opening up of government procurement markets 
by the end of 1992 is expected both to increase competition 
These are the chemical, electronics and computer industries. 
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and to lead to restructuring of the European industry. As 
the industries show substantial economies of scale and re-
quire large-scale units, this rationalization and the attendant 
reduction in the number of producers should allow the 
firms that remain to lower their costs. Also, in some of the 
industries there is considerable technological change, as for 
example fibre optic cables in the electric cable industry and 
high-speed trains and robotization in the railway equipment 
industry. 
Thus, the industries in this group might benefit considerably 
from greater concentration but also present a real danger of 
monopolization. They are already concentrated, demand is 
not growing very fast, and competition has been blunted by 
government subsidies. Hence, care must be exercised to 
prevent the monopoly positions that exist in many of the 
national industries being replaced by monopoly power over 
the whole Community market. 
Group 4 also contains parts of the food and drink industry, 
which is hampered by differences in standards in different 
Member States (see MAC Group (1988)). These differences 
restrict intra-Community trade and reduce the exploitation 
of scale economies. In these industries (pasta, flour milling, 
chocolate and beer) the prospect of 1992 is already producing 
a wave of mergers designed to lead to groups of world scale. 
In 1986-87, for example, the number of takeovers above the 
ECU 1 billion mark was more than double that in the 
previous two years in the food and drink industry as a whole 
(see Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy ( 1988)). These 
mergers have some benefits because they allow greater 
exploitation of economies of scale but they could also reduce 
competition. 
* 
* * 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main features of the four groups 
distinguished here and their implication as to the costs and 
benefits of mergers. The table illustrates the results of a 
classification based on the 120 manufacturing industries at 
the 3-digit NACE level. As we shall see at the end of Part 
C, this level of aggregation is sufficient for a first screening 
of merger proposals. Knowledge of the environment in the 
industry and of the relative and absolute size of the firms 
involved could also be used at this stage. But in cases which 
on this preliminary screening appear to raise problems, more 
detailed data about the products and firms will be needed. 
A further point to be borne in mind is that although the 
classification indicates that link-ups between firms in in-
dustries classified in Groups 3 and 4 could lead to efficiency 
gains, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
merger is the only way of achieving them. As we have 
suggested in Part A, other arguments such as the requirement 
for speed or difference in transaction costs should exist to 
justify the choice of merger rather than an alternative form 
of link. 
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Table 3.1 
Illustration of classification of industries for merger control purposes 1 
Group 
2 
3 
4 
Industry 
Building materials 
Metal goods 
Paints and varnishes 
Furniture 
Paper goods · 
Rubber goods 
Tobacco 
Steel 
Industrial and agricultural machinery 
Leather and leather goods 
Fur 
Clothing and textiles 
Sawn and processed wood and related 
products 
Pulp, paper and board 
Jewellery, toys, musical instruments 
Advanced materia ls 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 
Computers/office automation 
Telecommunications 
Electronics 
Motor vehicles 
Aerospace 
Instruments 
Boilermaking 
Cables and heavy electrical plant 
Railway equipment 
Shipbuilding 
Some food industries (confectionery, cho-
colate, flour and pasta) 
Beer 
Characteristics 
• Declining or mature industries 
• Markets closed to international trade 
• Not technology-intensive or only 
slowly changing technologically 
• Economies of scale limited or acting as 
entry barriers 
• Declining or mature industries 
• Fairly open to imports from inside and 
outside EC 
• In some industries, strong competition 
from low-wage countries 
• Economies of scale limited or already 
exploited 
• Not technology-intensive or with tech-
nology known throughout the world 
• Some industries highly fragmented 
(toys, furs) 
• Growth industries 
• Open to international trade 
• Strong competition from American and 
Japanese products 
• Large economies of scale 
• R&D very important, fast-changing 
technology 
• Mature industries 
• Little intra-Community trade and com-
petition restricted by segmentation of 
public procurement markets or differ-
ences in standards and regulations 
• Not technology-intensive (food and 
drink industries) or only moderately so 
• Large economies of scale 
1 The two classification matrices on which this table is based arc given in Annexes I (b) and I (c) . 
Souff<': Commission services. 
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Implications 
In these industries mergers offer little 
prospect of efficiency gains and present a 
danger of a reduction of competition 
Less danger of reduction of competition 
because of high import penetration and 
the fragmentation of some industries. But 
growth by merger is no longer an 
appropriate strategy for European firms. 
Instead, they should set out to specialize 
in top-of-the-range products, requiring 
modern and flexible production facilities 
Less danger of monopolization and 
prospects of substantial efficiency gains 
from mergers. In these industries, link-
ups between European firms would allow 
them to internationalize their operations 
from a solid European base 
In these industries the removal of barriers 
with the single market programme will 
lead to rationalization and European-
scale mergers. These may produce effi-
ciency gains but there is also a danger of 
reduction of competition 
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The points set out above provide certain criteria which make 
it possible to assess to what extent, in certain sectors, mergers 
will have had economic effects that are, overall, favo urable, 
or, on the contrary, unfavourable. Here it is a question of 
presenting the overall trends revealed, in more recent years, 
by the process of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the more 
recent major operations will be identified, according to dif-
ferent criteria (number, size, country) . 
Like the previous section, this section wi ll concentrate on 
manufacturing. A separate subsection ( 4.6) will however 
look at mergers in services. 
4.1. Increase in total numbers 
The results given here are based on Commission analysis of 
reports in the business press of mergers and acquisitions of 
majority stakes involving at least one of the I OOO largest 
firms in the Community, according to their financial data 
(source: European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Competition, annual reports on competition policy) . 
Most of the analysis is based on absolute numbers of deals, 
rather than value. This is because data on the value of 
acquisitions are not always available although prima facie 
such data would be more relevant. 
The results show that the total number of mergers and 
acquisitions involving at least one of the top I OOO EC firms 
has been steadily increasing, from 155 in 1984, to 208 in 
1985, 227 in 1986 and 303 in 1987. The sharp increase in 
merger and acquisition activity in 1987 is a trend which 
looks set to accelerate in the run-up to the single European 
market (Figure 4.1 ). 
This is because merger is one way of implementing strategies 
to achieve a broader geographical coverage and to exploit 
economies of scale. The studies of industries made by the 
Commission in connection with the single market pro-
gramme have clearly shown the degree of restructuring re-
quired in European industry. 
(i) The single market programme is aiming first of all to 
create an integrated demand in the Community. This 
integration should elicit a twofold strategic response 
from firms. First, they will have to specialize more in 
the activities they are best at and dispose of assets 
related to activities in which their competitive position 
is weak. Secondly, they will have to extend their geogra-
phical sphere of operation and so will tend to buy up 
firms in other Member States in their core businesses. 
Both these factors should lead to a sharp increase in 
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FIGURE 4.1: Nmnbersofmergersaadacqaisitionsofmajority 
stakes imohing the I OOO larpst European 
firms 
Total number 
of operations 
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Sourer : Competition reports. 
Year 
1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 
merger activity. In some indusrries such an increase 
has been observable since the early 1980s. In the food 
industry for example the number of takeovers of Euro-
pean firms averaged 17 a year between 1980 and 1984; 
over the period 1985-86 the average was as many as 42 
a year (MAC Group (1988)) . 
(ii) In some sectors supply is highly fragmented. This is 
especially true of industries supplying the public sector, 
in which the number of European producers is very 
high by compari son with the United States of America. 
For example in the industry making boilers for electric 
power plants there are 12 producers in the Community 
against only six in the USA, for turbine generators we 
have 10 producers compared with two in the USA, and 
we have 16 makers of electric locomotives to the USA 's 
two. The opening up of government and public utility 
procurement should eventually lead to mergers in these 
industries also (Atkins ( 1988)). In the railway equipment 
industries mergers are already under way. Alsthom for 
example after buying up the railway equipment business 
of Jeumont-Schneider has just acq uired a majority stake 
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in the Belgian firm ACEC which has railway and energy 
interests. Following its successful bid for the Spanish 
high-speed train contract, Alsthom is now planning to 
take control of the two Spanish firms in the industry 
which are at present State-owned. 
Clearly, this does not mean that all mergers should be 
encouraged, but the gradual integration of the EC market 
should cause the pace of restructuring and mergers to speed 
up even more than has already occurred. 
4.2. Geographical type 
An analysis of mergers according to whether they are purely 
national affairs, between partners from different Community 
countries, or involve a non-EC partner (see Table 4.1), shows 
that purely national operations still predominate. In 1985-
86 63,7% of mergers and majority acquisitions involved 
companies from the same country; in 1986-87 the figure was 
even higher at 69,6%. 
Among cross-frontier mergers and acquisitions deals invol-
ving firms from other EC countries have on average been 
much more numerous than those in which one of the parties 
is from outside the Community and their share in merger 
and acquisition activity sharply increased in 1986-87 com-
pared with that of wider international link-ups. In relation 
to 1992 the recent trends are interesting for two reasons. 
The first point is that on their home markets firms seem to 
be stepping up their merger and acquisition activity ready 
for the advent of the single market in order to achieve by 
1992 the critical mass necessary to face European competi-
tion with the maximum chance of success. Secondly, link-
ups with other EC firms have been on a steadily rising trend 
since 1983-84, when there were 29, increasing to 44 in 1984-
Table 4.1 
85, 52 in 1985-86 and 75 in 1986-87. It is mainly the larger 
firms which are forming such links, apparently in an effort 
to attain European scale as soon as possible. 
Whereas for many years it was only American firms that 
had an overall strategy for Europe covering all the EC 
countries, recent trends show that this is now changing. For 
example, in the food and drink industry, 44% of 46 major 
European manufacturers only had a presence in their home 
country or at most in one other Member State in 1987. The 
quest for European scale is now pushing them to acquire 
firms in other EC countries. Over the period 1980-84, only 
59% of acquisitions of European firms in this sector were 
made by other European based firms . In 1986-87, the percen-
tage was 76% . European firms are thus increasingly enga-
ging in restructuring (MAC Group ( 1988)). 
4.3. Main motives for mergers and acquisitions 
The results of an analysis of the main motives for mergers 
and acquisitions, as given in public statements about the 
transactions, throw interesting light on the subject (Table 
4.2). In a third of cases, the main motive was production 
rationalization and restructuring. 
Expansion was the second most common reason cited, while 
complementarity and strengthening of market position were 
among those less frequently mentioned. 
Hence the reasons managers are giving for merger activity 
are fully consistent with the findings of the report on 'The 
economics of 1992' (European Economy No 35 (1988)). On 
the one hand, the restructuring is intended to bring about 
rationalization of the production base and to achieve pro-
Mergers and acquisitions of majority holdings 1982-87, by nationality of parties (from same EC country, different EC countries, or an EC and 
a non-EC country) 
Year National EC International Total 
(same EC country) (different EC countries) (EC+ non-EC) 
1982-83 59 (50,5) 38 (32,5) 20 (17,0) 117 (100) 
1983-84 IOI (65,2) 29 (18,7) 25 ( 16, I) 155 (100) 
1984-85 146 (70,2) 44 (21 ,2) 18 (08,7) 208 (100) 
1985-86 145 (63,7) 52 (23,0) 30 ( 13,3) 227 (100) 
1986-87 211 (69,6) 75 (24,8) 17 (05,6) 303 (100) 
NB: Figure in brackets is percentage of total operations. 
Source: EC Commiss ion ( 1988). Sere11tee111J, Report 011 Compt•tition Polh'y . 
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Table 4.2 
Main motives for mergers and acquisitions in 1985-86 and 1986-87 
%' 
Rationalization, restructuring 
Expansion 
Complementarity 
Strengthening of market position 
Diversification 
R&D 
Specialization 
Other 
Total 
1985-86 1986-87 
35,0 
18,1 
14,4 
l l ,3 
12,5 
2,5 
l ,9 
4,4 
100 
29,7 
22, l 
12,4 
l 1,5 
5,7 
5,3 
l ,3 
l l ,9 
100 
I Percentage o f a ll merger cases for which precise in fo rmation about motives is ava ilable. 
Source: Sevem eenth Report on Competition Poli"}' (1988). 
ductivity gains, which corresponds to the first reason given 
for mergers. On the other, the incremental growth induced 
by the creation of a single market will encourage mergers 
and takeovers for the purpose of expanding production 
capacity, the second of the main motives given by managers . 
R&D is rarely mentioned as a motive for mergers. However, 
it is one of the main reasons given for joint ventures : 26% 
of joint ventures in 1985-86 and 19% in 1986-87 were promp-
ted at least partly by R&D considerations. In high-tech 
industries in particular, such alliances may clearly be justified 
in strategic terms (see Group 3 in Section 3.2(b) above) . 
4.4. Prominence of large groups 
Looking at the size of the firms engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions, one finds that the very large among the top 
I OOO firms are the most active. Firms with sales of over 
ECU I billion were involved in 57% of mergers in 1986/87 
compared with 53% in 1985-86. A large number of opera-
tions involved a combined turnover of over ECU 5 billion 
(67 in 1986-87 against -31 in the previous year) .1 
This trend towards increased merger activity by large in-
dustrial groups could eventually pose problems for competi-
1 For example, Volkswagen's takeover of Seat in Spain for OM 1,3 billion. 
CGE's acquisition of ITT's European interests fo r USO 1,5 billion. 
Never before have large companies· merge rs been su numerous; in 1986-
87 there was a tota l of 171 such deals (see Table 4. 3). 
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tion policy, as monopoly situa tions could develop and 
restrict competition. This is especia lly true of industries 
relatively closed to international trade (Group I in Chapter 
3). On the other hand , in industries where demand is growing 
strongly, the benefits in terms of efficiency may well out-
weigh the costs of an accretion of market power by large 
firms (see G roup 3, Section 3.2(b)). 
Table 4.3 
Breakdown of mergers by size (combined sales) of firms involved 
Under ECU Over 
ECU 500 mill ion 500- 1 OOO million ECU 1 OOO million 
1983-84 29 18 85 
l 984-85 62 3 1 92 
1985-86 63 33 108 
l 986-87 IOI 3 1 171 
Source': EC. Se1w1teenth Reporr on Competition Policy (1988). 
Firms in the middle of the size ra nge, with combined turn-
overs of between EC U 500 million and I billion, a re least 
prominent in the sharp increase in merger activity since the 
beginning of the 1980s. The increase among fi rms a t the 
bottom end of the sample, those with combined sa les of 
under 500 million , has been very rapid , however. This is 
borne out by an analysis of the data fo r a ll mergers (even 
smaller ones) reported in the business press (Seventeenth 
Report on Competition Policy ( 1988)). It emerges tha t smaller 
firms use the merger route to growth even more freq uently 
than any other ca tegory . This situation is hea lthier from the 
point of view of competition policy. The crea tion of larger 
units from medium-sized firms may promote competi tion 
with larger firms and lead to grea ter exploitation of econo-
mies of scale and effi ciency gains. 
4.5. Marked differences between Member 
States 
The number and size of cross-fro ntier mergers and acquisi-
tions involving large European firms show clearly the impor-
tance of a Community approach to competi ti on policy. But 
there are substantial differences in pa tterns of merger ac ti vity 
between Member States. Historical, as well as economic, 
institutional and lega l facto rs part ly explain this situa ti on. 
The scrutiny of mergers by na tional competition authorities 
va ries widely for firms based in the UK, Germany or France 
(both in the underl ying philosophy of the approach and in 
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the criteria applied). The vast differences between takeover 
legislation provide a striking example.1 
The study of mergers and acq uisitions in three EC countries 
by Booz Allen and Hamilton2 (Financial Times, 1987 and 
1988) shows how much the situation varies between 
coun tries . 
British firm s are involved in over three times as many mer-
ge rs in the US as in Europe, and thi s _trend has increased in 
the last few yea rs. The share of mergers with European 
partners fell from just under 40% in 1984 to only 20% in 
1987 . But a reversa l of this trend now seems to be taking 
place in the UK. In the first four months of 1988, British 
firms were involved in more takeovers in the EC than a 
year earlier (70 compared with 27), whereas takeovers of 
American firms were down from 177 to 66. Of course, the 
observa tion rela tes to a very short period . 
In Germany the preference for mergers with EC firms conti-
nues to predominate (accounting for two-thirds of the total 
in 1987). The fa ll in the share of mergers with European 
partners since 1984 (from 86% to 66% in 1987) will probably 
be reversed . Another point worth noting is how open the 
German market has become to takeovers. Booz Allen noted 
262 takeovers of German firms in 1987 compared with 
only I 06 in 1986. French companies with 156 takeovers in 
Germany in 1987 led the field. 
In France the most striking feature is the explosion of merger 
activity: up from 35 in 1986 to 196 in 1987. In 1987 French 
firms are reported to have been involved in 97 cross-frontier 
takeovers in the EC (Figure 4.2). 
A recent study by MacDermott and Gray ( 1988) is based 
· on different data (the American magazine Mergers and ac-
quisitions and the M&A specialists Gumin & Co .), but has 
the advantage of giving European data alongside compa-
rable figures for the USA and Japan.# 
The MacDermott and Gray study shows that the creation 
of an integra ted market of 320 million consumers is of 
1 A fi rst step towards harmonization has however been made with the 
adoption in Jul y 1988 of a directive obliging purchasers of shares to 
disclose ho ldings of quoted companies· sha res o nce they exceed a certain 
percentage of the total. 
2 Booz Allen and Hamilton used na ti onal sources and assembled data on 
all mergers and acq uisitions o f majority holdings disclosed by the sources. 
The fi gures should therefore be trea ted with caution and a comparison 
of numbers of opera ti ons between countries would not be meaningful. 
The result s obtained a re also markedly different from those of the EC 
Commission's Directora te-Genera l for Competition, which on ly relate 
to the I OOO biggest European fi rms. 
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interest to American firms which do not want to be left out 
of the process. In many industries American companies are 
making major acquisitions in Europe. Over the period 1980-
87, US firms acquired 314 companies in the UK (which 
continues to be the prime destination of American overseas 
investment), 95 in Germany and 88 in France, as against 
only 22 in Japan. In 1987 of USO 11 billion worth of 
acquisitions made by American firms , 78% was concentrated 
on the UK and Canada. 
Unlike the Americans, Japanese firms have traditionally 
preferred domestic production for cultural and historical 
reasons. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, many 
large Japanese groups have begun to internationalize their 
operations, as the high yen has reduced the cost of foreign 
acquisitions. But there have been only a few Japanese ac-
quisitions of European firms, like the takeover of Glaverbel 
by Asahi Glass or of Dunlop by Sumitomo Rubber In-
dustries. This situation could change rapidly with the coming 
of the single market. 
4.6. Mergers in services 
While the number of mergers involving the I OOO biggest 
manufacturing firms in Europe rose from 208 to 303 between 
1984-85 and 1986-87, the number of mergers recorded by 
the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition in 
distribution, banking and insurance over the same period 
rose from 67 to 112 (Table 4.4). 
In 1986-87 operations involving firms from the same country 
accounted for 70% of the total (79 of 112), a similar pattern 
to that observed in manufacturing. 
In banking and insurance, merger activity has sharply in-
creased. 
(i) In banking, the 200 largest banks in the world by asset 
value in 1986 included 46 Japanese with total assets of 
USO 79,4 billion, 38 American with total assets of USO 
75,6 billion and 75 European with assets of USO 158 
billion. Acquisitions are a quick way of establishing a 
presence in another Member State, and since 1986 they 
have proliferated, as shown in Table 4.5. 
The purpose of these mergers is not so much the achieve-
ment of economies of scale as a broadening of the 
product range and an extension of geographical cov-
erage. Mergers allow banks to offer their customers a 
wider range of services (international network) and to 
achieve cost reductions from this wider range ('scope 
economies'). 
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FIGURE 4.2: Mergers by nationality ofacquirerl 
500 
Number of mergers and acquisitions of majority stakes 
by nalionalily of acquiring finn 
Uniled Kingdom FR of Germany 
n/a 
France 
1982 1987 
Share of mergers and acquisitions involving other EC firms in total 
1982 1983 1984 
UK 37 34 39 
France 95 60 63 
FR of Germany n/a 83 86 
1 Sources differ fo r different countries. Comparison between countries for a given year wou ld therefore be misleading. 
Source : Booz. Allen & Hamilton. 
Table 4.4 
1985 
31 
47 
77 
200 
100 
0 
200 
100 
0 
1986 1987 
27 20 
77 50 
72 66 
National, EC cross-frontier and international (EC + non-EC) mergers (including acquisitions of majority holdings) in the Community 
1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 in services 
Sc.:ctor National EC c ro:,i:,.· fro nl1 t.T lntcrnat1onal Total 
1984-85 1985-86 1986-8 7 1984-8 5 1985-8(, 1986-87 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1984-85 1985-86 
Distribution 30 27 40 3 6 5 I 0 4 34 33 
Banking 10 12 22 6 4 3 2 9 10 18 25 
Insurance 7 5 17 7 3 7 4 4 15 12 
Total 47 44 79 16 13 15 4 13 18 67 70 
S01Jnt•: ."frn•11lt't'lllh R,•porr 011 Co111pt'titio11 Po/11y ( 1988 ). 
.. 
..• 
1986-87 
49 
35 
28 
11 2 
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(ii) In insurance, the top 10 companies in the world by 
premium income include only one European firm along-
side three Japanese and six American. This poor ranking 
points to a continuing fragmentation of the European 
industry in which European firms lag far behind their 
US and Japanese counterparts. The burst of merger 
activity in Europe is therefore not surprising. 
German insurance companies have been especially ac-
tive. Allianz, the largest European company, has 
established itself in Britain with the purchase of 100% 
of Cornhill Insurance (ECU 450 million) and a majority 
of Affiliated Legal Protection (ECU 9,5 million). Pre-
viously, Allianz had attempted to take over Eagle Star 
but was thwarted by BAT. In addition, Allianz owns 
43,5% of the Italian company R&S Insurance and is 
looking for French partners. Insurance companies in 
France feel they lack critical mass. The merger between 
Table 4.5 
Recent bank mergers and acquisitions 
Date Acquircr Country 
September PK Banken Sweden Takeover 
1986 
Compagnie du Midi and Axa is a response to this 
perceived need for larger size. 
In the financial sector as a whole the amount of merger and 
acquisition activity in Europe is as great as in the USA 
(ECU 17 billion in 1986), but in 1986 non-EC firms were 
involved in only 5,6% by value of these mergers. Again the 
situation varies considerably from one Member State to 
another, with some countries whose financial market is small 
(France, Spain and Italy) showing a preponderance of na-
tional deals (86,6% of the total), a relatively low average 
value per operation (ECU 32 million as against ECU 110 
million in Northern European countries) and very few cross-
frontier acquisitions (Muldur U. (1988)). 
Two remarks can be made about mergers and acquisitions 
in financial services. First, economies of scale are not impor-
tant in this domain, as labour and interest costs do represent 
Transaction Partner 
English trust group UK 
October Istituto Bancario San Paolo Acq. 6,4% shareholding Hambros UK 
1
1986 Torino 
December Deutsche Bank D Acquisition UKL 603 million Banca d'America e d'Italia USA 
1986 
February Paribas F Cooperation agreement Banca commerciale italiana 
1987 
July 1987 Banco de Bilbao E 5% shareholding Hambros UK 
November Istituto Ba:ncario San Paolo 49% shareholding Banque Vemes F 
1987 Torino 89% in 1989 
AGF F 11 % shareholding 
December Swiss Bank Corp. Switz. 51 % shareholding raised Banque Stem F 
1987 to 80% 
January Banco de Bilbao E Merger Banco de Vizcaya E 
1988 
February Amsterdam NL Exchange of shares Generale de Banque B 
1988 Rotterdam Bank 
March Banco de Nat-West March E 84% shareholding Banco de Asturia E 
1988 
June 1988 Banco Central E Merger Banco Espanol E 
June 1988 Nat-West UK Purchase Branches de la Banque de F 
!'Union 
October Royal Bank of Scotland UK Exchange of shares Banco Santander E 
1988 
S,mrn•: Nomura Research lnstllutc. 1988. 
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the major expenses. US banks for example, usually seem to 
exhaust size-related economies at a fairly low level of assets 
(USO 50 million). Second, mergers are far from being the 
easiest way for benefiting from the financial market integra-
tion. Europe's wholesale financial markets are already com-
petitive and bank mergers will make sense only in a limited 
number of cases. By contrast, Europe's retail financial mar-
kets may be headed for a shake-up through new entries. 
These entries require a retail network of offices or agents, 
obtained by opening new branches or by purchasing com-
petitors. Few financial firms are expected to follow the first 
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route, given the importance of taking speedy strategic actions 
and the already overbanked nature of most European 
countries. But purchasing a network has its own drawbacks. 
Many banks are owned by federal or provincial govern-
ments. Besides, banks for sale are frequently financially weak 
and costly to turn around. As we have seen in the case of 
industry, it is difficult to efficiently digest an acquisition. 
Friendly alliances ranging from agreements to cross-sell pro-
ducts to joint ventures could then be an alternative approach 
(see J. Morgan, 'Financial markets in Europe : towards 
1992', Worldfinancial markets, September 1988, No 5). 
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Chapter 5 - Assessment of merger trends with 
reference to sectoral criteria 
EC competition policy will be mainly concerned with mer-
gers between European-scale firms . It is therefore useful first 
to see how big a place large firms have in European industry 
overall. Then the section will look at the role of large firms 
in individual industries. Finally, we will consider recent 
patterns of merger activity in certain growth industries. 
5.1 . Concentration in manufacturing: interna-
tional comparisons 
Table 5.1 shows the share of the largest European firms in 
Community manufacturing industry and similar figures for 
the USA and Japan . 
Table 5.1 
Shares of manufacturing industry accounted for by large firms in the 
EC, USA and Japan - 1986 
% 
Share o f lhc n la rgcs l firms in to ta l sa les o f indust ry1 
10 20 
EUR 122 6,8 10,8 16,9 
USA 13,5 19,6 26,5 
Japan 8,0 12,6 17,5 
1 NACE sectors 1-4. 
~ Fo r EUR 12 total industry fi gures a rc based o n Com mission es tima tes. 
S011rn· : Nom'('/ EnmomiJI<'. ( 1987): calcu la tions by EC Commi ssion. 
40 
23 ,0 
34,6 
23,7 
The table shows clearly the importa nt part the largest firms 
play in European manufacturing. The top 40 firms for 
example account for 23% of a ll sa les generated by manufac-
turing, though representing less than 0,5% of manufacturing 
firms. 
Secondly, a comparison of the present situation in Europe 
wi th tha t prevailing in the USA shows that the giants of 
American industry are unquestionably even more significant 
for the US economy than their European counterparts are 
fo r the EC economy. The top 20 European companies gene-
ra te 16,9% of manufacturing turnover in the Community, as 
aga inst the 26,5% accounted for by the 20 largest American 
corporations. Compared with Japan however the signifi-
cance of the largest Europea n firm s in the EC is comparable 
to that of the leading Japanese firms in Japan. This shows 
that the top European companies already operate on a 
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Community-wide scale - another indication of the need for 
and importance of EC competition legislation. 
However there are major differences between individual in-
dustries within the manufacturing sector and these greatly 
exceed the differences observed between the three blocs 
(Europe, the USA and Japan) for manufacturing as a whole. 
Table 5.2 shows the share of total sales of selected manufac-
turing industries accounted for by the five or three biggest 
European firms in the industry. 
(i) In a few industries (e .g. motor vehicles, aerospace and 
computers), the five largest firms have a very large share 
- about two-thirds - of total sales. In some others 
(like tobacco, chemicals and electronics), the figures are 
over 40% . But it should be noted that the large shares 
of the market held by the biggest players in these in-
dustries are also partly due to the prominence of Ameri-
can multinationals in Europe. The prime example is 
IBM in computers. The share of the five largest firms 
in the total sales of these industries does not necessarily 
mean that mergers should be discouraged, especially 
between the smaller firms . Other factors too may argue 
in favour of mergers in industries dominated by a few 
large firms . Such factors include a market open to 
foreign competition, strong demand growth and the 
(ii) 
significance of R&D expenditure. In Part C we will 
suggest a procedure for vetting horizontal mergers in 
such industries which weighs the criteria of a possible 
reduction in competition against the possible efficiency 
gams. 
In other industries the concentration ratios are much 
lower, as in textiles, printing, metal goods and food. 
These findings on the significance of large firms are con-
sistent with those obtained from other sources (Buigues, 
Jacquemin (1988)). In industries such as computers, elec-
tronics and basic chemicals, firms employing over 500 people 
account for 70% of total sales in the industry in all EC 
countries for which data are available (Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, UK and Belgium). Conversely, the 
industries in which the top three or five firms have a smaller 
share of total industry sales are also those in the Buigues/ 
Jacquemin study in which firms employing more than 500 
people are less prominent (textiles, food and drink, tobacco). 
As we shall see in Part C, concentration ratios cannot be 
taken as the sole guide to the desirability of mergers in an 
industry. But they provide a necessary first indication of their 
impact. It is therefore clearly necessary that the Commission 
should have access to data allowing it to follow changes in 
concentration levels at a finer level of disaggregation. The 
NACE 3-digit level comprising 140 industries would be a 
first step . 
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Table 5.2 
Share of largest firms in output of selected EC industries 
% 
Industry NACE-C LI O Share o f top fi ve fi rms 
in to tal output 
Sha re o f to p th ree firms 
i n tot.ii output 
429 
431 to 439 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Chemicals 
Rubber 
251 to 256 + 259 
481 + 483 
43,7 
41 ,5 
22,3 
27,5 
6,4 
17,4 
241 to 248 Construction materials 
Iron and steel 
Metal goods 
Electronics 
221 to 224 + 31 I + 313 
312 + 314 a 316 6,9 
42,2 
65,5 
65,6 
28,7 
65,3 
13,7 
34, 1 
13,5 
12, 1 
Motor vehicles 
Aerospace 
Pharmaceuticals 
Computers, office equipment 
Industrial and agricultural machinery 
Drink 
342 to 347 
351 to 353 
364 
257 
330 
321 to 328 
424 to 427 
Food 
Printing and publishing 
411 to 423 + 428 
473 + 474 
Source: Co mmission services. DG 11 . 
5.2. Merger activity and economic conditions 
in industry 
The variety of situations found in different industries makes 
horizontal comparison difficult. But a study of merger and 
acquisition activity in growth and technology-intensive in-
dustries is instructive. Annex l(d) summarizes the data avail-
able at the finest level of disaggregation possible . 
Figures for the volume of domestic demand for industries' 
products in the EC, the USA and Japan show that for some 
industries demand growth has been little affected by the 
cyclical fluctuations seen in industrial economies. This is the 
case for example in computers, electronics, telecommunica-
tions, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
In these industries demand has continued to grow in volume 
terms at an average rate of 5% a year (Buigues, Goybet 
( 1988)). But it is here tha t EC firm s have lost the bigges t 
sha re of export markets compared with o ther OEC D 
countries: between l 979 and 1986 their sha re of export 
markets declined by nearly 2 percentage points, whereas tha t 
of Japanese industry went up by 7,6 points over the same 
period. Meanwhile, the import penetrati on of Community 
markets has been increasing : the sha re of EC demand 
supplied by imports from outside the EC rose from l 3,0% 
in 1979 to 20,0% in l 985. 
An ana lysis of merger acti vity in these industri es over the 
period 1982-87 shows tha t growth industri es have a number 
of features tha t set them apa rt from the rest of industry: 
(a) First of all , the number of mergers and acqui sit ions o f 
majority holdings involving firm s in the top l OOO has ri sen 
significantly less quickly in growth secto rs than in the rest 
of industry (Figure 5.1). 
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FIGURE 5.1: Index of merger and acquisition activity (1982-
83 = 100)1 
300 
200 
100 
Other 
industries 
Growth 23 indlllitries 
Year 
1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 
' The absolute number or mergers and acquisitions in each sector (growth industries 
and other) would be meaningless. as it depends on the number orlirms in the sample 
(the I OOO largest) belonging to that sector. 
Sour~: Competition reports. 
This is at first sight surprising in that in these industries 
mergers often produce substantial efficiency gains. A compa-
rison of the size of European firms with that of their Ameri-
can and Japanese competitors (Table 5.3) reveals that the 
European market leaders are smaller (for example in the 
aerospace, computer and consumer electronics sectors). 
While international comparisons of sales figures are not free 
of problems as they only reflect year-to-year positions at 
prevailing exchange rates, it is noticeable that for the same 
year and exchange rate European firms were among the 
world's largest in mature or declining industries such as steel 
or textiles. 
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As noted in Chapter 3, mergers must not automatically be 
rejected in growth industries. This is because : 
(i) the increase in merger activity has been less in industries 
facing a growth in demand than in industry overall; 
(ii) the European market leaders in these sectors are smaller 
than their international competitors; 
(iii) European firms have lost market share in third country 
markets and on the Community market in these in-
dustries . 
(b) A second observation is that it is in industries facing 
strong growth in demand that European firms often prefer 
mergers with partners from other countries. 
Whereas link-ups with firms from the same country accoun-
ted for 77, I % of the mergers recorded between 1982 and 
1987 in industries with weak or falling demand and 70% of 
those in sectors with moderate demand growth, in high-
growth industries they only represented 53,5% . Necessity 
being the mother of invention, the more strongly the market 
is growing and the higher the technological sophistication 
of the products, the more firms are obliged to leave their 
national market in order to attain the necessary volume of 
output to produce at lowest cost or to acquire technology 
unobtainable on their home market. 
In growth industries 32,5% of mergers involved firms from 
other Member States, compared with only 16,8% for in-
dustries with static demand growth, while 14% involved 
non-EC partners in high demand sectors and 6, I% in low. 
The proportion of joint ventures involving partners from 
non-EC countries is higher than in the case of mergers. In 
1987 non-EC firms were the partner in 50% of joint ventures 
in EC manufacturing industry. Of the 45 joint ventures with 
non-Community partners the other company was American 
in 22 cases and Japanese in 13. 
This second fact points to the importance for a Community 
merger control policy of clearly distinguishing between oper-
ations in growth (and generally technology-intensive) in-
dustries and in mature or declining industries. In the former 
case, the Community or international scale of the market is 
more pronounced. Moreover, in these sectors the integrated 
market will make substantial restructuring necessary since 
potential economies of scale are particularly significant, and 
European industry is in a relatively vulnerable position com-
pared with its main overseas competitors. 
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Table 5.3 
World and European leaders 
Sector Sales World 
of world 
leader 
ECU Company name NaL. 
billion 
Manufacturing sector 
Aerospace 16,8 Boeing USA 
Food 25,8 Unilever NL/UK 
Vehicles 105,8 General Motors 
Mechanical engineering 16,4 Mitsubishi 
Electrical engineering 2,6 General Electric 
Chemicals, pharmaceu-
ticals 28,0 Dupont de Nemours 
Oil 71,9 Exxon 
Computers 50,5 IBM 
Photographic products 11 ,9 Eastman-Kodak 
Cosmetics 2,7 L'Oreal 
Toys 1,4 Hasbro 
Consumer electronics 10,3 Matsushita JVC 
Steel 14;2 Thyssen 
Textiles 3,1 Courtaulds 
Services sector 
Banking 224,4 Dai-ichi Kangyo 
Media 4,3 Bertelsmann 
Advertising1 0,7 Dentsu Inc. 
Hotels Holiday Inn 
Airlines 8,8 United 
I Gross income 1986. 
Source : 'Laguerre mondiale des entreprises 1987'. l 'Expansion, 6/1 9. November 1987 . 
Table 5.4 
Mergers by geographical type and economic conditions in industry 
Total period 1982-87 
Strong Moderate Weak 
growth growth j!TOWth 
National 53,5 70,0 77,1 
(same EC country) 
EC 32,5 19.2 16,8 
(different EC countries) 
International 14,0 10,8 6, 1 
(EC+ non-EC) 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sourn?: Se'l'enleenrh Rt•port on Compt•tition Policy and DG IV. 
USA 
Japan 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
F 
USA 
Japan 
D 
UK 
Japan 
D 
Japan 
USA 
USA 
% 
Yt'ar: /YH6 
Sales Europe Number 
of Eur. of companies 
leader in top n companies 
ECU Company name Nat. EUR USA Japan n 
billion 
5,0 Aerospatiale F 7 13 20 
25,8 Unilever NL/UK 4 14 20 
31 ,0 Daimler/ Benz D 7 3 8 20 
8,2 Mannesmann D 4 2 2 10 
0,4 Philips NL 3 3 4 10 
19,3 Bayer D 9 10 20 
66,7 RD Shell NL/ UK 5 10 2 20 
4,5 Siemens D 4 II 5 20 
3,3 Agfa Gevaert D I 2 2 5 
2,7 L'Oreal F I 3 I 5 
5 5 
8,1 Philips NL 2 0 3 5 
14,2 Thyssen D 8 4 5 20 
3,1 Courtaulds UK 3 II 5 20 
146,5 Credit Agricole F 7 I 12 20 
4,3 Bertelsmann D 2 5 2 10 
0,5 Saatchi et Saatchi UK I 8 I 10 
Compton 
Trusthouse Forte UK 2 8 10 
4,8 British Airways UK 3 6 10 
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Part C - Analysis for the purposes of European merger control 
The impact of a merger can be of three basic types: it can 
improve efficiency without any reduction of competition, 
reduce competition without any gain in efficiency, or have 
effects at once conducive to efficiency and harmful to compe-
tition. As the first case is wholly positive, only the second 
and third situations give cause for concern. The questions 
which arise are, first, what criteria are there to determine 
whether a merger or takeover will bring about a significant 
reduction in competition? Secondly, if a significant reduction 
in competition is likely, what criteria are there to estimate 
possible efficiency gains as a result of the operation and to 
determine whether these outweigh the adverse effects? 
With specific reference to the proposed European merger 
control regulation (see text in Annex 2), Chapter 6 of Part 
C begins by looking at the criteria, generally accepted in 
competition policies, for the impact of concentration on 
competition in the light of the discussion in Parts A and B. 
On the basis of these criteria Chapter 7 goes on to examine 
the criteria adopted in the merger control proposal, including 
the turnover measure, and assesses the value of efficiency 
gains as a justification for mergers both in relation to the 
regulation and to the economic and political role that the 
Commission will be called upon to play in administering the 
European merger control system. Chapter 8 suggests the 
order of steps to be followed in the merger vetting process. 
First of all, the complementary nature of the relationship 
between control of mergers at the level of competition policy 
and the control of takeover bids (TOB) in the field of 
company law must be underlined. On the one hand a regu-
lation of TOB could ensure the publicity and transparency 
of large-scale mergers at Community level mainly by requir-
ing that the acquisition of voting rights in an enterprise 
above a certain threshold should force the bidder to make 
a public purchase or exchange offer. Requirements for infor-
mation about the intentions of the predator concerning 
the future activities of the firm involved follow the same 
guidelines. On the other hand we have seen in Part A that 
takeover bids constitute a means whereby competition is 
enhanced, encouraging the replacement of inefficient man-
agement. Their regulation could therefore outlaw certain 
defensive measures which would prevent in an abusive fa-
shion the functioning of a free 'market for corporate control'. 
The recent Directive of the Commission, whose text is pro-
vided in Annex 3, conforms to this approach. 
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Chapter 6 - Criteria for a reduction in Euro-
pean competition 
In the European merger control proposal the first two 
articles are of key importance for the economic analysis. 
They state that the mergers covered by the regulation are 
those which have a Community dimension and that of such 
mergers those which create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion in the common market or a substantial part of it are to 
be disallowed. The criteria adopted for determining whether 
this is the case are (Article 2(1)): 
(i) the market position and economic and financial power 
of the firms concerned; 
(ii) the possibilities of choice of suppliers and consumers; 
(iii) access to supplies or markets; 
(iv) the structure of the markets affected, having regard to 
international competition; 
(v) barriers to entry (legal or de facto); 
(vi) the trend of supply and demand for the goods or services 
concerned. 
It is further stated in the recitals that mergers which, on 
account of the small market share of the firms concerned, are 
unlikely to impede effective competition may be presumed to 
be compatible with the common market (and would there-
fore not be blocked), and that this presumption exists in 
particular where the merging firms do not have a market 
share of over 25% in the common market as a whole or in 
any substantial part of it. 
To evaluate the implications of these prov1s1ons, we will 
examine them in the light of the criteria which economic 
analysis suggests should be used in assessing the competitive 
impact of a horizontal merger. 
6.1. Criteria suggested by economic analysis 
From the simple model described in Part A it is clear that it 
is impossible to rely on a single criterion to determine the 
danger of a merger's conferring or strengthening monopoly 
power. At the margin, in a perfectly contestable market, 
where among other things there is complete freedom of entry 
and exit, a horizontal merger that raised a firm's share of 
the market to I 00% would still not automatically give the 
firm monopoly power. 
In fact, to assess the competitive impact of a horizontal 
merger it is necessary to analyse several aspects of the struc-
ture of the market. 
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First of all, we have to define what the relevant market is. 
In this market we have to include all the goods (or services) 
that are close substitutes from the consumer's point of view. 
The definition must also determine the geographical extent 
of the market (local, regional or international), i.e. the area 
within which a purchaser can reasonably be expected to 
consider offers of the goods or service. 
Secondly, the degree of concentration of this market must 
be calculated and the possible impact of the merger on the 
scope for collusion estimated. 
Thirdly, the relative ease of entry into the market has to 
be assessed, whether for domestic or foreign firms or for 
imports. 
In Part B two further very important factors from the point 
of view of the single European market were identified and 
analysed with reference to EC data. These are the rate 
of growth in the industry and the degree of openness to 
international trade. As we shall see, these factors are very 
important for the assessment of the three aspects mentioned 
above. 
Competition policies consider goods (or services) as forming 
a market if there is effective competition between them, 
which implies a sufficient degree of interchangeability for the 
same use (see for example the European Court of Justice's 
judgment in Hoffman-La Roche (1979) in which each group 
of vitamins was considered to form a separate market be-
cause of their specific metabolizing functions). A theoretical 
way of measuring interchangeability is to calculate the cross-
elasticity of demand. If this is positive and high, there is a 
presumption of interchangeability. 1 In practice this type of 
calculation is supplemented or replaced by an examination 
of the specific features of the various products to determine 
whether they can really be said to satisfy the same need. The 
current merger guidelines of the US Anti-trust Division2 
have adopted a new approach to this question: rather than 
looking to data of actual substitution, they refer to a concept 
of potential substitution. 
1 Cross-elasticity of demand can be expressed as: 
Eij = liqi . pj 
lipj qi 
where qi is the quantity demanded of product i and pj is the price of 
product j. If a given increase in the price of product j leads to a large 
increase in the quantity demanded of product i, it is concluded that the 
two products are substitutes. Obtaining data for such changes is not easy 
and in addition the conclusions depend on the ceteris paribus assumption. 
2 US Department of Justice, Merger guidelines, 14 June 1982. 
A market is defined as a group of products such that a 
hypothetical monopolist or cartel controlling all production 
capacity for the products could profitably increase the price 
by 5% above the current price for a non-transitory period. 
The market thus represents the businesses a producer must 
control in order to be able to significantly increase prices. 
Such a definition requires a consideration of all potential 
substitutions in the demand (buyers defecting to other pro-
ducts) and supply sides (sellers of other products switching 
their capacity to supply the market in which prices have been 
raised). 1 If prices cannot be increased by such a percentage it 
is because substitutability acts as a strong constraint. 
The emphasis on the ability of a hypothetical monopolist to 
raise prices accords fairly well with the European concept 
of dominant position, which is characterized by the possi-
bility of independent conduct whereby the firm is able to 
act without great regard to its competitors, customers or 
consumers (see in particular the Court of Justice's judgments 
in Continental Can (1973) and United Brands (1978)). 
Nevertheless, the criterion raises at least two questions. 
First, the equating of actual and potential competition is 
open to objection: not only is the evaluation of the intensity 
of potential competition much more subjective, but also its 
effects are felt over a longer time scale than those of actual 
competition. 
Secondly, reference to the current price would be inappropri-
ate if this already reflected monopoly power as it would 
lead to existing dominant positions not being identified and 
challenged. 2 
This suggests that in defining the relevant market for anti-
trust purposes we should be wary of relying exclusively on 
quantitative or mechanical tests which inevitably involve a 
degree of arbitrariness, and should include qualitative analy-
ses that take into account the special features of each case. 
The definition of the geographic market must have regard 
to a number of well-known criteria: the significance of 
transport costs, the perishability of the project, local or 
1 In the Continental Can case (1973) the European Court of Justice held 
that in defining the relevant product market the Commission had failed 
to consider the possibility of substitution on the supply side, i.e. the ease 
with which cylindrical metal can producers could switch their production 
to making packaging in more complex shapes for meat and fish. 
2 Schmalensee (1988): 'It makes sense to define a market as something 
that could profitably be monopolized, not as something for which price 
could be profitably increased over current (possibly monopolistic) levels'. 
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regional differences and consumption habits. But the crucial 
aspect, given the 1992 programme, is the degree of openness 
to international trade. 
In defining the geographic market it is therefore natural to 
take into account the production capacity of foreign firms 
selling into the relevant market, national or European. If 
there are imports into the market, a certain rise in prices on 
the market is liable to produce an increase in imports or 
even a complete switching of foreign production to the 
market. Clearly, the removal of non-tariff barriers in the 
Community will increase such effects and reduce the danger 
of mergers leading to monopolization. 
In Part A it was shown that imports could exert considerable 
competitive pressure on domestic products. The model dis-
cussed there suggests that the more foreign firms sell on a 
market, the less is the loss of consumer welfare on that 
market resulting from a merger and the more likely in fact 
there is to be a net social gain. 
In applying Article 86 the Commission and the Court of 
Justice have regularly taken imports and even potential 
competition from abroad into account in defining the geo-
graphic market. In some cases this approach has led to the 
market being defined as the world market (for example 
Bayer/Gist (1976), Commercial Solvents (1974), Hoffman-La 
Roche (1979)). 
But the role played by international competition is extremely 
variable. First, as we saw in Part B from a classification of 
industries according to their degree of openness to imports, 
there is wide variation in import penetration ratios (share 
of imports in domestic consumption) between industries. 
Secondly, foreign competition is not a perfect substitute for 
domestic competition in that import flows are subject to 
extra uncertainties that do not affect domestic production. 
For example, economic measures such as tariffs, quotas, 
standards or safeguard clauses can stop the flow of imports. 
As we saw in Part A, this is also true of macroeconomic 
measures such as a devaluation of the domestic currency 
against that of the exporting country, which can make im-
ports uncompetitive. In general, exchange rate volatility 
reduces the protection that foreign competition affords 
against the adverse effects of a domestic merger. Also, tne 
intensity of competitive pressure from imports is more likely 
to change than that from domestic competition. 
Hence it is not surprising that in a considerable number of 
cases, the Commission and the Court of Justice have held 
the relevant geographic market to be only part of the Com-
munity market, the national market of a medium-sized 
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Member State, and even only part of a large Member State 
(Sugar cartel ( I 975)). I 
The degree of concentration on the relevant market has 
hitherto been considered as the crucial criterion both on the 
basis of the theoretical models presented in Part A and of 
econometric studies establishing positive correlations bet-
ween concentration ratios and profitability. The Herfindahl 
index is particularly illuminating in this respect. 
Unlike measures based on the market shares only of the 
largest firms, the Herfindahl index reflects the distribution 
of the market shares of all firms: for a given number of 
firms it is higher where the distribution of market shares is 
very unequal and lower where the distribution is more even. 
Also, it is strongly influenced by the distribution of the 
shares of the largest firms. This aspect is important because 
it is reasonable to assume that collusive behaviour is more 
likely in the case of a more unequal distribution so that there 
should be a positive correlation between the concentration 
figure and the likelihood of collusion. 
Again, use of this index in the European context requires 
consideration of the degree of openness to international 
trade. A possible approach would be to calculate market 
shares excluding exports out of the relevant geographic 
market (national or Community) and including imports into 
the market. 2 
The Herfindahl index has been adopted in the current US 
merger guidelines to determine the threshold from which a 
merger is considered dangerous. It is also used in some 
studies by the EC Commission. To obtain the index as a 
whole number, the squares of the market shares expressed 
as fractions are multiplied by 10 OOO. Thus in the case of a 
monopoly with one firm holding I 00% of the market, H = 
I O OOO. Where, on the other hand, the industry is composed 
of n firms of equal size, 
H = 10 OOO 
n 
1 In the case of the planned sale of BSN's Dutch and German glassmaking 
interests to Pilkington, the Commission made it clear to the parties that 
the geographic market in which Pilkington had a dominant position 
(here the British nat glass market) could be different from the location 
of the abuse (here the Dutch and German markets). See Tenth Report 
on Competition Policy (1981) p. 133 et seq. 
2 Let Pi be the output of firm i and P the total output of all firms in the 
relevant market, Xi the exports of firm i and X total exports and M total 
imports. 
H = . ~ [ (Pi - Xi)/(P - X + M)2] 
I= I 
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The US merger guidelines lay down the rule that in markets 
where the value of H is above I 800, mergers can expect to 
be challenged if they increase the index by 25 points or more. 
An index reading of I 800 is equivalent to 5,5 or 6 equal-sized 
firms, and roughly corresponds to a four-firm concentration 
ratio of over 70%.3 
It is worth noting that in applying Article 86, the EC authori-
ties have regard not to the degree of concentration, but 
directly to the market share of the firm concerned. The 
Court of Justice ( Hoffman-La Roche ( I 979)) has held that 
barring exceptional circumstances a large market share is 
sufficient evidence by itself of a dominant position. 
In particular a market share of 80% or over has been 
regarded as pointing to a dominant position without the 
need for further evidence while for shares of 40 or 50% 
further particulars would be required. 
There are strong objections to such a use of concentration 
ratios and market share data. As we have seen, the theory 
tells us that concentration ratios ( or market share data) 
alone cannot be used to prove the existence of monopoly 
power. In most cases high concentration and a large market 
share is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Other 
variables must be lakt:n into consideration, such as the 
elasticity of demand and entry conditions. Furthermore, 
recent empirical work suggests that where it exists the corre-
lation between the degree of concentration and profitability 
is statistically weak and unstable. On the other hand, the 
correlation with price is generally positive and strong, which 
is an argument in favour of relating concentration to collu-
sion (for a recent survey, see Schmal en see ( I 988). 
These reservations about concentration and market share 
data - apart from the inevitable arbitrariness of the 
thresholds chosen - suggest that high concentration or 
market share should be regarded merely as indicators trig-
gering an investigation since they are usually necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for the exercise of monopoly power. 
The investigation itself should focus on the conduct, namely 
whether a merger is liable to affect the interests of consumers 
directly or indirectly through a substantial change in market 
structure. Similarly, at a legal level, it is not market con-
3 At the other extreme, for H values of less than I OOO (equivalent to 10 
firms of equal size and a four-firm concentration ratio of above 40%), 
the market is nol considered lo be concentrated and mergers are presumed 
acceptable. 
centration as such that should be set up as a separate legal 
category and subject of control, but the act of merger.' 
This position appears to be taken by the draft merger control 
regulation when it makes a presumption that mergers invol-
ving a market share of under 25% are compatible with the 
common market. However unlike the American system no 
reference at all is made to the concentration of the market, 
even only as a trigger. 
Jn recent years entry and exit conditions to and from the 
relevant market have been assigned increasing importance. 
The famous study by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) 
showed that, even in a monopoly, price could equal average 
and marginal costs in equilibrium if the market was perfectly 
contestable. This state requires completely free entry and 
exit, but is also compatible with the existence of economies 
of scale. If this situation of con testability were general, the 
role of competition policy would be very small and even 
large market shares would not call for intervention. In fact, 
it is clear that in most industries there are barriers to entry 
in the form of sunk costs and that even where sunk costs are 
quite low (compared with the variable costs of production or 
because only part of high fixed costs are truly irrecoverable 
and therefore sunk), this is sufficient to make potential 
competition incapable of forcing prices down to the competi-
tive level. 2 
The question is therefore to estimate the height of such entry 
barriers. Among the factors to be taken into consideration 
are the capital cost of entry, the structure of production 
costs (and especially whether there are economies of scale 
with sunk costs necessitating entry on a large scale), and the 
speed at which entry is possible. The latter is largely depen-
dent on the need to change consumer habits or to incur 
high expenditure on product promotion and establishing 
reputation. In the light of these factors it can be assumed, 
as we suggested in Part B, that industries experiencing strong 
growth in demand and relatively open to trade are, other 
things being equal, less protected by entry barriers. Conver-
sely, mature industries (where competition is often non-
existent) or those relatively closed to imports are less subject 
to potential competition; in these cases, the analysis should 
focus on current concentration of the market. 3 
1 For a legal analysis on these lines, see Vogel ( 1988) and the preface by 
B. Goldman. It should be pointed out that contrary to the view expressed 
by Vogel, this legal approach is not inconsistent with the economic view, 
as presented by a dynamic analysis of strategic conduct by firms wishing 
to alter over time the structure of their markets. Sec Jacquemin { 1987). 
For the empirical aspect, see Baumol and Willig { 1980) and for the 
theoretical arguments. Dasgupta and Stiglitz { 1988). 
3 See Salop { 1986). 
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Finally, in assessing whether or not entry barriers are such 
as to allow mergers to have anti-competitive effects the 
question to be asked is the same as for defining the relevant 
market: would new sellers find it profitable to enter the 
market if the merger led to a rise in prices? 
Once again to answer this question it is not possible to use 
a simple, single measure. We must assemble a body of data 
with which to make a qualitative classification similar to that 
made by Bain (1962) into high, medium and low barriers. 
6.2. Analysis of the European merger control 
proposal 
(a) Article 2: mergers which 'create or strengthen a domi-
nant position' 
We now look at what the EC proposal has to say about the 
criteria for identifying the competitive effects of a merger in 
the light of the above discussion. 
The list in Article 2 contains no reference to concentration 
but does mention other criteria such as 'market position', 
'economic and financial power of the firms concerned' and 
'structure of the markets affected'. 
Market position can only be determined by reference to a 
number of structural features. Market structure includes 
distribution of market shares and entry barriers, which are 
mentioned separately. As for economic and financial power, 
this probably cannot be equated with a size or performance 
criterion, since the Court of Justice has explicitly rejected the 
relevance of these two factors for establishing the existence of 
a dominant position (Hoffman-La Roche (1979)). However, 
it could perhaps be a factor in assessing ability to prevent 
entry. 
That leaves four criteria: 
The 'possibilities of choice of suppliers and consumers' are 
key elements in market definition. 'Access to supplies or 
markets' is related to vertical integration but is also an 
important factor in the identification of entry barriers which 
are referred to separately ('legal or de facto barriers to 
entry'). 
The same applies to 'international competition', which must 
be taken into account in several connections, namely in 
defining the relevant market, in measuring concentration 
and in evaluating entry barriers. 
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Finally, the dynamic aspect is taken into account in the 
reference to the 'supply and demand trends for the relevant 
goods or services'. As we have seen in Part B, such trends 
can lead to a presumption of greater or lesser competitive 
pressure. 
The overall impression given by Article 2 is that the list 
is unsystematic and needs to be Oeshed out by guidelines 
elucidating the criteria and setting out the procedural steps 
that will be followed in assessing mergers. 
(b) Article 1(2): the turnover criterion 
As noted above, the Court of Justice has rejected a number 
of criteria for identifying a dominant position which are also 
unsupported by the economic evidence. The principal of such 
criterion is absolute size. Yet Article I uses this criterion. It 
states that a merger has a Community dimension and so 
falls under the regulation where the total worldwide sales of 
all the firms concerned exceed ECU I billion and the tota l 
sales in the Community of at least two of the firms concerned 
exceed ECU 100 million . However, mergers do not have a 
Community dimension (and fall outside the scope of the 
regulation) where each of the firms concerned earns more 
than three-quarters of its total sales within the Community 
in one and the same Member State. 
The thinking behind this approach is explained in the pre-
amble to the regulation . There it is said that the regulation 
should apply to 'structural alterations the effects of which are 
substantial and go beyond national borders of one Member 
State'. The scope of application of the regulation should 
therefore be 'defined according to the territory of operations 
of the firms concerned and be limited by quantitative 
thresholds in order to include only those operations which 
have a Community dimension'. This is the case, the preamble 
continues, where the aggregate turnover of all the firms 
concerned exceeds a given level and each of the firms invol-
ved in the merger has its sole or principal field of activities 
in a different Member State. I 
Two reasons for using a sa les threshold are that it reduces 
lega l uncertainty about when the regulation applies, as sales 
1 It wou ld a lso be the case where although the firms concerned mainly 
operate in a single Member State at least one of them has substantial 
operations in other Member States through subsidia ries o r direct sa les. 
or where mergers by firms not having their sphere of operati ons in the 
Community are likely to have effects in the com mon market. 
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figures can be directly calculated, and cuts down the number 
of cases that have to be processed. But the choice of such a 
threshold has major economic implications as for some 
industries it will be high relative to total Community output 
while for others it will be low. 
( i) Industries in which total output is low relative to an 
£CU 1 billion threshold 
In some industries total Community output is of the order 
of ECU 2-3 billion, and in a few it is under I billion. (While 
this is the figure for Community, not world , output, many 
of these industries are fragmented and so world output 
figures are not relevant.) Of the approximately 120 3-digit 
NACE industrial sectors, 15 have a total EC output of less 
than ECU 3 billion and seven an output under ECU 1,2 
billion (see Table 6. 1 ). But the 3-digit NACE sub-divisions 
are still quite broad categories as compared with product 
groups. For example NACE 453 'Manufacture of ready-
made clothing and accessories' is counted as a single 3-digit 
sector, but it covers completely different businesses such 
as women's and girls' outerwear (453.1), men's outerwear 
(543.2), rainwear and leather clothing (453.4), underwear, 
corsetry and shirts (543.5), hats (453.6) etc. 
Hence, an ECU I billion threshold could miss a large number 
of mergers in industries in which total EC output is itself 
around this figure allowing even a monopoly to fall below 
the threshold . Thus, the problem of mergers falling below 
the ECU I billion threshold in niche markets in which total 
output is low and the market shares of the merging firms 
very high is not tackled by the proposal. The regulation is 
silent about such cases, whose number it is difficult to 
estimate. 
( ii ) Industries in which EC output is very high relative to an 
£CU 1 billion threshold 
In other industries EC output is very high relative to an 
ECU I billion threshold . There are about 15 3-digit NACE 
sectors in which total EC output is over or around ECU 40 
billion. (See Table 6.2) . 
In such industries the danger posed by a firm arising out 
of the merger of two firms with consolidated sales of on ly 
ECU I billion may be very small indeed. As such, modifica-
tions of the threshold will not solve the problem. 
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Table 6.1 
Sectors in which 1985 EUR 12 output was under ECU 3 billion 
232 
244 
246 
319 
348 
363 
365 
374 
434 
435 
455 
456 
466 
492 
493 
Salts of potassium and of natural phosphates 
Articles made of asbestos (except for articles made of asbestos-cement) 
Grindstones and other abrasive products 
Other metal workshop products n.e.s. 
Assembly and installation of electrical equipment and apparatus (except work relating to the wiring of buildings) 
Cycles, motorcycles, invalid carriages 
Children's prams, invalid chairs, animal-drawn vehicles 
Clocks and watches 
Preparation and spinning of flax , hemp and ramie 
Jute industry 
Household linen, bedding, curtains, wall coverings and awnings, sails, flags , bags 
Fur articles 
Articles of cork, straw, basketware (other than furniture) , brooms, brushes 
Musical instruments 
Products for developing and printing cinematographic and photographic films 
Sourt"c·: Europc•an Ernnomy No 35 (1988). Annex C. Table I Dimension and structure or the internal ma rket : prod uction {E UR 12), 1985. 
Table 6.2 
Sectors in which 1985 EUR 12 output was over or around ECU 10 billion 
221 
224 
251 
257 
316 
328 
342 
344 
351 
412 
413 
429 
467 
473 
483 
Cast iron, crude steel, hot-rolled products, cold-rolled sheet, coated sheet (ECSC products) 
Non-ferrous metals 
Basic chemicals 
Pharmaceutical products 
Tools and finished metal a rticles, except electrical equipment 
Other machinery and mechanical equipment 
Electric motors, generators, transformers , switches 
Telecommunications equipment, meters and measuring equipment, electro-medical equipment 
Motor vehicles and engines 
Meat, meat products, other products from slaughtered animals 
Milk and dairy products 
Tobacco products 
Wood and cane furniture , mattresses 
Printing products 
Plastic products 
S11 11rn•: J::uropmn J::nnwmy No JS ( 1988 ). Annex C. Ta ble I Dimension and structure or the in ternal ma rket pru<l ut: tion (EU R 12). 1985. 
3,0 
1,2 
1,2 
1,2 
2,4 
3,0 
0,6 
2,4 
1,8 
1,8 
3,0 
0,6 
1,8 
1,2 
1,2 
100,8 
47, l 
129,2 
37,4 
58,0 
62,2 
54,4 
50, l 
126,2 
59,8 
69,4 
44,7 
42,9 
54,9 
48,9 
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Chapter 7 - The efficiency defence 
In Part A we presented a simple analysis of mergers by 
which it is theoretically possible to identify cases in which 
the loss of efficiency due to a restrictive effect on competition 
to produce output is more than offset by a positive impact 
on costs and prices. 
It is clear however that in an economy characterized by 'non-
convexity', product differentiation, incessant technological 
change and imperfect information, it is impossible to reduce 
the determinants of social welfare to a simple price-output 
relation at a given point in time. Welfare is in fact determined 
by multiple factors including product quality and durability, 
security of supply, the pace of technical progress and innova-
tion. The narrow efficiency criterion is only a subset of the 
general concept of the interest of consumers. But once the 
need for this extension is recognized the analysis runs into 
serious problems. Many of these aspects are not measurable. 
Also, difficult trade-offs have to be made. How for example 
can one determine whether the effect of a reduction in output 
of a product is offset by an increase in resources devoted to 
R&D or a greater variety of products? 
Such questions belong to the difficult area of theory of the 
'second best' which can provide few general conclusions 
about the optimality of conduct. The situation becomes 
more complicated if we try to include the redistributive 
effects of mergers between producers and consumers and to 
determine whether the efficiency gains brought about by a 
merger are passed on to buyers. 
In its proposal the Commission has clearly opted for a 
pragmatic approach and a broad interpretation of the effi-
ciency concept on the lines of Article 85(3). 
The pragmatic approach emerges clearly in the preamble, 
which states that the dismantling of non-tariff barriers will 
lead to major and beneficial corporate restructuring in the 
Community, particularly through merger. It goes on to say 
that such developments are to be welcomed as they will help 
strengthen the competitiveness of European industry. On 
the other hand, the restructuring should not be allowed to 
cause lasting damage to competition. Thus, no presumption 
for or against mergers is made. Rather, a neutral stance is 
adopted, a position justified by the theoretical and empirical 
analysis presented in Part A of this report. 
As far as the interpretation of efficiency is concerned the 
proposal says that mergers will be allowed if the resulting 
harm to competition is more than compensated by the 
contribution the merger makes to the attainment of basic 
objectives of the Treaty, and in particular to: 'improving 
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technical or economic progress or to improving the competi-
tive structure within the common market, taking due account 
of the competitiveness of the firms concerned with regard to 
international competition and of the interests of consumers, 
provided that they do not: 
(a) impose on the firms concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the achievement of the merger; or 
(b) afford the firms concerned the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods 
or services concerned' (Article 2(3)). 
The choice of factors reflects the Commission's concern 
both to have regard to dynamic as well as static economies 
(improvement in production or distribution, promotion of 
technical or economic progress) and to consider competitive 
conditions on the international market as well as the Euro-
pean domestic market (structure of competition within the 
common market, international competition). 
With regard to the latter aspect, the analysis in Part B 
showed that European firms in growth and technology-
intensive industries are currently in a weak position. They 
are losing market share and are often smaller than their 
American or Japanese rivals. This prevents them exploiting 
all the possible economies of scale. In these industries mer-
gers may therefore enhance efficiency. 
But in view of the findings of empirical research against a 
general presumption in favour of mergers and the fact that 
firms themselves are best placed to identify the efficiency 
gains they expect from a merger, it is reasonable to place 
the main burden of proof of efficiency gains on the initiator 
of the operation and to require the production of detailed 
evidence. In Fisher's (1988) words, 'such claims are easily 
made and .... often too easily believed'. A trap into which 
the Commission sometimes fell in its early application of 
Article 85(3) and which should be avoided now is that of 
being too easily satisfied with general statements about the 
possibilities of rationalization or synergies. 1 
As well as a reference to the interests of consumers, which 
might require a consideration of the redistributive and not 
merely allocative effects of the merger, two conditions are 
specified for the acceptance of an efficiency defence. 
1 Whereas in the early days of the application of Article 85 some commen-
tators thought an exemption under Article 85(3) would be very diflicult, 
if not impossible to obtain, it seems that in a number of early cases the 
Commission granted exemption mainly on the basis of the text of the 
agreement. See Jacquemin ( 1970). 
First, the merger must not impose on the firms concerned 
restrictions not indispensable to the success of the operation. 
An alternative wording, consistent with Article 85(3), would 
have been to say that a merger will only be approved if the 
resulting efficiency gains probably cannot be obtained by 
alternative means less restrictive than the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. 
We saw in Part A that the economic benefits of large scale 
could be attained in many alternative ways, including by 
internal growth and cooperation. A reasonable requirement 
would therefore be to show by reference to differences in 
transaction costs, speed, etc., that the merger route was 
preferable. 
The second condition is that the merger does not give the 
merging firms the ability to eliminate competition in a 
substantial part of the market. This is no doubt failsafe: as 
in Article 85(3), it allows the Commission to block mergers 
without really examining the efficiency arguments. 
It should be pointed out, however, that although Article 
2 is concerned with the conditions for exceptions to the 
prohibition of mergers which establish or strengthen a domi-
nant position, it will not be easy to distinguish in practice 
between the establishment or strengthening of a dominant 
position and acquisition of the power to eliminate competi-
tion in a substantial part of the market. Another point is 
that the provisions go further than Article 86, which only 
condemns the strengthening of dominant positions but re-
gards the establishment of such a position as legal. This 
extension has required the Commission to invoke Article 
235 of the Treaty which allows the Council to take action 
unanimously for cases in which the Treaty has not provided 
the necessary powers. 
Chapter 7 - The efficiency defence 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the criteria for assessing 
the benefits of a merger are (inevitably) vague and give the 
Commission considerable discretion. 1 As noted above, any 
public interest criterion transcends the purely economic and 
contains a substantial political element. This explains why 
in countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany the 
competition authorities only scrutinize the implications for 
intensity of competition and leave the question of the wider 
effects of the mergers to the Federal economics minister 
(Hopt (1982)). To confer on the Commission responsibility 
for scrutinizing all aspects of mergers is thought in some 
quarters to amount to a major transfer of sovereignty by 
the Member States to a European administrative body as 
mergers go to the heart of national restructuring processes 
and industrial policies. 
It is natural therefore that Article 18 of the regulation 
should provide for consultation of an advisory committee of 
national government officials before any decision allowing 
or disallowing a merger under Article 8 or imposing fines. 
Depending on the background of the officials designated, 
the arguments put forward in the committee will probably 
vary widely. Article 18 merely requires that at !east one of 
the representatives of each Member State should be an expert 
in restrictive practices and monopolies. 
I On the other hand, the use of precise criteria can lead to very debatable 
choices. For example the new Canadian merger legislation adopted in 
1986 provides in Section 68 concerning an exception on efficiency grounds 
that two factors should be given particular consideration: the fact that 
the merger will lead to a significant increase in exports or a significant 
substitution of imports by domestic products. This is a mercantilist view 
which assumes that more exports and less imports are in all circumstances 
desirable. 
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Chapter 8 - Procedure for scrutinizing mergers 
The draft contains a number of provisions on the procedures 
for dealing with cases of mergers that have to be notified to 
the Commission. In particular, it lays down the periods 
within which the Commission must open proceedings with 
respect to a notified merger and within which it has to take 
a final decision on whether the merger can be allowed to go 
ahead as compatible with the common market or must be 
prohibited as incompatible. Figure 8.1 is a flowchart of the 
decision-making process. The length of the periods allowed 
largely determines the thoroughness of the analyses that 
can be made to decide whether the transaction should be 
investigated and whether it should be authorized or blocked. 
It is therefore worth attempting to work out a possible 
sequence of steps in the vetting of mergers on the basis of 
these provisions. The first stage in the screening process is 
decided by the obligation to notify or not to notify. As we 
showed in Chapter 6.2(b) a threshold is liable to allow 
potentially dangerous operations to slip through the net and 
to require the notification of quite harmless ones. After the 
preliminary elimination process, three stages are suggested 
by the draft for the subsequent examination of cases (Figure 
8.2). 
Stage I, in which the Commission has one month from 
notification to decide whether or not to open proceedings 
in a case, will probably have to be limited to a check of sales 
figures as they alone determine whether the regulation is 
applicable. At best it should also be possible to verify that 
the transaction is in fact a merger and not a more temporary 
form of link . 
Our approach would have been to use this stage to rapidly 
screen out mergers which, though above the size thresholds, 
clearly did not present any danger to competition . Two 
indicators of the need or otherwise to open proceedings in 
a case could be used. 
First, the size of the firms relative to their principal competi-
tors could have been looked at. Secondly, general knowledge 
of conditions in the industry could have been used to shed 
further light on the prospective merger in addition to the 
evidence of the absolute size criteria. For e)fample, in Part 
B we proposed two criteria for assessing the danger of 
mergers leading to reduction of competition in an industry, 
namely import penetration and demand growth. Other infor-
mation could also be useful , such as the market share of the 
n largest European firms or the size of the European market 
leaders compared with their US or Japanese competitors. 
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The idea would be to have a comprehensive and up-to-date 
body of data on industries, albeit at a fairly crude level of 
disaggregation (for example the 120 3-digit industrial sectors 
in the NACE classification), and to organize this data in 
such a way as to give a typology of industries that could be 
used in the quick preliminary assessment of mergers. 
Under the present system, even innocuous cases that ex-
ceeded the sales threshold would not be disposed of at stage 
I, but would have to be taken through to the stage of a 
formal decision. 
Stage 2 will be concerned with the cases not eliminated at 
stage I, in which the Commission has decided to open 
proceedings. It will have to analyse the effects of the merger 
on competition by looking at the market shares of the firms 
concerned in relation to existing products and competitors 
and to the possibilities of entry. It is here that the criteria 
for determining whether the merger would create or reinforce 
a dominant position and the presumption that the merger is 
unobjectionable where the firms do not have a market share 
of over 25% would be applied. How market shares are to 
be calculated is defined in the regulation. 
At this second stage more detailed data involving a full 
economic analysis of the firms' markets and products would 
be required. The criteria used to describe the general condi-
tions in the industry would also come in, but this time at 
firm level. Throughout this report, we have tried to show 
the value of a battery of indicators not only of firms' size 
and market shares but also on the stage in product life cycles 
and the competitive pressure of imports. The Commission 
would have one month to carry out this analysis and to 
clear mergers that did not create or strengthen a dominant 
position. 
The last stage would look at efficiency arguments in justifica-
tion of mergers that created or strengthened a dominant 
position in order to determine whether or not these out-
weighed adverse effects so that the merger could be allowed 
to go ahead or should be blocked. The Commission would 
have four months to make up its mind. At this stage, argu-
ments such as those referred to in Part B concerning potential 
scale economies and R&D efforts should be considered. It 
is reasonable to place the burden of proof on the defenders 
of the merger; they should be required to make out a strong 
case that the potential gains are genuine, that they could not 
be achieved by less restrictive alternatives, and that they will 
benefit consumers. 
Chapter 8 - Procedure for scrutinizing mergers 
FIGURE 8.1: Stages in the merger vetting process 
Pre-notification 
if thresholds 
exceeded 
Possible anti-trust 
developments 
(not de minimis) 
No: 
Case closed 
Parties informed immediately 
Yes: 
Immediate opening of proceedings 
I 
I month 
I 
No creation or 
strengthening 
of dominant 
position 
Merger 
allowed 
Decision to be taken within ... 
Economic 
benefits 
outweigh 
effects 
t 
Merger 
allowed 
I 
Max. 4 months 
I 
Creation or 
strengthening 
of dominant 
position 
' - I 
Adverse 
effects 
outweigh 
benefits 
t 
Merger 
disallowed 
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FIGURE 8.2: Onlerofproceedingin the scrutiny of horizontal 
mergen 
Factors determining 
whether or not to start 
proceedings 
Criteria for assessing possi-
bility of reduction of com-
petition 
Criteria for assessing poss-
ible efficiency gains 
Stage 1 
Community dimension of merger: 
turnover; size of firms compared 
with their main competitors; general 
knowledge of conditions in the in-
dustry 
Stage2 
Identification of the product and 
geographic market a producer would 
need to control to be able to signifi-
cantly raise prices; market shares of 
firms taking into account inter-
national trade, entry conditions, 
product life cycles, etc. 
Stage3 
Potential static and dynamic econ-
omies (economies of scale, signifi-
cance of R&D); transfer of benefit 
to consumers; advantages of merger 
over alternative forms of link-up 
Conclusions 
The poten~ial benefits of the internal market programme 
will not be fully realized unless business adopts new strategies 
and government implements credible common policies that 
support such strategies. As 1992 approaches many firms in 
Europe are engaged in restructuring, in refocusing on their 
core businesses and in extending their geographical spread. 
As we have seen, these strategies are resulting in a high 
level of EC and international cross-frontier mergers and 
acquisitions , which in certain cases are an essential phase in 
the modernization of European industry . But there is a 
danger that a significant proportion of mergers and acqui-
sitions may not be prompted purely by the quest for ef-
ficiency and may create or reinforce dominant positions. 
This report first attempts to summarize the main costs and 
benefits of mergers in an international perspective in the 
light of the latest economic research . It then illustrates how 
some of the economic criteria (economies of scale, techno-
logical change, openness to international trade and demand 
growth) can be applied in order to classify Community 
industries, and discusses recent trends in merger activity in 
the EC (number of transactions, size of firms involved, 
and geographical type - domestic, EC cross-frontier or 
international). Finally, the report discusses the proposal for 
a European merger control regulation in the light of these 
factors. 
There a re still some problems with the practica l applica ti on 
of the regulation. First of a ll , the turnove r criterion in spite 
of its ease of use by firms is not always sufficient to identi fy 
the mergers that could have an effect of red ucing competition 
especially in industries whose to ta l sa les a re in the region of 
ECU I billion, the threshold for notification. Without the 
possibility of prior vet ting of mergers in these indust ries, it 
would be essential to use Article 86 of the Trea ty as a back-
up. 
Secondly, in the procedure bo th befo re and after the decision 
to open proceedings in a given case it would be worthwhile 
deciding the steps to be followed and defining the most 
appropriate criteria to use at each step . At the va rio us stages 
in the merger-vetting process it is useful to have a battery 
of criteria to throw light on the va rious facto rs a ffecting 
competition and to assess the probability of a reduction in 
it. 
The comments made in this report a re intended to help 
flesh out the Community legisla ti on in la ter Commission 
implementing regulations. The provisions of the basic reg u-
lation itself are capable of ensuring effecti ve Community 
control of mergers and are relatively well suited to the 
pragmatic approach tha t is desired. 
57 

Annexes 

Annex 1 
Annex l(a) 
Definitions of indicators 
Demand growth: in each industry domestic demand is calcu-
lated for EUR 9 (D+DK+F+I+IRL+NL+B/L+UK). 
Domestic demand is defined as: production + imports -
exports. The growth of demand is calculated in real terms 
over the period 1980-85. Demand growth helps to determine 
the stage in the life-cycle of the industry. 
Import penetration ratio: the proportion of domestic demand 
supplied by imports indicates the degree of openness of a 
market to penetration by foreign products. On average the 
import penetration ratio in Community (EUR 9) industry is 
35% for intra-EC and non-EC imports combined, 20,9% 
for intra-EC imports and 14,1 % for non-EC imports. Prima 
facie the danger of a reduction of competition is less in 
industries open to the penetration of imports, whether these 
come from other Member States or non-EC countries, i.e. 
in those in which total intra-EC or non-EC import pen-
etration is above average. Conversely, the danger of a re-
duction of competition is greater in industries relatively 
closed to imports, i.e. in those in which total intra-EC and 
non-EC import penetration is below average. 
The potential economies of scale in an industry are the ad-
ditional unit costs borne by firms operating at below 50% 
of the optimal scale. The data are drawn mainly from a 
survey of recent research into economies of scale (see Pratten 
( 1988)). Industries in which potential economies of scale 
are substantial include transport equipment (motor vehicles, 
locomotives and aircraft), computers, electrical and telecom-
munications equipment and some sectors of the chemicals 
and food industries. 
Technology content: several criteria can be used to identify 
high-technology sectors: the intensity of R&D, the pro-
portion of scientists employed, the speed of obsolescence of 
products and processes, the amount of high-risk investment, 
etc. The main source here is the classification suggested by 
the OECD which uses the ratio of R&D expenditure to 
output for each industry in the OECD area (see OECD 
(1986)). The same criterion is adopted by de Woot (1988), 
who considers it to be the most stringent. De Wool identifies 
four major technologies of the future (information tech-
nology, biotechnology, opto-electronics and advanced ma-
terials) and six high-tech industries in which the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to sales is at least double the average for 
industry (pharmaceuticals, office automation and com-
puters, telecommunications, electronic components, aircraft 
and aircraft components and rockets and spacecraft). Other 
sources drawn on in addition include: Cardiff ( 1983) quoted 
in NEI (1983), Querette ( 1987), and Archibugi et al. ( 1987). 
They distinguish around 20 high-technology industries, 
which are listed below. 
High-technology industries 
NACE Industry 
code 
247 Glass 
248 Ceramics 
251 Basic chemicals 
256 Biotechnology 
257 Pharmaceuticals 
259 Other chemicals 
260 Man-made fibres 
Machine tools 
Computers and office automation 
Electric cables and wire 
Electrical plant and machinery 
Electrical equipment, batteries 
Telecommunications 
Electronic appliances, radio, TV 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Lighting equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Railway rolling stock 
Aircraft 
Precision instruments 
Medical and surgical equipment 
322 
330 
341 
342 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
351 
362 
364 
371 
372 
373 
374 
Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
Clocks and watches 
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Annex l(b) 
Identification of industries in which there is a danger of monopolization 1 
Import penetration 
Demand Below EC averagc2 Above EC a vcragc3 
growth NACE code Industry Total IP NACE code Industry Total IP 
241 Bricks 4,1 221 Iron and crude steel 27,2 
242 Cement, lime and plaster 4,3 224 Non-ferrous metals 70,7 
243 Cement, lime and plaster products 2,9 231 Construction materials 33,6 
244 Asbestos products 25,5 247 Glass 30,0 
311 Iron castings 9,3 248 Ceramics 36,7 
312 Metal forgings 18,4 322 Machine tools 46,6 
315 Boilermaking 7,2 323 Textile machinery 88,1 
420 Sugar 16,3 327 Wood, paper and leather machinery 60,9 
424 Alcohol distilling 15,1 363 Cycles and motorcycles 37,3 
Weak 463 Wooden structures and components 8,7 374 Clocks and watches 66,2 
464 Wooden containers 3,6 438 Carpets and linoleum 57,9 
467 Wooden furniture 22,6 451 Footwear 57,7 
456 Fur articles 
461 Sawn or planed wood 57,5 
462 Plywood and hardboard 42,4 
465 Wood manufactures (except furniture) 36,0 
466 Cork and basketware articles, brushes 54,3 
482 Retreaded tyres 60,5 
491 Gold and jewellery 
494 Toys and games 59,0 
245 Working of stone and of non-metallic min- 222 Steel pipes and tubes 44,8 
era! products 22,5 223 Drawn wire arid other drawn products 35,9 
255 Paints and varnishes 9, 1 232 Potash and phosphates 25,5 
313 Secondary processing of metals 10,4 259 Other chemicals 67, 1 
314 Metal fabrication 11 ,1 260 Man-made fibres 72,2 
316 Tools and finished metal goods 21 ,3 324 Food processing and chemical plant 46,5 
325 Mining and metallurgical plant 28,4 326 Mechanical transmissions 40,8 
342 Electrical plant and machinery 20,0 328 Other machinery and mechanical equip- 47,0 
352 Motor vehicle bodies, trailers, caravans 11 ,6 ment 
361 Shipbuilding 12,2 346 Domestic electrical appliances 33,0 
362 Railway ro lling stock 8,7 347 Lighting equipment 54,9 
413 Milk and dairy products 14,9 364 Aircraft 58,9 
Moderate 416 Grain milling 15,8 371 Precision instruments 41 ,5 
417 Pasta 10,7 372 Medical and surgical equipment 63 ,9 
419 Bread and flour confectionery 7,6 373 Optical and photographic equipment 
421 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar products 18,0 411 Vegetables and animal fats 51,0 
422 Animal feedingstuffs 6,9 412 Meat and meat products 31 ,0 
423 Other food products 18,0 431 Woollen goods 52,4 
425 Wine, sparkling wine 22,3 432 Cotton goods 64,2 
427 Brewing and malting 3,9 436 Knitwear 61 ,5 
472 Pulp, paper and board 21 ,4 439 Other textile products 54,9 
473 Printing 9,9 442 Leather goods 55,0 
481 Rubber goods 27,8 453 Clothing 42,4 
455 Household linen 56,0 
471 Pulp, paper and board 52,3 
483 Plastic goods 30,6 
492 Musical instruments 70,4 
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Import penetralion 
Demand Below EC a ve ragc2 
growth NACE code Industry 
257 Pharmaceuticals 
258 Soa p a nd detergents 
341 Electrical cables and wire 
4 18 Starch products 
Strong 428 Mineral water a nd soft drinks 
429 Tobacco prod ucts 
Industries in which va lue.added in EUR 12 represents a t least 0.0 1 % o f to ta l industry. 
Tota l IP < 35, intra-IP < 20. and ext ra-IP < 15. 
3 Total IP ;;. 35, intra-IP ;;. 20. or extra- IP ;, 15. 
Total IP 
18,7 
12,4 
12,0 
25 ,0 
4,2 
6,4 
Annexes 
Above EC avc rngcJ 
NAC E code Industry Tot.t l IP 
256 Other chemica l prod ucts fo r industr ia l 
a nd agricult ural purposes 54,4 
32 1 Agricul tura l machinery 28 ,3 
330 Computers a nd office automa tion 67 ,7 
344 Telecommunicat ions 45, 1 
345 Electronic a ppliances, radio , TV 43,9 
35 1 Mo tor vehicles, engines 43, 1 
353 A utomotive components and accessories 56,5 
41 5 Preserved fis h 25,7 
44 1 Lea ther 60,8 
63 
Annexes 
Annex l(c) 
Identification of industries in which mergers could lead to efficiency gains 
Economics of scale (EOS) 1 
Tech no- Insignificant Modest o r substantial 
logical 
content NACE code Industry EOS NACE code Ind ust ry EOS 
223 Drawn wire and other d rawn products I 22 1 Iron and crude steel 8 
243 Cement, lime and plaster products l 222 Steel pipes and tubes 8 
255 Paints and varnishes 3 224 Non-ferrous metals 8 
258 Soap and detergents 3 24 1 Bricks 20 
323 Textile machinery 4 242 Cement, lime and plas ter 15 
324 Food processing and chemical plant 4 311 Iron castings 10 
325 Mining and meta llurgical plant 4 315 Boilermaking 20 
326 Mechanical transmissions 5 32 1 Agricultura l machinery 7 
327 Wood working, paper and leather ma- 4 36 1 Shipbuilding 8 
chinery 411 Vegetable and animal o ils and fats 9 
328 Other machinery and mechanical equip- 4 412 Meat and meat products 9 
ment 416 G rain milling 20 
363 Cycles and motorcycles 4 41 9 Bread and flour confectionery 12 
413 Milk and dairy products 3 420 Sugar 14 
429 Tobacco products 2 42 1 Cocoa, chocola te and sugar confectionery 14 
Low to 43 1 Woollen goods 2 422 Animal feedingstuffs 14 
med ium 432 Cotton goods 2 427 Brewing and malting 8 436 Knitwear 2 438 Carpets and linoleum 10 
439 Other texti le products 2 47 1 Pulp, paper and board 10 
44 1 Leather 2 473 Printing 20 
442 Lea ther goods 2 
451 Footwear 2 
453 Clothing 2 
455 Household linen 2 
456 Fur goods 2 
46 1 Sawn or planed wood 2 
462 Plywood and hardboard 2 
463 Wooden structures and components 2 
464 Wooden containers 2 
465 Wood manufactures (except furniture) 2 
466 Cork and basketwa re a rticles, brushes 2 
467 Wooden fu rniture 2 
48 1 Rubber goods 5 
259 Other chem icals 3 247 Glass 7 
322 Machine tools 4 248 Ceramics 6 
343 Electrical equipmen t, batteries 3 25 1 Basic chemicals 10 
256 Other chemical products for industria l o r 10 
agricultu ra l purposes 
257 Pharmaceuticals 6 
260 Man-made fibres 10 
330 Computers and office automation 9 
342 Electrical plant and machinery 12 
Hi gh 344 Telecommunications 12 
345 Electronic appliances, radio, TV 9 
346 Domestic electrical appliances 6 
35 1 Motor vehicles, engines 9 
362 Railway rolling stock 20 
364 Aerospace 20 
37 1 Precision instruments 9 
372 Medical and surgical equipment 9 
373 Optical and pho tographic equipment 9 
1 Pcn.:cnlagc cos t penal ty l'o r opera ting a t half optimum scale . 
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Merger activity and economic conditions in industry 
Mining and extractive industries 
Manufacture and primary processing of 
metals 
Construction materials 
Chemicals, fibres, glass, 
ceramics, rubber 
Machine tools and precision instruments 
Office equipment 
Electrical equipment and electronics 
Motor vehicles and other transport equip-
ment 
Food and drink 
Textiles, leather, clothing 
Wood, furniture, paper 
1 Percentage of tota l sales of industry: 
S = strong demand growth. 
M = moderate demand growth. 
W = wea k demand growth. 
NACE 
code 
21 +23 
22+31 
24 
25+26+247+ 
248+48 
32+37 
33 
34 
35+36 
41 +42-429 
43 + 44+45 
46+47-
473-474 
Demand 
growth 1 
w 
w 
w 
s 
M 
s 
s 
M 
M 
w 
M 
Openness of market 2 
Import penetration 1986 
EC non-EC total 
54,8 18,4 73,2 
12,5 17,8 30,3 
4,3 12,5 16,8 
10,0 24,5 34,5 
19,0 27,6 46,6 
33,7 34,1 67,8 
16,6 18,2 34,8 
11,2 24,5 35,7 
5,7 11 ,9 17,6 
22, 1 27,2 49,3 
15,0 11,9 26,9 
2 Proportion of total domestic demand supplied by intra-Community (EC import penetration) and non-EC (non-EC impo rt penetration) imports. 
3 Percentage of total sales o f industry. 
Source: EC, Reports on competition policy and other Commission departments. 
Market 
share 
of five 
la rges t 
finns3 
18,0 
22,3 
21,0 
12,5 
65,3 
40,4 
51 ,0 
12,6 
3,7 
4,3 
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Number of mergers 
involving top 
I OOO firms 
Total 
1982-87 1986-87 
43 
72 
75 
252 
133 
6 
104 
54 
122 
36 
92 
9 
19 
19 
71 
31 
2 
41 
21 
52 
6 
25 
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Annex 2 
Amended proposal for a Council Regulation 
(EEC) 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(suhmitted hy the Commission pursuant to Article 149( 3) 
of' the EEC Treaty) 
The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Econ-
omic Community, and in particular Articles 87 and 235 
thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion ot the Economic and Social 
Committee, 
(I) Whereas, for the achievement of the aims of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community. Ar-
ticle 3(f) requires the Community to institute ·a system 
ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted'; 
(2) Whereas this system is essential for the achievement of 
the internal market by 1992; 
(3) Whereas the dismantling of internal frontiers can be 
expected to result in major corporate reorganizations 
in the Community. particularly in the form of concen-
trations; 
(4) Whereas such a development must be welcomed as being 
in line with the requirements of dynamic competition 
and liable to strengthen the competitiveness of Euro-
pean industry. to improve the conditions of growth and 
to raise the standard of living in the Community; 
(5) Whereas. however. it must be ensured that the process 
of reorganization does not give rise to lasting damage 
to competition; whereas the system of undistorted com-
petition must therefore include provisions gt1\erning 
those L'llncentratit111s whiL'h may impt'tk effeL'livL' L'llm-
PL'tition in tht' L'llmnwn market; 
(6) Whneas. pursuant tn ArtiL'ks ~.:, and ~o. antiL'l1mpeti-
tiH· agreements, dt:L'isit111s and praL'liL't'S, whiL'h may 
aiTL'L't trade bL't,wt·n l\kmber States, art' pwhibitt·d. 
pnl\·idt·d that their i111paL·t 1111 n1111pt·tition and trade 1s 
apprt',·iabk; 
(7) Whereas the principles laid down in Articles 85 and 86 
apply also to arrangements which alter the competitive 
structure of the market and whereas provisions for 
the implementation of those principles must take due 
account of the specific context of market structure; 
(8) Whereas those provisions should apply to significant 
structural changes, whose impact on the market goes 
beyond the national borders of one Member State; 
(9) Whereas the scope of application of this Regulation 
should therefore be defined according to the territory 
of operations of the undertakings concerned and be 
limited by quantitative thresholds in order to include 
only those operations of concentration which have a 
Community dimension; 
(I 0) Whereas this is the case where the aggregate turnover 
of all the undertakings concerned exceeds a given level 
and where at least two of the undertakings concerned 
have their sole or principal field of activities in a differ-
ent Member State or where. although the undertakings 
in question act mainly in one and the same Member 
State. at least one of them has substantial operations 
in at least one other Member State through subsidiaries 
or direct sales; whereas this is also the case where the 
concentrations effected by undertakings which do not 
have their principal field of activities in the Community 
are such as to have an effect within the common market; 
( 11) Whereas the existing competition rules and in particular 
Article 87 provide a legal basis for the control of certain 
forms and types of concentration; 
( 12) Whereas it is necessary. however, to create a legal frame-
work which makes it possible to treat in a comprehen-
sive way all concentrations having the same impact on 
the competitive structure of the common market or a 
substantial part thereof; 
( IJ) Whereas. pursuant to Article 235 the Community may, 
by way of Regulation. give itself the additional powers 
of action necessary for the attainment of this objective, 
and in particular with regard to concentrations on the 
markets for products listed in Annex II to the Treaty; 
( l-1) Whereas the Regulation should establish the principle 
that conL'entrations which create or strengthen a ~os-
ition as a result of which the maintenance or develop-
ment of effective competition is impeded in the common 
market or in a substantial part thereof are to be declared 
incompatible with the common market; 
( 15) Whereas concentrations which. by reason of the limited 
market share of the undertakings concerned. are not 
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liable to impede effective competition may be presumed 
to be compatible with the common market; whereas, in 
particular, this may be presumed where the market 
share of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 
25% either in the common market or in a substantial 
part thereof; 
(16) Whereas authorization should be available in respect 
of concentrations which, although they impede effective 
competition, contribute to the attainment of the basic 
objectives of the Treaty in such a way that, on balance, 
their economic benefits prevail over the damage they 
cause to competition; 
( 17) Whereas the Regulation should also provide that de-
cisions of compatibility and authorizations may be 
made subject to conditions and obligations to be deter-
mined case by case in order to ensure that conditions 
of effective competition are maintained; 
(18) Whereas the Commission should have the task of taking 
all the decisions necessary to establish whether or not 
concentrations which fall within the scope of appli-
cation of the Regulation are compatible with the com-
mon market, as well as decisions designed to restore 
and maintain conditions of effective competition; 
(19) Whereas, to ensure effective supervision, prior notifi-
cation and the suspension of concentrations should be 
made obligatory; 
(20) Whereas a period within which the Commission must 
initiate a proceeding in respect of a concentration noti-
fied to it and a period within which it must give a final 
decision on the compatibility or incompatibility with 
the common market of a notified concentration should 
be laid down; 
(21) Whereas undertakings concerned must be accorded the 
right to be heard by the Commission as soon as a 
proceeding has been initiated, and third parties showing 
a legitimate interest must be given the opportunity to 
submit their comments; 
I (22) Whereas the Commission should act in close and con-
stant liaison with the competent authorities of the Mem-
ber States and should obtain the views of those most 
directly concerned by a concentration; 
(23) Whereas, for the purposes of this Regulation, the Com-
mission must be afforded the assistance of the Member 
States and must also be empowered to require infor-
mation to be given and to carry out the necessary 
investigations in order to appraise concentrations; 
(24) Whereas compliance with this Regulation must be en-
forceable by means of fines and periodic penalty pay-
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ments: whereas the Court of Justice should be given 
unlimited jurisdiction in that regard pursuant to Article 
172; 
(25) Whereas it is appropriate to define the concept of con-
centration in such a manner as to cover operations 
bringing about a change in the structure of the under-
takings concerned; whereas it is therefore necessary to 
exclude from the scope of application of this Regulation 
those operations which have as their object or effect the 
coordination of the competitive behaviour of indepen-
dent undertakings, since such operations fall to be 
examined under the provisions of other regulations im-
plementing Article 85 or Article 86; 
(26) Whereas the Commission should be given exclusive 
competence to apply this Regulation, subject to review 
by the Court of Justice; whereas it should also be 
stipulated that the provisions of this Regulation apply 
to all concentrations with a Community dimension, 
whether or not they fall within the scope of Article 85 
or Article 86; 
(27) Whereas the Member States may not apply their na-
tional legislation on competition to concentrations hav-
ing a Community dimension, unless expressly empow-
ered to do so by the Commission; 
(28) Whereas, however, this principle does not prevent 
Member States from taking appropriate measures in so 
far as is necessary to protect legitimate interests other 
than those pursued by this Regulation, provided that 
such interests are sufficiently defined and protected by 
domestic law and that such measures are compatible 
with the other provisions of Community law, 
Has adopted this Regulation: 
Article 1 
Scope of application 
1. This Regulation shall apply to all concentrations having 
a Community dimension as defined in paragraph 2, 
whether or not they fall within the scope of Article 85 
or Article 86. 
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration has· 
a Community dimension where: 
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertak-
ings concerned is more than ECU 1 OOO million, and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of 
at least two of the undertakings concerned is more 
than ECU 100 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than three quarters of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State. 
Article 2 
Appraisal of concentrations 
1. Concentrations falling within the scope of this Regu-
lation shall be appraised with a view to establishing 
whether or not they are compatible with the common 
market, by reference in particular to the market position 
of the undertakings concerned and to their economic and 
financial power, to opportunities of choice available to 
suppliers and users, to their access to supplies or markets, 
to the structure of the markets affected taking account 
of international competition, to legal and factual barriers 
to entry, and to supply and demand trends for the rel-
evant goods or services. 
2. Concentrations which do not create or strengthen a pos-
ition as a result of which the maintenance or development 
of effective competition would be impeded in the com-
mon market or in a substantial part thereof shall be 
declared compatible with the common market. 
3. Concentrations which create or strengthen a position as 
a result of which the maintenance or development of 
effective competition is impeded in the common market 
or in a substantial part thereof shall be declared incom-
patible with the common market unless authorized on 
the ground that their contribution to improving pro-
duction and distribution, to promoting technical or econ-
omic progress or to improving the competitive structure 
within the common market outweighs the damage to 
competition. In this respect, the competitiveness of the 
sectors concerned with regard to international compe-
tition and the interests of consumers shall be taken into 
account. 
Concentrations shall be authorized on account of their 
compatibility with the common market only in so far as 
they do not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the implementation 
of the concentration; and 
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(b) afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the goods or services concerned. 
Article 3 
Definition of concentration 
1. A concentration shall be deemed to occur where: 
(a) two or more undertakings merge; or 
(b) (i) one or more persons already controlling at least 
one undertaking, or 
(ii) one or more undertakings 
acquire, whether by purchase of shares or assets, by 
contract or by any other means, direct or indirect 
control of the whole or parts of one or more under-
takings. 
2. Operations which have as their object or effect the coor-
dination of the competitive behaviour of independent 
undertakings shall be deemed not to give rise to a concen-
tration within the meaning of paragraph l(b). 
The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting 
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
which does not have as its object or effect the coordi-
nation of the competitive behaviour of the undertakings 
concerned, shall be deemed to be a concentration within 
the meaning of paragraph 1 (b ). 
3. Control is constituted by rights or contracts which, either 
separately or jointly, and having regard to the consider-
ations of fact or law involved, make it possible to deter-
mine how an undertaking shall operate, and in particular 
by: 
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets 
of an undertaking; 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on 
the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of 
an undertaking; 
(c) rights or contracts which make it possible to manage 
the business of an undertaking; 
(d) contracts made with an undertaking concerning the 
computation or appropriation of its profits; 
(e) any other means conferring decisive influence on the 
activity of an undertaking. 
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4. Control is acquired by persons, undertakings or groups 
of persons or undertakings which: 
(a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under 
the contracts concerned; 
(b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to 
rights under such contracts, have power to exercise 
the rights deriving therefrom; 
(c) in a fiduciary capacity derived from a private law 
contract, hold assets of an undertaking or shares in 
an undertaking, and have power to exercise the rights 
attaching thereto, unless that power may be revoked 
at any time or unless they are bound by special 
instructions from their principals. 
5. Control of an undertaking is not constituted where banks 
or financial institutions acquire shares in an undertaking 
with a view to selling them, provided that they do not 
exercise voting rights in respect of those shares with a 
view to determining the competitive behaviour of that 
undertaking. 
Article 4 
Prior notification of concentrations 
I. Concentrations as referred to by this Regulation, whether 
or not they form the subject-matter of an agreement, 
shall be notified to the Commission before they are put 
into effect. 
2. Concentrations within the meaning of Article 3(l)(a) 
shall be notified jointly by the parties concerned. In the 
cases referred to in Article 3(1 )(b ), the notification shall 
be made by the party or parties seeking to acquire control 
of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings. 
3. Where the Commission finds that a concentration falls 
within the scope of application of this Regulation, it shall 
immediately publish the main contents of the notifi-
cation. The publication shall contain the names of the 
parties, the nature of the concentration and the economic 
sectors involved. It shall take account of the legitimate 
interest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets. 
Article 5 
Calculation of turnover 
I. Aggregate turnover within the meaning of Article I shall 
be calculated by adding together the pre-tax turnover of 
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the undertakings concerned for all goods and services in 
the last financial year. Turnover deriving from internal 
operations within a group shall not be included in this 
calculation. 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph I, where the 
concentration consists in the acquisition of parts, whether 
or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more under-
takings or of a group of undertakings, only the turnover 
relating to the parts which are the subject of the operation 
shall be taken into account with regard to the seller or 
sellers. 
3. In place of turnover the following shall be used: 
(a) for banking and financial institutions: as regards Ar-
ticle 1(2)(a) and (b), one tenth of their assets; as 
regards the final part of Article I (2), operations with 
clients from their own and from other Member States; 
(b) for insurance companies: the value of premiums re-
ceived. 
4. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2, the 
relevant turnover for each of the undertakings c0ncerned 
shall be calculated by adding together the respective 
turnovers of all undertakings belonging to the same 
group. 
In this respect the following undertakings shall be taken 
into account: 
(a) those which take part directly in the concentration; 
(b) those in which a party to the concentration, directly 
or indirectly, 
(i) owns at least half the capital or business assets, 
or 
(ii) has the power to exercise at least half the voting 
rights, or 
(iii) has the power to appoint at least half the mem-
bers of the supervisory board, board of manage-
ment or bodies legally representing the undertak-
ings, or 
(iv) has the right to manage the undertaking's affairs; 
(c) those which directly or indirectly have, in or over a 
party to the concentration, rights or powers as listed 
in (b); 
(d) those in or over which an undertaking as referred to 
in (c) directly or indirectly has rights or powers as 
listed in (b ). 
Undertakings in which several undertakings as referred 
to in (a) to (d) jointly have, directly or indirectly, rights 
or powers as set out in (b) shall also be considered to be 
undertakings concerned. 
Article 6 
Initiation of proceedings 
I. Where the Commission finds that a concentration falls 
within the scope of application of this Regulation, it 
shall immediately initiate a proceeding with a view to 
establishing whether or not that concentration is compat-
ible with the common market. It shall so inform the 
undertakings concerned and the competent authorities 
of the Member States without delay. 
2. Where the Commission finds that a notified concen-
tration does not fall within the scope of application 
of this Regulation, it shall immediately so inform the 
undertakings concerned and the competent authorities 
of the Member States. 
3. As regards notified concentrations, decisions pursuant 
to paragraphs I and 2 shall be taken within a period not 
exceeding one month, unless the undertakings concerned 
agree to extend that period. The period of one month 
shall commence on the day following the date of receipt 
of the notification, or if the information to be supplied 
with the notification is incomplete, on the day following 
the date of receipt of the complete information. 
4. The Commission may initiate a proceeding after the 
expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 3 where 
the information supplied by the undertakings in the noti-
fication or thereafter is false or misleading. 
Article 7 
Suspension of the concentration 
I. Undertakings shall suspend the implementation of a con-
centration which falls within the scope of application of 
this Regulation until the Commission has decided on 
initiation of a proceeding pursuant to Article 6. 
2. In order to ensure conditions of effective competition, the 
Commission may decide, when it initiates a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 6(1 ), that the suspension of the im-
plementation of a concentration should be extended until 
it takes a final decision pursuant to Article 8. 
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3. The provisions of paragraphs I and 2 shall not impede 
the implementation of a public takeover or exchange bid 
which has been notified to the Commission by the date 
of its announcement, provided that the acquirer does 
not exercise the voting rights attached to the shares in 
question. 
4. The Commission may, on request, waive the provisions 
of paragraphs I and 2 or the proviso contained in para-
graph 3 in order to prevent serious damage to one or 
more undertakings concerned by a concentration; the 
waiver may be subject to conditions and obligations in 
order to ensure conditions of effective competition. 
Article 8 
Powers of decision of the Commission 
I. For each proceeding initiated pursuant to Article 6 and 
concerning a notified concentration, the Commission 
shall establish by decision whether or not that concen-
tration is compatible with the common market. 
2. Where the Commission finds that a notified concen-
tration fulfils the conditions of compatibility laid down 
in Article 2(2), it shall issue a decision declaring the 
concentration compatible with the common market; con-
ditions and obligations may be attached thereto in order 
to ensure conditions of effectiye competition. In such a 
case, the Commission may also empower Member States 
which are directly concerned by the concentration to 
apply their national legislation on competition in order 
to ensure conditions of effective competition in local 
markets within their respective territories. 
3. Where the Commission finds that a notified concen-
tration fulfils all the conditions laid down in Article 2(3), 
it shall issue a decision authorizing the concentration as 
being compatible with the common market; conditions 
and obligations may be attached thereto in order to 
ensure conditions of effective competition. The decision 
granting the authorization shall also cover additional 
restrictions reasonably ancillary to the implementation 
of the concentration. 
4. Where the Commission finds that a concentration fulfils 
the conditions of incompatibility laid down in Article 2(3) 
but does not fulfil the conditions for an authorization 
laid down therein, it shall issue a decision refusing the 
authorization and declaring the concentration incompat-
ible with the common market. 
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5. Where a concentration has already been implemented, 
the Commission may require in a decision pursuant to 
paragraph I or by separate decision, the undertakings or 
assets grouped together to be separated or the cessation 
of common control or any other action that may be 
appropriate in order to restore conditions of effective 
competition. 
6. The Commission may revoke its decision pursuant to 
paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 where the decision is based 
on incorrect information for which one of the undertak-
ings involved in the concentration is responsible or where 
the decision has been obtained by deceit. 
It may also revoke its decision pursuant to paragraph 2 or 
paragraph 3 where the undertakings concerned commit a 
breach of an obligation attached to the decision. 
7. Authorizations of concentrations by the Commission 
shall in no way alter collective workers' rights in force 
in the undertakings concerned. 
Article 9 
Time limits for decisions 
I. Decisions pursuant to Article 8(2) concerning notified 
concentrations shall be taken within one month following 
the date of initiation of the proceeding, unless the under-
takings concerned agree to an extension of that period. 
2. Decisions pursuant to Article 8(3) and (4) concerning 
notified concentrations shall be taken within four months 
following the date of initiation of the proceeding, unless 
the undertakings concerned agree to an extension of that 
period. 
3. By way of exception, the periods of one and four months 
set respectively by paragraphs I and 2 shall be suspended 
where the Commission, owing to circumstances for which 
one of the undertakings involved in the concentration is 
responsible, has had to request information by decision 
pursuant to Article 10 or to order an investigation by 
decision pursuant to Article I 2. 
Article JO 
Requests for information 
I. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this Regu-
lation, the Commission may obtain all necessary infor-
mation from the governments and competent authorities 
of the Member States and from persons, undertakings 
and associations of undertakings. 
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2. When sending a request for information to a person, 
an undertaking or an association of undertakings, the 
Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of 
the request to the competent authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the residence of the person or 
the seat of the undertaking or association of undertakings 
is situated. 
3. In its request the Commission shall state the legal basis 
and the purpose of the request and also the penalties 
provided for in Article I 3(1 )(b) for supplying incorrect 
information. 
4. The information requested shall be supplied, in the case 
of undertakings, by their owners or their representatives 
and, in the case of legal persons, companies or firms, or of 
associations having no legal personality, by the persons 
authorized to represent them by law or by their statutes. 
5. Where a person, an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings does not supply the information requested 
within the period fixed by the Commission, or supplies 
incomplete information, the Commission shall by de-
cision require the information to be supplied. The de-
cision shall specify what information is required, fix an 
appropriate period within which it is to be supplied and 
mention the penalties provided for in Article 13( I )(b) 
and Article 14(1)(a) and the right to have the decision 
reviewed by the Court of Justice. 
6. The Commission shall at the same time forward a copy 
of its decision to the competent authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the residence of the person or 
the seat of the undertaking or association of undertakings 
is situated. 
Article I I 
Investigations by the authorities of the Member States 
I. At the request of the Commission, the competent auth-
orities of the Member States shall undertake the investi-
gations which the Commission considers to be necessary 
under Article 12(1 ), or which it has ordered by decision 
pursuant to Article I 2(3). The officials of the competent 
authorities of the Member States responsible for conduct-
ing these investigations shall exercise their powers upon 
production of an authorization in writing issued by the 
competent authority of the Member State in whose terri-
tory the investigation is to be made. Such authorization 
shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the investi-
gation. 
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the competent 
authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
investigation is to be made, officials of the Commission 
may assist the officials of such authority in carrying out 
their duties. 
Article 12 
Investigating powers of the Commission 
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this Regu-
lation, the Commission may undertake all necessary in-
vestigations into undertakings and associations of under-
takings. 
To this end the officials authorized by the Commission 
are empowered: 
(a) to examine the books and other business records; 
(b) to take or demand copies of or extracts from the 
books and business records; 
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot; 
(d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport 
of undertakings. 
2. The officials of the Commission authorized to carry 
out the investigations shall exercise their powers upon 
production of an authorization in writing specifying the 
subject-matter and purpose of the investigation and the 
penalties provided for in Article 13(l)(c) in cases where 
production of the required books or other business rec-
ords is incomplete. In good time before the investigation, 
the Commission shall inform the competent authority of 
the Member State in whose territory the investigation is 
to be made of the investigation and of the identity of the 
authorized officials. 
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall sub-
mit to investigations ordered by decision of the Com-
mission. The decision shall specify the subject matter and 
purpose of the investigation, appoint the date on which 
it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in 
Article 13(l)(c) and 14(l)(b) and the right to have the 
decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. 
4. The Commission shall inform the competent authority 
of the Member State in whose territory the investigation 
is to be made in good time of its intention to take 
a decision pursuant to paragraph 3. It shall hear the 
competent authority before taking its decision. 
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5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member State 
in whose territory the investigation is to be made may, 
at the request of such authority or of the Commission, 
assist the officials of the Commission in carrying out 
their duties. 
6. Where an undertaking opposes an investigation ordered 
pursuant to this Article, the Member State concerned 
shall afford the necessary assistance to the officials auth-
orized by the Commission to enable them to make their 
investigation. Member States shall, after consultation 
with the Commission, take the necessary measures to 
this end before .... 
Article 13 
Fines 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on persons, 
undertakings or associations of undertakings fines of 
from ECU I OOO to 100 OOO where intentionally or negli-
gently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in a 
notification pursuant to Article 4; 
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a 
request made pursuant to Article I O or fail to supply 
information within the period fixed by a decision 
taken pursuant to Article I O; 
(c) they produce the required books or other business 
records in incomplete form during investigations 
under Article 11 or Article 12, or refuse to submit to 
an investigation ordered by decision taken pursuant 
to Article 12. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines not ex-
ceeding I 0% of the aggregate turnover of the undertak-
ings concerned within the meaning of Article 5 where the 
persons or undertakings concerned, either intentionally 
or negligently: 
(a) breach an obligation imposed pursuant to Article 7 
or Article 8; 
or 
(b) implement a concentration in breach of the provisions 
of this Regulation. 
3. In setting the amount of the fine, regard shall be had to 
the gravity of the infringement. 
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 shall 
not be of a criminal law nature. 
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Article 14 
Periodic penalty payments 
I. The Commission may by decision impose on persons, 
undertakings or associations of undertakings periodic 
penalty payments of up to ECU 50 OOO for each day of 
the delay calculated from the date appointed by the 
decision, in order to compel them: 
(a) to supply complete and correct information which it 
has requested by decision taken pursuant to Article 
10; 
(b) to submit to an investigation which it has ordered by 
decision taken pursuant to Article 12. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose on persons or 
undertakings periodic penalty payments of up to ECU 
I 00 OOO for each day of the delay, calculated from the 
day appointed by the decision, in order to compel them 
to apply the measures resulting from a decision taken 
pursuant to Article 8(5). 
3. Where persons, undertakings or associations of under-
takings have satisfied the obligation which it was the 
purpose of the periodic penalty payment to enforce, the 
Commission may set the total amount of the periodic 
penalty payment al a lower figure than that which would 
arise under the original decision. 
Article 15 
Review by the Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction within 
the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty to review decisions 
whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty 
payment; it may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or per-
iodic penalty payment imposed. 
Article 16 
Professional secrecy 
I. Information acquired as a result of the application of 
Articles I 0, 11 and 12 shall be used only for the purposes 
of the relevant request or investigation. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 19, the 
Commission and the competent authorities of the Mem-
ber States, their officials and other servants shall not 
disclose information acquired by them as a result of the 
application of this Regulation and of the kind covered 
by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
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3. The provisions of paragraphs I and 2 shall not prevent 
publication of general information or surveys which do 
not contain information relating to particular undertak-
ings or associations of undertakings. 
Article 17 
Hearing of the parties and third parties 
I. Before taking decisions provided for in Article 8, para-
graph 2, where conditions and obligations are attached 
thereto, and in Article 8, paragraphs 3 to 6, as well as in 
Articles 13 and 14, the Commission shall give the parties 
the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which 
the Commission has taken objection. 
2. The Commission may also, on application or on its 
own initiative, hear other natural or legal persons and 
associations. 
3. Natural or legal persons or associations showing a legit-
imate interest shall be entitled to make such applications. 
4. Applications to be heard on the part of members of the 
administrative or management organs and the acknowl-
edged employees' representatives from the undertakings 
concerned, shall in all cases he granted. 
Article 18 
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States 
I. The Commission shall transmit forthwith to the com-
petent authorities of the Member States copies of notifi-
cations and of the most important documents lodged 
with or issued by the Commission pursuant to this Regu-
lation. 
2. The Commission shall carry out the procedures set out 
in this Regulation in close and constant liaison with the 
competent authorities of the Member States, which may 
express their views upon those procedures. It shall obtain 
the views of the competent authorities of the Member 
States which show that they are directly concerned by 
the concentration, in particular with a view to the appli-
cation of Article 8(2). 
3. An Advisory Committee on Concentrations shall be con-
sulted prior to the taking of any decision pursuant to 
Article 8, paragraphs 3 to 6, as well as Articles 13 and 
14, or of implementing provisions pursuant to Article 22. 
4. The Advisory Committee shall consist of officials of the 
Member States. Each Member State shall appoint two 
officials to represent it; if prevented from attending, they 
may be replaced by other officials. At least one of the 
representatives of a Member State shall be competent in 
the matter of restrictive practices and dominant pos-
itions. 
5. Consultation shall take place at a joint meeting convened 
at the invitation of and chaired by the Commission. A 
summary of the facts, together with the most important 
documents and a preliminary draft of the decision to be 
taken, shall be sent with the invitation. The meeting shall 
take place no earlier than 14 days after the invitation has 
been sent. The Commission may, however, shorten this 
period in order to avoid serious harm to one or more of 
the undertakings concerned by a concentration. 
6. The Advisory Committee shall deliver an opinion on the 
Commission's draft decision, if necessary by taking a 
vote. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion 
even if some members are absent and unrepresented. The 
opinion shall be delivered in writing and appended to 
the draft decision. It shall not be made public. 
7. The Commission shall take the utmost account of the 
opinion delivered by the Committee. It shall inform the 
Committee of the manner in which its opinion has been 
taken into account. 
Article 19 
Publication of decisions 
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which it 
takes pursuant to Article 8(2), where conditions and 
obligations are attached thereto, and to Article 8(3) to 
(6) in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties and 
the main content of the decision; it shall have regard to 
the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection 
of their business secrets. 
Article 20 
Jurisdiction 
I. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Com-
mission shall have sole competence to take the decisions 
provided for in this Regulation. 
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2. Member States shall not apply their national legislation 
on competition to concentrations having a Community 
dimension, unless expressly empowered to do so by the 
Commission in accordance with the provisions of the last 
sentence of Article 8(2). 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs I and 2, 
Member States may take appropriate measures where 
necessary to protect legitimate interests other than those 
pursued by this Regulation, provided that such interests 
are sufficiently defined and protected in domestic law 
and that such measures are compatible with other pro-
visions of Community law. 
Article 21 
Exclusive application of this Regulation 
Regulation No 17 and Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, No 
4056/86 and No 3975/87 shall not apply to concentrations 
falling within the scope of this Regulation. 
Article 22 
Implementing provisions 
The Commission shall have power to adopt implementing 
provisions concerning the form, content and other details of 
notifications pursuant to Article 4, time limits pursuant to 
Articles 6 and 9, as well as hearings pursuant to Article 17. 
Article 23 
Entry into force 
This Regulation shall enter into force .... 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
Done at ... For the Council 
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Annex 3 
Proposal for a 13th Council Directive 
on company law concerning takeover and other general 
bids 
(presented by the Commission) 
Explanatory memorandum 
I. Introduction 
1. In its White Paper programme for removing all remain-
ing internal barriers in the common market by 1992, the 
Commission saw a need for harmonizing Member States' 
law on takeover bids and announced that it would be 
bringing forward a proposal for a directive on this sub-
ject. 
2. Takeovers are one of the areas yet to be covered in 
the programme of company law coordination directives 
under Article 54 of the EEC Treaty. The aim of the 
coordination is to afford shareholders and other inter-
ested parties equivalent standards of protection before 
the law in all Member States. To date the harmonization 
has covered requirements relating to disclosure, 1 forma-
tion and capital, 2 accounts 3 and consolidated accounts, 4 
the qualifications of auditors, 5 and two types of recon-
struction or amalgamation, namely mergers 6 (strictly 
speaking, 'legal mergers' or 'assets mergers') and 'div-
isions'. 7 
3. Takeovers, or 'share mergers', are however also a com-
mon type of reconstruction or amalgamation of com-
panies. It is therefore unsatisfactory that the harmoniza-
tion legislation should not yet cover this type of financial 
operation, which is quite different from legal mergers 
and divisions. 
1 Directive 68/151/EEC. OJ L 65, 14.3.1968. 
Directive 77/91/EEC, OJ L 26, 31.1.1977. 
1 Directive 78/660/EEC, OJ L 222, 14.8.1978. 
4 Directive 83/349/EEC, OJ L 193, 18.7.1983. 
5 Directive 84/253/EEC, OJ L 126, 12.5.1984. 
Directive 78/855/EEC, OJ L 295. 20.10.1978. 
Directive 82/891 /EEC. OJ L 378, 31.12.1982. 
4. In a legal merger, all the assets and liabilities of a com-
pany are transferred to another company and the com-
pany being taken over is dissolved, without going 
through the liquidation procedure, and its shareholders 
issued with shares in the acquiring company. Alterna-
tively, the assets and liabilities of two or more existing 
companies are transferred to a newly-formed company 
and both the original companies dissolved. 8 
5. A division differs from a legal merger in that the assets 
and liabilities of an existing company, which is subse-
quently dissolved, are transferred to several other com-
panies. Otherwise, the two operations are largely the 
same. 
6. A takeover or 'shares merger' although often commer-
cially and economically the equivalent of a legal or assets 
merger, is legally quite different. It does not involve the 
dissolution of one of the companies or the transfer of 
its assets or liabilities to the acquiring company. The 
company whose shares are acquired remains in existence. 
7. Legal mergers between companies from different Mem-
ber States are not covered by Directive 78/855/EEC, but 
only intra-State ones. A proposal for a 10th company 
law Directive to facilitate inter-State legal mergers was 
sent to the Council on 14 January 1985,9 and is currently 
before Parliament. Takeover bids for companies in other 
Member States can already be mounted without diffi-
culty. 
8. Unlike assets mergers, which in most European countries 
have been taking place since the 1930s, if not before, 
mergers by takeover are a phenomenon which has only 
emerged in the last 25 years and which varies greatly in 
frequency from country to country. This explains why 
some Member States have established very detailed rules 
on the subject while others have made no specific pro-
vision at all. Takeovers have nevertheless become an 
increasingly widely used technique throughout the Com-
munity, and one whose importance is growing with the 
gradual liberalization of capital markets. 
9. A takeover bid is generally understood to mean an offer 
made to the holders of securities carrying voting rights 
in a company or convertible into securities carrying such 
rights (i.e., shares, convertible bonds, subscription rights, 
options and warrants) to acquire their securities for a 
consideration in cash or other securities, the purpose of 
8 Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 78/855/EEC. 
9 OJ C 23, 25.1.1985, p. 11. 
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the offer usually being to acquire control of the company 
or consolidate the offeror's existing control, and the offer 
being made conditional upon sufficient offerees accepting 
it to achieve the offeror's objective 
To guarantee the equal treatment of all shareholders, the 
directive fixes a threshold at which there is an obligation 
to launch a takeover bid. Besides, in order to protect 
minority shareholders and to avoid purely speculative 
partial bids the directive ensures that the offeror must 
make a bid concerning all the shares of the company. 
10. To enable the addressees of a takeover or other general 
bid to make a properly informed assessment before decid-
ing whether to accept, the offeror must be required to 
draw up and bring to their notice an offer document 
setting out all the terms of the bid. The Directive must 
also specify the circumstances in which an offer, once 
formally made to shareholders in this way, can be with-
drawn. Another essential feature of a takeover bid is the 
setting of a closing date for acceptances, which should 
not, however, preclude revisions of the initial offer within 
certain limits. 
As well as the offer document drawn up by the offeror, 
provision should also be made for shareholders to receive 
a report giving the view of the offeree company's board 
on the offer. 
11. Rules to protect the interests of those affected by take-
over bids are unlikely to be effective unless they are 
policed by an official regulatory body independent of 
the parties. The Directive requires Member States to 
designate such a supervisory authority or authorities. 
How this regulatory system is organized is left to the 
Member States, provided the authorities have the power 
to effectively police the takeover rules. The Directive 
also lays down a rule for determining the supervisory 
authority responsible in cases where bids are launched 
simultaneously in several Member States and in such 
cases requires the mutual recognition of offer documents. 
12. The Directive secures the protection of shareholders, by, 
inter alia, ensuring that they receive full and substantiated 
information on the offer, and by imposing the respect of 
the fundamental principle of equality of treatment of 
those to whom the offer is addressed. Such persons, 
especially when resident in a different Member State than 
the target company, should be properly informed of what 
is going on during a bid and appreciate the importance of 
the various steps in the bid procedure. Such shareholders 
often have only a small portfolio of shares and little 
information to go on apart from the annual accounts of 
78 
their company and possibly the current stock exchange 
price of their shares. The company making the bid is 
usually better informed about the situation of the target 
company and the value of its shares than the company's 
shareholders, because it has taken the initiative. 
The Directive ensures a basic level of protection for the 
addressees of takeover bids throughout the Community. 
This does not affect Member States' rights to maintain 
or introduce more far-reaching or detailed provisions in 
their law. 
13. Certain recent events have raised the question whether 
the Directive should introduce a reciprocity clause 
towards bidders from third countries. 
The need for such a clause has been emphasized by those 
who say that in general it is easier for a company from 
a third country to take control of a Community company 
than the opposite. 
The situation within the Community is not as open as 
one may think. Indeed, company law in several Member 
States also allows companies to adopt a range of defens-
ive measures to ensure that control of the company 
remains in the hands of friendly shareholders. These 
defensive measures are very widely used in some Member 
States. As a consequence the conditions in which a take-
over bid is carried out vary considerably between Mem-
ber States. 
Against this background, and given the lacunae which 
exist within the Community, it would be premature to 
introduce a reciprocity clause now at Community level. 
For the time being and until subsequent harmonization, 
Member States may introduce such a clause into their 
national law, bearing in mind their international commit-
ments. 
II. Article-by-article commentary 
Article I 
The scope of the Directive as regards the types of companies 
covered is defined by reference to the company whose shares 
are the subject of the general bid. 
Only the public companies limited by shares are covered. 
The public companies need not be quoted; to restrict the 
rules to quoted companies would discriminate between the 
shareholders of quoted and unquoted companies by accord-
ing a higher standard of protection to the former. However, 
a number of special rules are laid down for those cases 
where the securities of quoted companies are offered to the 
shareholders of the offeree company to reflect capital market 
regulatory requirements. 
Thus the obligation to make a bid for all the shares of a 
company once a certain threshold of participation is reached 
does not depend for application on whether the target com-
pany is quoted on the Stock Exchange or not. The rules of 
the Directive apply to obligatory bids and also to cases 
where someone decides voluntarily to make a bid for the 
shares of a small or medium-sized company not quoted on 
the Stock Exchange. 
Because there are restrictions in many Member States on 
the transfer of shares of private limited companies, the 
Directive does not apply to bids for such companies. 
The characteristic feature of a general bid is that the offer 
is made on the same terms to all the holders of voting stock 
of the company, or instruments convertible into voting stock, 
or of a particular class or classes of voting stock. 
Article 2 
The definition of 'securities' includes instruments carrying 
potential voting rights such as convertible bonds, subscrip-
tion rights, options and warrants. 
Any person or company who launches a bid either on the 
basis of Article 4 or on a voluntary basis is considered to be 
an 'offeror'. It goes without saying that if the members of 
the board of the target company decide to launch a bid they 
are to be considered as offerors too. They are subject to all 
obligations imposed by this Directive. 
The term 'parties to the bid' is used in the requirement for 
an expert's report in certain cases where the consideration 
offered includes securities (Article 14(2)). The parties to the 
bid are the offeror and its agent, the addressees of the bid 
and the directors of the offeree company. The offeror may 
be a company or an individual. If it is a company, its 
directors are also parties to the bid. 
Account must be taken of the fact that in a takeover bid the 
offeror often does not act alone but in concert with others. 
'Persons acting in concert' are defined as persons who, 
pursuant to an agreement, cooperate with one another to 
acquire a company's securities. 
Article 3 
The Directive lays down in this article a fundamental prin-
ciple of company law, that of equal treatment of share-
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holders who are in the same position. The text also contains 
provisions which apply this principle to individual situations, 
for example Article 4 (obligation to make a bid), and Article 
16 (automatic revision). 
Article 4 
So that the principle of equal treatment of shareholders cited 
in Article 3 may be respected, the Directive requires an offer 
to be made by persons wishing to acquire shares, which, 
when added to any existing holdings, give them a percentage 
of voting rights which Member States may not fix at less 
than one third. 
To avoid purely speculative partial bids, the Directive obliges 
the offeror to make a bid concerning all the shares in the 
company. This also has the aim of preventing shareholders 
suffering a loss caused by the reduction in value of the shares 
they continue to own after a partial bid. 
For the purpose of the obligation imposed by this Article, 
the voting rights held by certain persons connected with the 
offeror must be added to those held by the offeror himself. 
These are on the one hand persons acting in their own name 
but on behalf of the offeror and on the other hand persons 
acting in concert with the offeror. Where the offeror is a 
company the voting rights held by companies belonging to 
the same group of companies as the offeror within the 
meaning of Article I of Directive 83/349/EEC on consoli-
dated accounts and those held by the members of the man-
agement body of these companies must also be taken into 
account. 
The threshold of one third is that from which the offeror may 
exercise a blocking minority. Indeed, numerous important 
decisions which, within a company, must be taken by the 
general meeting of shareholders, require at least a majority of 
two-thirds of the votes attached to the securities represented. 
This is the level used in Community legislation to limit or 
suppress the right of preferential subscription for cases of 
increase of capital, for the reduction of capital, for the total 
or partial writing-off of capital I and for operations such as 
mergers 2 or scissions. 3 
In certain cases the obligation to launch a bid as set out in 
paragraph I of this Article could lead to undesirable results. 
For example, it would be exaggerated to impose this obli-
gation on those who reach the required threshold in an 
I Article 40 of Directive 77 /91 /EEC. 
Article 7 of Directive 78/855/EEC. 
J Article 5 of Directive 82/891/EEC. 
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accidental manner (from donations, inheritance, etc.). A bid 
could be incompatible with the interests of shareholders or 
even with the objectives of the Directive. That is why the 
supervisory authority may grant exemptions to this obli-
gation. It must give the reasons for its decision and adopt 
all measures necessary to ensure equal treatment of all share-
holders. 
Article 5 
The obligation described in Article 4 could have excessive 
results if the company concerned is small or medium-sized. 
These are normally companies for which the obligations 
imposed by the offeror could lead to disproportionate costs 
by reference to the size and the value of the target company. 
Thus, when this company is small or medium-sized as de-
fined in Article 27 of Directive 78/660/EEC on annual ac-
counts or when it belongs to a group of undertakings which 
do not exceed the limits established by that article, and it is 
not quoted on the Stock Exchange, the offeror is exempt 
from the requirement to make a bid. If the offeror decides 
to make a bid anyway, it must be made in accordance with 
the requirements of the Directive. 
Article 6 
Member States are required to designate a supervisory 
authority or authorities to monitor compliance with the rules 
by all bid parties and must inform the Commission of 
their arrangements, including the division of responsibilities 
between the authorities if several bodies have regulatory 
furM:tions in the area. 
The Directive leaves it to Member States whether a public 
or private or a nationally or regionally organized body is 
designated and how the authority operates, provided it has 
the necessary powers to effectively police the system and see 
that the Directive is respected. In this respect, the authority 
(or authorities) must have in every case either the power 
to forbid the publication of an offer document which is 
incomplete by reference to the requirements of the Directive, 
or the power to oblige the offeror to revise such a document 
at a later date. 
It is necessary to specify which Member State's authority is 
responsible for policing cross-frontier bids. This responsi-
bility (in particular, for supervising the content and notifi-
cation to shareholders of the offer document) is assigned to 
the authority of the Member State in which the offeree 
company has its registered office. Where a bid is launched 
simultaneously in several Member States, the Directive re-
quires authorities to recognize offer documents drawn up 
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under each other's supervision, as in the rules on listing 
particulars. 1 
After the offer document has been published or otherwise 
brought to the notice of shareholders, the authorities of the 
various Member States concerned are required to assist one 
another in performing their duties and for this purpose to 
supply one another with all necessary information. 
To avoid the creation of false markets in securities concerned 
in takeover bids, it is provided that all current or former 
officers or servants of supervisory authorities must be bound 
to strict confidentiality regarding information coming to 
their knowledge in the course of their professional duties 
and must not disclose such information to any person or 
body not legally entitled to receive it. 
The liability position of supervisory authorities 1s to be 
governed by their national law. 
Article 7 
Article 7 is based on the principle that information capable of 
having an influence on the market in the securities concerned 
should be made public as soon as possible to reduce the 
scope for insider dealing. Hence, as soon as the offeror 
decides to make the bid, even though the details might not 
have been fully worked out, it must announce its intention 
to all the intended addressees by one of the means provided 
for by the Directive for notifying the offer document to them 
(Article 11). It must then immediately prepare an offer 
document meeting the requirements of Article 10 in order 
to inform the addressees of the exact terms of the offer. 
However the offeror must take certain steps before the 
publication of the offer document. He must forward the 
offer document to the supervisory authority and to the board 
of the offeree company. 
Article 8 
The administrative or management body of the offeree com-
pany must at all times act in the interests of the company. 
Unless the general meeting authorizes it to do so, therefore, 
it would be prohibited from impeding the bid by issuing new 
securities carrying voting rights in the offeree company, or 
deciding to engage in operations of an exceptional nature 
which might cause a substantial loss of the company's assets. 
In this connection, operations of an exceptional nature are 
1 Directive 87/345/EEC, OJ L 185, 4.7.1987, p. 81. 
considered to be those which are not carried out in the 
normal course of the company's business or not in conform-
ity with normal market practice. 
This ban would take effect when the offeror informs the 
administrative or management body of the offeree company 
that he intends to make a bid (Article 7( 1 )), and would last 
until the period for acceptance has expired. 
Article 9 
To ensure that offerors fully comply with the rules, they are 
required to be represented by a licensed dealer in securities 
or a financial institution authorized to act within the Com-
munity, which are subject to codes of practice in their activi-
ties as advisers in takeover bids and will thus help to ensure 
that the rules are observed and that shareholders are prop-
erly protected. 
Article JO 
This Article sets out the minimum content of the offer 
document. 
The document must first identify the offeree company and 
the offeror and its agent. 
It must also state the securities or class or classes of securities 
for which the bid is made and the holdings of such securities 
already in the possession of the offeror or its associates and 
the voting rights attached to the securities already held. The 
associates whose holdings must be disclosed are persons 
acting in their own name but for the account of the offeror, 
persons acting in concert with the offeror, and, where the 
offeror is a company, its directors and any companies be-
longing to the same group for the purposes of Article 1 of 
the consolidated accounts Directive 83/349/EEC. The date 
and price ( or other considerations) at which such share-
holdings were acquired must also be stated in the offer 
document. Where the offeror is a company, any stakes held 
by the offeree company in the offeror must be similarly 
disclosed. 
The offer document must state the consideration offered for 
each security and the basis of the valuation used in calculat-
ing it and, where the offer is for cash or includes a cash 
element, provide guarantees of the offeror's ability to meet 
the financial obligations resulting from the bid. If the offeror 
finances the bid by any means that might cause debts to the 
target company he has to state this clearly in the offer and 
specify the importance of this future indebtedness. 
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In the case of a share (or mixed cash and share) offer, the 
document must also state from what date the shares offered 
will become entitled to a dividend. 
The offer may be made subject to conditions approved by 
the responsible supervisory authority. These, too, must be 
stated in the offer document. 
The closing date for acceptances must be given within the 
limits laid down in Article 12. 
The offeror must say what steps have to be taken by share-
holders wishing to accept the bid in order to signify their 
acceptance and to receive the offeror's consideration for the 
shares they transfer to it. 
In the interest of all parties to the bid and taking into account 
the social policy of the Commission, it seems indispensable to 
make clear in the offer document the intentions of the offeror 
concerning the future of the offeree company, especially as 
regards its activities, including the use of its assets but also 
as regards its management and staff. 
The offeror must also disclose any special advantages it 
intends to grant to the directors of the offeree company and 
any agreements concerning exercise of the voting rights 
attached to the shares of the offeree company. 
Finally, the offer document must identify all the offeror's 
associates and persons acting in concert with it in the bid, 
as specified above. 
The Directive will not prevent regulatory authorities requir-
ing additional items of information to be included in the 
offer document where it is necessary in the particular circum-
stances of the case that shareholders should be made aware 
of them. 
The Directive requires that, where the offer includes newly 
issued securities for which an official stock exchange listing 
has been applied for, the offer document must be ac-
companied by the listing particulars required by Council 
Directive 80/390/EEC. 1 Thus the recipients of the offer will 
receive full disclosure concerning the shares which are being 
offered to them. 
With the same objective in mind, where no official stock 
exchange listing has yet been applied for securities offered in 
exchange. the Directive seeks to guarantee offerees adequate 
information by requiring that the offer document must put 
I OJ L I 00. 17.4.1980. p. I. 
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the offerees in possession of all facts necessary to make 
an informed judgment of the issuer's assets and liabilities, 
financial position, record and prospects. 
Article I I 
Shareholders must be given an opportunity to acquaint 
themselves with the bid terms. 
The offer document, and if appropriate the listing particulars 
or equivalent of securities offered in exchange, therefore 
need to be brought to their attention. 
This may be done in a number of ways. The offer document 
and any accompanying documents may be published in full 
in one or more national mass-circulation newspapers and in 
the official gazette designated under Article 3(4) of Directive 
68/151/EEC. Alternatively, the offeror may announce in the 
newspapers and the official gazette, or in some other medium 
approved by the supervisory authority, that the documents 
are available at stated addresses. 
Where all the securities comprised in the bid are registered, 
the offeror may also circulate the offer document and any 
accompanying documents to all the addressees individually. 
The offeror is required to file a copy of the documents with 
the supervisory authority so that it can carry out its duties 
with regard to the takeover rules. 
Article I 2 
The Directive sets out time-limits within which the offeror 
may fix the period for accepting the offer which may not be 
less than 4 weeks or more than I 0, from the date of publi-
cation of the offer document. 
On one hand, the period should be sufficiently long to allow 
offerees to obtain information concerning the conditions of 
the offer and to consult the report of the board of the 
offeree company. On the other hand, taking into account the 
limitations imposed by Article 8, the target company should 
not be prevented from carrying out its normal activities for 
too long a period. 
Unless authorization on the basis of a reasoned decision is 
given by the supervisory authority, the acceptance delay may 
not be changed unless a rival bid is launched. 
Article 13 
To allow the offeror to withdraw a bid once the offer 
document has been brought to the notice of the shareholders 
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by one of the means provided for in the Directive would 
be to sanction abuse of the takeover process. The offeree 
company and its shareholders must be protected against bids 
made for purposes other than the acquisition of control or 
a significant proportion of the voting rights in the company. 
There are several other circumstances in which withdrawal 
is permitted. First, the bid may be withdrawn in accordance 
with Article 20(4) if a competing bid is made. 
Withdrawal of the bid is also permitted if the approval of 
the general meeting of the offeror company is not obtained 
for the issue of new securities offered in exchange for the 
securities bid for or if the securities offered in exchange fail 
to obtain an official stock exchange listing as the offeror 
intended. 
Another case in which a bid may be withdrawn is where 
the requisite judicial or administrative authorization for 
acquisition of the shareholding is refused. A typical example 
would be prohibition of the operation by the merger control 
authorities. 
The offeror may also withdraw the bid if a condition of the 
bid approved by the supervisory authority is not met. 
In wholly exceptional cases, when the offer cannot be made 
for reasons of force majeure the supervisory authority may 
authorize the withdrawal of that offer on the basis of a 
reasoned decision. 
The withdrawal of the bid must be notified to the original 
addressees by the same means as the offer document and to 
the supervisory authority. 
Article 14 
The board of the offeree company, is required to give its 
view of the bid in a report setting out, in particular, the 
arguments for and against acceptance. 
Takeover bids are not always contested by the target com-
pany's management; indeed in many cases the latter has 
negotiated the takeover and its terms with the offeror. In 
the case of friendly takeovers of this kind, such matters 
should not be concealed from shareholders but should be 
made clear in the report of the target company's board. 
The report should also specify any agreements between the 
offeree company's management and the offeror on the exer-
cise of voting rights attached to the target company's shares. 
In drawing up its report, the board is of course under a duty 
to act in the best interests of the offeree company. 
Where the consideration offered in the bid includes securities 
for which at the time of the bid no official stock exchange 
listing has been applied for, the board's report is required 
to be accompanied by the report of an expert independent 
of the bid parties appointed or approved by the supervisory 
authority. In his report the expert must state whether, in his 
opinion, the consideration offered is fair and reasonable and 
give his views on the basis of the valuation used to determine 
the consideration. The purpose is to give the target com-
pany's shareholders an independent assessment of the share 
exchange ratio proposed, as in the experts' reports on the 
proposed terms of assets mergers under Article 10 of Direc-
tive 78/855/EEC. 
The report of the target company's board and the expert's 
report, if required, must be notified to the addressees of the 
bid by the same means as the offer document before the 
expiry of the period for acceptance and filed with the super-
visory authority. Where the bid is 'friendly', there is no 
objection to the offer document and the report of the offeree 
company's board being published or otherwise notified to 
shareholders together. 
Where there are competing bids or revised bids it is clear 
that the management of the target company should give its 
reaction to them and accordingly they are subject to the 
same rules as original bids. 
Article 15 
The Directive allows the offeror to revise the terms of the 
bid any time up to one week before the expiry of the period 
for acceptance. This limitation is necessary to maintain an 
orderly market in the shares and to ensure that the addressees 
are informed of the revised terms in time. Indeed, the offeror 
may not revise the offer during the last week of the accept-
ance period unless he is authorized to do so by the supervis-
ory authority on the basis of a reasoned opinion. To give 
addressees enough time to consider the new terms of the 
offer, however, it is provided that the initial period for 
acceptance must be extended by one week in that case. This 
can be modified by the supervisory authority on the basis 
of a reasoned decision. 
No definition of 'revision' is given. Consequently, a revision 
does not necessarily have to raise the cash price or share 
exchange ratio. Determining whether the terms of a new 
offer are better than those of the original one is often more 
difficult than comparing absolute prices or ratios, especially 
for share exchange or mixed cash and share offers. 
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As with the initial offer, the offeror must be required to 
make an immediate public announcement of its intention 
and then to notify shareholders of the new terms. The view 
of the offeree company's board on the amended offer must 
be similarly publicized and the revised bid terms and the 
board's report filed with the supervisory authority. 
The principle of equality of treatment of all addressees of 
the bid must be upheld by requiring that all shareholders 
who have already accepted the previous offer may accept 
the revised bid instead. 
Article 16 
An irrefutable presumption of revision of the offer takes 
place in all cases where the offeror, persons acting in concert 
with him or persons acting in their own name but on behalf 
of the offeror buy during the acceptance period shares which 
are the subject of the offer at a higher price than that laid 
down in the offer document or one of its revisions. The 
effect of these acquisitions is the increase of the consideration 
for offers already accepted. In this way, once again, the 
principle of equality of treatment is respected. 
Article 17 
This Article is intended to ensure that the regulatory auth-
orities are kept informed of the progress of the bid so that 
they can exercise their supervisory functions. 
Throughout the period for acceptance of the bid the offeror 
should be required to inform the supervisory authority at 
any time, on request, of the number of acceptances received 
to date. 
Furthermore, from the time the bid is publicly announced 
the supervisory authority should be informed of all further 
acquisitions of securities concerned in the bid by holders of 
I% or more of the voting rights in the companies concerned 
or persons acting in concert with them or for their account, 
and the price at which the securities were acquired. The 
obligation laid down in this paragraph is particularly impor-
tant because it permits the presumption of a revision laid 
down in Article 16 to operate. 
Article 18 
All parties should be properly informed of the outcome of 
the bid. For this purpose it is required that the result should 
be brought to the notice of the shareholders to whom the 
bid was addressed by one of the means required for notifi-
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cation of the offer document and should be communicated 
to the supervisory authority. In this way the offeror will 
have to make public such information as the number of 
acceptances, the voting rights attached to the securities trans-
ferred to it by acceptors, and whether the objective of the 
bid was achieved or the bid was withdrawn. 
Article 19 
One of the fundamental objectives of this Directive is to 
inform those chiefly concerned by the operation of its conse-
quences. Among the persons mainly concerned are the em-
ployees of the target company for whom the operation 
may have serious repercussions. This article imposes on the 
administrative or management body of the target company 
the obligation to communicate to employees' representatives 
the documents concerning the bid. These representatives 
thus have access to the offer document and to the documents 
foreseen in Article I 0(3) and ( 4) for takeover bids where 
shares are offered in consideration as well as to the report 
of the management of the target company and, where appro-
priate, to the experts' report foreseen in Article 14(2). 
Article 20 
The takeover rules should not stand in the way of competing 
bids, which are in the interest of the target company's share-
holders. 
All bids in competition with a bid already made must comply 
with the same rules as the initial bid as regards procedure, 
the content and notification to shareholders of the offer 
document and the report of the offeree company's board, 
the period for acceptance and revision of the bid. 
To maintain an orderly market in the shares and to ensure 
that shareholders are informed in time, the competing of-
feror must be required to notify its offer document to the 
addressees before the period for acceptance of the initial bid 
expires. 
The Directive does not allow competing bids from persons 
acting in concert with the original offeror or acting in their 
own name but for its account, except with the permission of 
the supervisory authority. This provision is intended to avoid 
a proliferation of bids that are competitive in name only, 
while allowing the supervisory authority to depart from this 
principle where the shareholders' interests require. 
The original offeror may withdraw his bid in the face of a 
competing one. If it does not, the period for acceptance of 
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its bid is extended to the date of expiry of that of the 
competing bid. The extension must be notified to share-
holders in the usual way and to the supervisory authority. 
Article 21 
The policing of the takeover rules by regulatory authorities 
in different Member States, and the possible delegation of 
some functions to other bodies, may give rise to problems. 
For this reason it is proposed to set up a contact committee 
to advise the Commission in three areas: firstly, uniform 
application of the rules, for which regular consultations will 
be held; secondly, to bring together the strategies followed 
by Member States seeking to obtain reciprocity of treatment 
for Community companies and nationals as regards the 
purchase of shares of a company by means of a takeover 
bid; thirdly, changes in the rules. The committee formula is 
modelled on that in the accounts Directive 78/660/EEC. 1 
The Council of the European Communities, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Econ-
omic Community, and in particular Article 54 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
In cooperation with the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee, 
Whereas it is necessary to coordinate certain safeguards 
which Member States require of companies and firms within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty for the protection of members and others, in order 
to make such safeguards equivalent throughout the Com-
munity; 
Whereas it is necessary to protect the interests of the share-
holders of public companies limited by shares when these 
are the subject of a takeover or other general bid; 
Whereas shareholders who are in the same position should 
be treated equally; 
Whereas this equality of treatment requires that the obli-
gation to make a bid is imposed on persons wishing to attain 
a certain level of participation in a company and in order 
1 Article 52 of Directive 78/660/EEC. 
to ensure the protection of minority shareholders and to 
avoid purely speculative partial bids, it is necessary to require 
that these persons make a bid for all the shares of that 
company; 
Whereas each Member State should designate a supervisory 
authority or authorities to ensure that parties to a takeover 
or other general bid fulfil their obligations; and whereas it 
is necessary to determine which authority has territorial 
jurisdiction in the case of cross-frontier bids and to provide 
for the mutual recognition of offer documents within the 
Community; whereas the different authorities must cooper-
ate with one another and their present or former officers 
and servants should be bound to preserve confidentiality; 
Whereas to reduce the scope for insider dealing offerors 
should be required to announce their intention of launching 
a bid as soon as possible and to inform the supervisory 
authority and the offeree company's board of the precise 
terms of the bid before they are made public; 
Whereas to avoid operations which frustrate the bid it is 
necessary to limit the powers of the board of directors of the 
offeree company to engage in operations of an exceptional 
nature; 
Whereas to help ensure compliance with the obligations 
resulting from the Directive it should be compulsory for 
offerors to be represented by a person or credit institution 
licensed to deal on the financial markets; 
Whereas the addressees of a takeover or other general bid 
should be properly informed of the terms of the bid by 
means of an offer document and, where the consideration 
offered includes securities, should be provided with certain 
additional information about the company issuing those 
securities; 
Whereas the offeror should be required to bring the offer 
document to the attention of all addressees of the bid and 
where the offer document contains insufficient information 
to clarify the real intentions of the offeror, the supervisory 
authority should be able either to forbid the publication of 
the offer document or to make the offeror publish a revised 
document; 
Whereas it is necessary to set a time-limit for takeover bids; 
Whereas, in the interests of the offeree company and the 
addressees of the bid, it should be provided that once an 
offer document has been made public the bid may not be 
withdrawn except in certain specified circumstances; 
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Whereas the board of the offeree company should be re-
quired to report in writing to its shareholders its view of the 
bid, and whereas where the consideration offered in the bid 
includes securities for which at the time the bid is made no 
official stock exchange listing has been applied for it should 
also be required to obtain and make available to all ad-
dressees of the bid an additional report by an independent 
expert; 
Whereas offerors are entitled to revise their bids; whereas 
limits should be placed on that right in order to maintain 
an orderly market in the shares and it should be ensured 
that the addressees of the bid are informed in time; whereas 
it is necessary that the offeror draw up and make public a 
fresh document setting out the amendments to the original 
bid and whereas addressees who have already accepted the 
bid should be entitled to accept the revised bid; 
Whereas in order to ensure equal treatment of addressees of 
the bid, any acquisition by the offeror, or by certain persons 
associated with him, of shares which are the subject of the bid 
at a higher price than that laid down in the offer document or 
one of its revisions, must itself be considered as a revision; 
Whereas to be able to perform their functions satisfactorily, 
supervisory authorities need to be able to find out at any 
time how many acceptances have been received to date 
and whereas, from the time the intention to make a bid 
is announced by the offeror, any dealing in the securities 
concerned must be made public by any person already hav-
ing a significant shareholding; 
Whereas the result of the bid must be made public and 
notified to the supervisory authority; 
Whereas taking into account the social policy of the Com-
munity, it is necessary that representatives of the employees 
of the offeree company be informed with regard to the bid 
and that they should receive all the documents concerning 
that bid; 
Whereas competing bids for the securities of a company are 
necessarily to the advantage of its shareholders; whereas all 
such bids should be subject to the same rules as the original 
bid and the original offeror should be entitled to withdraw 
his bid in such a case; 
Whereas this Directive does not until subsequent coordi-
nation affect the capacity of Member States to forbid a 
takeover or other general bid where the offeror is either a 
national or a company from a third country, in particular 
where Community nationals and companies do not benefit 
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from reciprocal treatment as regards the acquisition of shares 
by means of such a bid in a company governed by the law 
of that third country, 
Has adopted this Directive: 
Article I 
(Scope) 
The coordination measures prescribed by this Directive shall 
apply to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States relating to takeover and other general 
bids addressed, on the same terms, to all holders of the 
securities, or the securities of a particular class or classes, of 
any of the following types of company: 
(a) in Germany: 
die Aktiengesellschaft, die Kommanditgesellschaft auf 
Aktien; 
(b) in Belgium: 
la societe anonyme/de naamloze vennootschap, la societe 
en commandite par actions/ de commanditaire vennoot-
schap op aandelen; 
(c) in Denmark: 
ak tieselskaber, kommandi tak tieselska ber; 
(d) in Spain: 
la sociedad anonima, la sociedad en comandita por ac-
ciones; 
(e) in France: 
la societe anonyme, la societe en commandite par actions; 
(I) in Greece: 
H avci:ivuµT] Etatpia, TJ EtEp6ppu8µT] Kata µi:wxtc; 
Etatpia; 
(g) in Ireland: 
the public company limited by shares; 
(h) in Italy: 
la societa per azioni, la societa in accomandita per azioni; 
(i) in Luxembourg:· 
la societe anonyme, la societe en commandite par actions; 
(j) in the Netherlands: 
de naamloze vennootschap; 
(k) in Portugal: 
sociedade anonima, sociedade em comandita por accoes; 
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(I) in the United Kingdom: 
the public company limited by shares. 
Article 2 
(Definitions) 
I. For the purposes of this Directive, 'offeree company' 
shall mean a company whose securities are the subject 
of a takeover or other general bid (hereinafter referred 
to as 'a bid'). 
2. For the purposes of this Directive, 'offeror' shall mean 
any person or company including, where appropriate, 
the directors of the offeree company, who launches a bid 
in accordance with the obligation set out in Article 4 or 
on a voluntary basis. 
3. For the purposes of this Directive, 'securities' shall mean 
securities carrying voting rights in a company or which 
can be converted into securities carrying such rights. 
4. For the purposes of this Directive, 'parties to the bid' 
shall mean the offeror, the representative of the offeror 
within the meaning of Article 9, the directors of the 
offeror, if the latter is a company, the addressees of the 
bid and the directors of the offeree company. 
5. For the purposes of this Directive, 'persons acting in 
concert' shall mean persons who, pursuant to an agree-
ment, cooperate with one another with the aim of acquir-
ing the securities of a company. 
Article 3 
(Equal treatment) 
Shareholders who are in the same position shall be treated 
equally. 
Article 4 
(Obligation to make a bid) 
I. Any person aiming to acquire a number or percentage 
of securities, which, added to any existing holdings, gives 
him a percentage of the voting rights in a company which 
may not be fixed at more than 33 1/3 %, shall be obliged 
to make a bid to acquire all the securities of that com-
pany. 
2. To calculate the threshold referred to in paragraph 1, 
the following must be added to the voting rights held by 
the offeror: 
(a) voting rights held by persons acting in their own 
name but on behalf of the offeror; 
(b) where appropriate, voting rights held by companies 
belonging with the offeror to the same group of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article I of 
Council Directive 83/349/EEC; I 
(c) voting rights held by persons acting in concert with 
the offeror; 
(d) where appropriate, voting rights held by directors of 
the offeror company. 
3. The supervisory authority may grant exemptions to the 
rule laid down in paragraph 1, giving reasons for its 
decision and adopting all measures necessary to ensure 
equal treatment of all shareholders. 
Article 5 
(Exemptions on the basis of size of the offeree company) 
Article 4 shall not apply: 
(a) where the securities of the offeree company have not 
been admitted to official stock exchange listing or have 
not been the subject of a request for such admission at 
the moment when the bid is announced in accordance 
with Article 7; and 
(b) where the offeree company, or, where appropriate, the 
group of undertakings within the meaning of Article I 
of Directive 83/349/EEC to which the company belongs, 
do not exceed, at the balance-sheet date, the amounts of 
two of the three criteria laid down in Article 27 of Council 
Directive 78/660/EEC. 2 
Article 6 
(Supervisory authority) 
I. Member States shall designate the authority or auth-
orities which must discharge the functions specified in 
this Directive. The authorities thus designated may del-
egate all or part of their powers to other authorities or 
to associations or private bodies. Member States shall 
1 OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. I. 
OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11. 
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inform the Commission of these designations and of any 
delegation of powers and shall specify all divisions of 
functions that may be made. 
2. The authorities and, where appropriate, the associations 
or private bodies referred to in paragraph I must have 
all the necessary powers to ensure that this Directive is 
put into effect and, in any case, either the power to forbid 
the publication of an offer document which is incomplete 
by reference to the requirements of this Directive or the 
power to oblige the offeror to correct an inadequate offer 
document and to make it public by the means set out in 
Article 11 (I). 
3. The authority competent for supervising the drawing-up 
and publication of the offer document shall be that of 
the Member State in which the offeree company has its 
registered office. Where the bid is made in several Mem-
ber States simultaneously, the offer document as pre-
pared under the supervision of the national authority 
responsible shall be accepted in the other Member States, 
without their supervisory authorities having the right to 
require the inclusion of any additional particulars in the 
document. 
4. After an offer document has been made public in accord-
ance with Article 11 (I), the competent authorities of the 
Member States shall give each other any cooperation 
required for the performance of their duties and for this 
purpose shall supply each other with any information 
that may be necessary. 
5. All present or former officers or servants of supervisory 
authorities shall be bound by the rules of professional 
secrecy. Information that has come to their knowledge 
in the course of performing their professional duties shall 
not be disclosed to any person or body not legally entitled 
to receive it. 
6. This Directive shall not affect the legislation of Member 
States concerning the liability of competent authorities. 
Article 7 
(Procedure prior to publication of the offer document) 
I. As soon as it decides to make a bid, the offeror shall 
make public its intention of doing so by one of the 
means provided for in Article 11 (I). It shall inform the 
competent supervisory authority accordingly. 
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2. The offeror shall then immediately draw up an offer 
document in accordance with Article I O and make it 
public in accordance with Article 11 (I). 
3. Before the offer document is made public, the offeror 
shall communicate it to the competent supervisory auth-
ority and to the board of the offeree company. 
Article 8 
(Restriction of the powers of the board of the offeree com-
pany) 
After receiving the information referred to in Article 7( I) 
and until the expiry of the period for accepting the bid, 
the board of the offeree company shall not, without the 
authorization of the general meeting of shareholders, decide: 
(a) to issue securities carrying voting rights or which may 
be converted into such securities; 
(b) to engage in transactions which do not have the character 
of current operations concluded under normal conditions 
unless the competent supervisory authority has author-
ized them, giving its reasons for such authorization. 
Article 9 
(Representative of the offeror) 
The offeror shall be represented either by a qualified person 
authorized to deal on the Community financial markets or 
by a credit institution authorized within the Community. 
Article JO 
(Offer document) 
1. The offeror shall draw up an offer document in respect 
of the bid stating at least: 
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(a) the type, name and registered office of the offeree 
company; 
(b) the name and address of the offeror or, where the 
offeror is a company, the type, name and registered 
office of that company; 
(c) the name and address or, where appropriate, name 
and registered office of the representative of the 
offeror referred to in Article 9; 
(d) the securities or class or classes of securities for 
which the bid is made; 
(e) the securities, or the securities of the relevant class 
or classes, already held by: 
(i) the offeror, 
(ii) other persons for the account of the offeror, 
(iii) companies belonging with the offeror to the 
same group of undertakings within the meaning 
of Article I of Directive 83/349/EEC, 
(iv) persons acting in concert with the offeror, 
(v) where the offeror is a company, its directors, 
and the voting rights attached to those securities and 
the date and the price at which they were acquired; 
(f) where the offeror is a company, the securities, or 
the securities of a particular class or classes, of the 
offeror held by the offeree company, and the voting 
rights attached to them and the date and the price 
at which they were acquired; 
(g) the consideration offered for each security and the 
basis of the valuation used in determining it and, in 
the case of a cash consideration, the guarantees 
provided by the offeror regarding payment of that 
consideration, and, where appropriate, a statement 
concerning any future indebtedness of the offeree 
company to finance the bid; 
(h) where the consideration comprises securities, the 
date from which those securities will entitle their 
holders to a share in the profits and any special 
conditions affecting that entitlement; 
(i) any condition authorized by the competent supervis-
ory authority which the offeror places on the bid; 
(j) the latest date on which the bid may be accepted; 
(k) the steps to be taken by the addressees of the bid in 
order to signify their acceptance and to receive the 
consideration for the securities which they transfer 
to the offeror; 
(I) the intentions of the offeror, explicitly expressed, 
regarding the continuation of the business of the 
offeree company, including the use of its assets, the 
composition of its board and its employees; 
(m) any special advantages which the offeror intends to 
grant to the directors of the offeree company; 
(n) all agreements concerning the exercise of the voting 
rights attached to the securities of the offere.: com-
pany. 
2. In addition, the offer document shall identify: 
(a) any person for whose account the offeror is acting; 
(b) any companies belonging with the offeror to the same 
group of undertakings within the meaning of Article I 
of Directive 83/349/EEC; 
(c) any person acting in concert with the offeror. 
3. Where the consideration offered includes newly-issued 
securities for which at the time of the bid an official stock 
exchange listing has been applied for, the offer document 
shall be accompanied by the listing particulars required 
by Council Directive 80/390/EEC. 1 
4. Where the consideration offered includes securities for 
which at the time of the bid no official stock exchange 
listing has been applied for, the offer document shall 
contain all the facts necessary to enable the addressees 
of the bid to form an informed judgment as to the assets 
and liabilities, financial position, record and prospects 
of the issuer. 
Article I I 
(Publication of the offer document) 
I. The offer document and, where appropriate, the docu-
ments required by Article 10(3) or (4) shall be either: 
(a) published in full in one or more national or mass-
circulation newspapers and in the national gazette 
designated under Article 3(4) of Council Directive 68/ 
151 /EEC;2 or 
(b) made available to the addressees of the bid at ad-
dresses announced in notices in the newspapers and 
the gazette referred to at (a) or by equivalent means 
approved by the competent supervisory authority; or 
(c) where all the securities comprised in the bid are regis-
tered, circulated to all addressees of the bid. 
2. The offer document and, where appropriate, the docu-
ments referred to in Article 10(3) and (4) shall also be 
filed with the competent supervisory authority. 
Article 12 
(Period for acceptance) 
1. The period for accepting the bid indicated in the offer 
document in accordance with Article I 0( I )U) may not be 
OJ L 100, 17.4.1980, p. I. 
OJ L 65, 14.3.1968, p. 8. 
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less than four weeks or more than I O weeks from the 
date of publication of the document in accordance with 
Article 11 (I). 
2. The period may not be modified without the authoriz-
ation of the supervisory authority, giving its reasons, 
without prejudice to Article 20. 
Article 13 
(Withdrawal of bids) 
I. Once a bid has been made public by the means provided 
for in Article 11 ( l ), it may be withdrawn only in the 
following circumstances: 
(a) where there are competing bids and the offeror de-
cides to withdraw his bid in accordance with Article 
20(4); 
(b) in a bid in which new securities are offered in ex-
change for the securities bid for, where the approval 
of the general meeting of the offeror company is not 
obtained for the issue of the new securities; 
(c) in a bid in which securities are offered in exchange 
for the securities bid for, where the securities fail to 
obtain an official stock exchange listing as the offeror 
intended; 
(d) where the necessary judicial or administrative auth-
orization is not obtained for the acquisition of the 
securities for which the bid is made, and in particular 
in the event of lack of authorization of the acquisition 
by the merger control authorities; 
(e) where a condition of the bid announced in the offer 
document in accordance with Article I 0( I )(i) and 
approved by the competent supervisory authority is 
not fulfilled; 
(f) in exceptional circumstances and with the authoriz-
ation of the supervisory authority, giving reasons, 
where the bid cannot be put into effect for reasons 
beyond the control of the parties to the bid. 
2. The withdrawal of the bid shall be made public by the 
means provided for in Article 11 (I) and communicated 
to the competent supervisory authority. 
Article 14 
(Report of board of offeree company) 
I. The board of the offeree company shall draw up a 
detailed report giving its views on the bid and setting out 
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the arguments for and against acceptance. The report 
shall state whether the board is in agreement with the 
offeror on the bid and specify any agreements on the 
exercise of the voting rights attached to the securities of 
the offeree company. 
2. Where the consideration offered comprises securities for 
which at the time of the bid no official stock exchange 
listing has been applied for, the board's report shall be 
accompanied by the report of an expert independent of 
the parties to the bid appointed or approved by the 
competent supervisory authority. This report shall in all 
cases state whether, in the expert's opinion, the consider-
ation offered is fair and reasonable and shall give the 
expert's views on the basis of valuation used to determine 
the consideration. 
3. The reports shall, in good time before the expiry of the 
period for acceptance, be made public by the means 
provided for in Article 11(1) and filed with the competent 
supervisory authority. 
4. Where the board of the offeree company is in agreement 
with the offeror, the board's report, accompanied, where 
appropriate, by the expert's report as referred to in para-
graph 2, may be attached to the offer document provided 
for in Article I 0. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to revisions 
of the bid and to competing bids. 
Article 15 
(Revision of bids) 
I. At any time before the last week of the period for 
acceptance announced in accordance with Article 10(1) 
U), the offeror may revise the terms of the bid. Article 
7( I) shall apply as regards the public announcement of 
the offeror's intention to revise the bid. 
j 
2. Where a bid is revised, the previous period for acceptance 
shall be automatically extended by one week. 
3. The offeror shall draw up a document setting out the 
amendments to the offer document and making it public 
by the means provided for in Article 11 (I). 
4. Member States shall ensure that persons who have 
already accepted the previous bid by the offeror may 
accept the revised bid. 
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5. The periods provided for in paragraphs I and 2 may 
be modified with the authorization of the competent 
supervisory authority, which must set out the reasons on 
which it is based. 
Article 16 
(Automatic revision) 
The acquisition by the offeror, by persons acting in concert 
with him or by persons acting in their own name but on 
behalf of the offeror, during the acceptance period, of 
securities in respect of which the bid is made at a price higher 
than that established in the offer document or one of its 
revisions, will itself be considered as a revision of the bid 
and have the effect of increasing the consideration offered 
to those who have accepted previously. 
Article 17 
(Provision of information to the supervisory authority) 
I. Throughout the period for acceptance of the bid the 
offeror shall provide the competent supervisory authority 
at any time on request with information as to the number 
of acceptances received to date. 
2. From the time a bid is publicly announced in accordance 
with Article 7(1), the offeror or any holder of I% or 
more of the voting rights of the offeree company, of the 
offeror company if the offeror is a company, or of any 
other company whose securities are offered by way of 
consideration, shall declare to the competent supervisory 
authority all acquisitions of securities of the said com-
panies by the offeror or the holder, persons acting in 
concert with them or persons acting in their own name 
but for their account, and the purchase price of such 
securities. 
Article 18 
(Publication of result of bid) 
Once the period for acceptance has expired, the result of the 
bid shall be made public by the means provided for in 
Article 11 (I) and shall be communicated to the competent 
supervisory authority by the offeror. 
Article 19 
(Information for representatives of employees of the target 
company) 
The board of the offeree company shall communicate to its 
workers' representatives, as designated by national legis-
lation or customary practice in Member States, the offer 
document and, where appropriate, the documents referred 
to in Article 10(3) and (4), as well as its own report as 
referred to in Article 14 and, if appropriate, the expert's 
report as referred to in Article 14(2). 
Article 20 
(Competing bids) 
I. Where competing bids are made for the securities of the 
offeree company, this Directive shall apply to each such 
bid. 
2. Competing bids shall be publicly announced in accord-
ance with Article 7(1 ). The offeror shall draw up an offer 
document in accordance with Article I O and shall make 
it public by the means provided for in Article 11 (I) before 
the period for acceptance of the initial bid expires. 
3. Except with the authorization of the competent supervis-
ory authority, which must set out the reasons on which 
it is based, persons acting in concert with the offeror or 
acting in their own name but for the account of the 
offeror may not make a bid competing with the initial 
bid. 
4. Where there are competing bids and the initial offeror 
does not withdraw its bid, the period for acceptance of 
the initial bid shall be extended automatically to the date 
of expiry of the period for acceptance of the competing 
bid. The extension shall be made public by the means 
provided for in Article 11 (I) and communicated to the 
competent supervisory authority. 
Article 21 
(Contact Committee) 
I. A Contact Committee shall be set up under the auspices 
of the Commission. Its function shall be: 
(a) without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 169 
and 170 of the Treaty, to facilitate the uniform appli-
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cation of this Directive through regular consultations 
on, in particular, practical problems arising in its 
implementation; 
(b) to ensure concerted action upon the policies followed 
by the Member States in order to obtain reciprocal 
treatment for Community nationals and companies 
as regards the acquisition of securities of a company 
by means of a takeover bid; 
(c) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on additions 
or amendments to this Directive. 
2. The Contact Committee shall be composed of representa-
tives of the Member States and representatives of the 
Commission. The Chairman shall be a representative of 
the Commission. Secretarial services shall be provided 
by the Commission. 
3. The Committee shall be convened by the Chairman either 
on his own initiative or at the request of one of its 
members. 
Article 22 
(Transposition of the Directive) 
I. Member States shall adopt before ..................... the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith inform 
the Commission thereof. 
2. Member States shall fix the date of entry into force of 
these provisions in any case at the latest by .................... . 
3. Member States shall communicate to the Commission 
the texts of the main provisions of national law which 
they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 
Article 23 
(Addressees of the Directive) 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels For the Council 
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Fiche d'impact sur la competitivite et l'emploi 1 
I. Quelle est la justification principale de la mesure? 
1. Assurer que Jes actionnaires d'une societe qui fait l'objet 
d'une offre publique d'achat ou d'echange (OPA) soient 
traites de fac;on egale. 
2. Assurer que ces memes destinataires d'une OPA aient 
toute !'information dont ils ont besoin pour evaluer l'of-
fre ainsi que le temps necessaire pour decider s'ils l'accep-
tent ou pas. 
II. Caracteristiques des entreprises concernees 
En particulier : 
(a) Y a-t-il un grand nombre de PME? 
La directive prevoit une exemption lorsque la societe 
visee est une PME non cotee (voir III ci-dessous), pour 
tenir compte de la specificite des operations impliquant 
ces societes. 
(b) Note-t-on des concentrations dans des regions? 
I. Eligibles aux aides regionales des Etats membres? 
II. Eligibles au Feder? 
Non. 
III. Quelles sont les obligations imposees directement aux 
entreprises? 
Les mesures proposees imposent une serie d'obligations aux 
personnes et aux societes voulant acquerir le contr6le d'une 
societe en vue de garantir Jes objectifs mentionnes sous I. 
ci-dessus. II s'agit notamment de !'obligation de lancer une 
OPA a partir d'un certain seuil de participation dans une 
societe, de !'obligation d'accorder un traitement egal aux 
actionnaires de la societe visee se trouvant dans des con-
ditions identiques, ainsi que de !'obligation d'informer Jes 
destinataires de l'offre en etablissant un document contenant 
Jes conditions de celle-ci. Ce document doit egalement etre 
publie. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne !'obligation de lancer 
une offre, la directive prevoit une exemption lorsque la 
societe visee est une PME non cotee. 
I English text not available. 
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IV. Quelles sont les obligations susceptibles d'etre im-
posees indirectement aux entreprises via les autorites 
locales? 
Nulles. 
Les autorites locales peuvent accorder des exceptions aux 
obligations decrites ci-dessus visant a alleger Jes obligations 
imposees par la directive lorsque celles-ci resulteraient en 
des charges excessives. 
V. Y a-t-il des mesures speciales pour les PME? 
Lesquelles? 
Voir II (a) ci-dessus. 
VI. Quel est l'effet previsible? 
(a) Sur la competitivite des entreprises? 
Effet positif. Les OPA constituent en general un moyen 
tres sain d'assurer le renouvellement des equipes diri-
geantes des entreprises europeennes par le remplacement 
d'administrations peu efficaces ou non innovatrices. Cela 
provoque une selection par le marche des entreprises 
plus competitives et une restructuration des entreprises 
europeennes qui est indispensable pour faire face a la 
concurrence internationale. 
Dans la mesure ou une OPA risquerait de provoquer une 
concentration excessive dans un secteur determine, cela 
pourrait etre evite par !'utilisation des pouvoirs de la 
Commission en matiere de libre concurrence. 
(b) Sur l'emploi? 
Pas d'effet direct. 
VII. Les partenaires sociaux ont-ils ete consultes? Quels 
sont leurs a vis? 
Le texte a ete etabli apres consultation d'un groupe d'experts 
des Etats membres en matiere de droit des societes et des 
principaux partenaires sociaux. Les avis des milieux concer-
nes ont ete pris en consideration pour !'elaboration de la 
presente proposition de directive. 
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